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2Abstract
This thesis is an attempt to present a detailed exposition of 
certain changes occurring in a social system during its transformation 
from subsistence to commercialized agriculture. This transformation 
has been accelerated by the introduction of an irrigation system.
The analysis is constructed from general theoretical literature and 
data collected from an irrigated lowland North-east Thai village.
In Chapter One I discuss the distribution of certain factors 
of production, and the means by which they are acquired. I attempt 
to show how these factors previously organized through social channels 
are slowly becoming commercialized. I also show how the imposition 
of an irrigation system conflicts in certain areas with the traditional 
system of land tenure.
In Chapter Two I discuss the Domestic Mode of Production and 
identify certain factors influencing the economic intensity of households. 
I argue that due to the availability of irrigation water to certain 
farmers, production levels previously related to household composition 
are now more a function of resource endowment.
Chapter Three discusses opportunity response and,choice. I begin 
by considering the different types of response to opportunity both 
agricultural and non-agricultural, and I show how different response 
patterns are related to such factors as household composition, kinship 
ties and resource endowment. I then continue with an analysis of the 
way in which certain features of the social system are conducive to
/
3or inimical to economic change. Village expenditure patterns ar8 then 
examined, and the choicB - whether to re-invest in production, or to 
purchase consumer goods, are discussed.
Chapter Four examines the relationship between economic and social 
power and prestige. Notions of status, socio-economic differentiation , 
village leadership and the ideology of wealth are discussed in order 
to comment on the possibilities of an emerging class structure.
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Introduction
Thailand which has one of the highest rates of population growth 
1
in the world - 3,1 per cent - is rapidly becoming overpopulated. Until 
recently, land pressure was not a serious problem, and in most regions 
land could be cleared to accommodate the growing population. The 
balance between man and land has ncsy been altered and development 
projects geared to raise agricultural productivity are necessary in all
four major regions of the country: the North, South, Central Plains and
the North-East, The most underdeveloped of these four regions is the 
North-east, the subject of this thesis.
The North-east context
L.D. Stamp in 1929 wrote of the Northeast of Thailand:
"Twenty people to the sq. mile inhabit this inhospitable land, 
wresting from the reluctant soil crops barely sufficient to maintain 
an existence, which, passed amidst damp and mud for half of thB year, 
and in a dry, hot dust-laden atmosphere for the other, is one of the 
most miserable imaginable"^,
Gedney, writing some thirty years later gives a contrasting
picture of the North-east, which he claims is neither Appalachia nor
an Arabia Deserta but a region:
"where the climate is not unpleasant, the vegetation attractive in^
parts and where the people are full of grace, wit and wisdom"
The landscape of the North-east region contrasts sharply with the
other regions of Thailand, especially the Northern mountainous parts,
4
for example the Chiengmai valley described by Potter as an "arcady"
1 See "Food and Population", Asia 1977 Yearbook. Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Hongkong, 1977, p.49
2 Stamp, Lj Asia, 1929, p.432
3 Gedney, W; "Some Questions on the Northeast", Asian Survey, Vol.6,1966,
4 Potter,Jj Thai Peasant Social Structure,Chicago,1976,p.12. P«379
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and one of the loveliest places of the world* The North-east with 
an area of 70,OOP sq. miles Bxtends eastwards from the Valley of the 
Chao Phraya to the west bank of the Mekong River* There is much 
evidence to demonstrate the cultural, linguistic and historical assoc­
iation of many of the North-east's inhabitants with neighbouring Laos^. 
The North-easterners distinguish themselves from the other Thai regions, 
epitomized in the use of the word 1isaan' (north-east) to refer to 
their ethnic identity. They speak a Lao-dialect not dissimilar to
central Thai, they eat sticky rice, and havB a distinctive culture.
2
Wyatt comments that one of the earliest and most consistent themes in
Thai history has been the process whereby cultural and linguistic
3
minorities have been integrated into the national society . Wyatt 
argues that the integration of substantial Thai minorities of the North, 
South and North-east in recent history into the national society has 
been less effective. These minorities have not lived in close proximity 
to the Central Thai, intermarriage has been less frequent and
1 Keyes,C; "Ethnic Identity and Loyalty of Villagers in North-east 
Thailand", Asian Survey, no.6, 1966, p.362
2 Wyatt, D; "Northeast Thailand: An Historical Perspective", Asian
Survey, vol.'6, 1969, p.353
3 For example the large Mon and Khmer populations absorbed into the 
early Thai kingdoms of Ayudhya and Sukothai between 1300-15DD A.D. 
and the large numbers of Khmer, Cham, Vietnamese, Malay, Mon and 
Burmese captives incorporated into the later Ayudhya Kingdom. Both 
the Ayudhya and its successor kingdom Bangkok also assimilated large 
numbers of ChinesB.
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"they have much deeper-rooted and better developed local and regional 
sentiments"
The economy of the North-east is still dominated by subsistence 
cultivation of glutinous rice. For much of the North-east soils are 
sandy, poorly drained, and not particularly fertile. The average rice 
yields pBr rai for the North-east in 1971 ware 253.1 kg compared with
2
the national average of 292.2 kg, and yields in the north of 386.5 kg . 
Although rice production in the North-east expanded at a ratB of 3,4% 
per annum in the 1960’s, this was mainly due to the increase in cultiv­
ated area. The principal cash crops of the North-east are maize, kenaf 
and more recently cassava, Kenaf cultivation was rapidly increased 
after a series of very bad jute crops in Bengal in the late 1950’s,
The North-east is also the principle livestock region of the country.
The North-east is the poorest of Thailand’s four regions. The
3
socio-economic survey for 1971-1973 puts the average annual rural 
household income at 6,890 baht compared with 24,353 baht for the 
Bangkok-Thonburi area, 11,076 baht for the North, 15,816 baht for the 
Central region, and 11,179 baht for the South. In contrast the average 
incomes of the North-east municipal area stand at 28,633 baht, the 
second highest regional average. Disparities of income between the 
rural and municipal areas in the North-east are considerable, and
4
higher than any other region in Thailand* Dixon writes that as well 
as having the lowest per capita income of the four regions the North­
east has a disproportionately small share of the national income, the 
lowest growth-rate, and furthermore the structure of the economy has
1 liiyatt, D; op.cit; p.353
2 Source: Statistical Year Book National Statistical Office. Office of 
the Prime Minister 1972-73, p.186
3 Socio-Economic Survey 1971-1973, National Statistical Office, Office 
of the Prime Minister
4 Dixon, Cj "Markets, Marketing and Agricultural Change in Northeast 
Thailand". Institute of British Geographers Developing Areas Study
Group Conference. 1974, p.3
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has failed to change in line with the Thai economy as a whole. The 
gap between the North-east and the other regions of the country is 
increasing.
In recent years much of the Thai government's development effort 
in the North-east, their heavy investment in infrastructure, particularly 
communications and irrigation, has been stimulated by the political 
instability of the region. There has been a history of terrorist 
insurgency in the North-east although it is difficult to determine 
whether any marked increase in incidents has occurred in recent years, 
While most of the anti-government strongholds are in the poorest North­
east provinces, no direct relationship between per capita income levels 
and levels of insurgent activity can be demonstrated due to the fact 
that the poorer provinces are the more remote areas and therefore offer 
the best refuge. The Communist Party of Thailand began armed struggle 
in 1965, and after the military take-over on October 6, 1976, announced 
that the only cpurse of action now left was armed struggle based in 
rural areas. Long in 1966 wrote;
"Both the Thai and American governments have apparently concluded 
that poverty coupled with past neglect by the centre have made the 
North-east region of Thailand ripe for infiltration by anti-government 
forces. To forestall these anticipated political developments this 
region has been made the centre of American and to a large extent Thai 
efforts for economic and social improvement"!.
The development effort in the North-east has to be considered in this 
wider political context, and Wilson's statement
"In the mid-1960's North-east Thailand is properly considered an area 
of strategic importance in the conflict of South-east Asia"
1 Long, "Economic Development in North-east Thailand; Problems and 
Prospects", Asian Survey, Vol.6, 1966, p,357
2 Wilson, D; "Introductory Comments on Politics and the North-east",
Asian Survey. Vol.6, 1966, p. 349
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is even truer in 1977.
This brief review of the economic and political setting of the 
region should sbtvs to establish a context in which this present research 
was conducted.
The Research Area
Kalasin province is one of-Six teen North-east provinces, and 
lies north-east of Mahasarakam which occupies the central area of the 
North-east region. In relation to other North-east provinces Kalasin 
has a moderate rice production, reasonable soil fertility and moderate 
areas of upland cultivation, Kalasin is neither one of the richest, 
nor one of the poorest provinces, but occupies a somewhat middle 
position in respect of its resources. The fieldwork village Ban Na 
Chuak Nuea is one of 119 villages in the Yang Talad district. The 
village lies $ km. east of a main excess road which runs to Yang Talad 
and to Kalasin, the provincial capital. There is a small market in 
Yang Talad, but the main market centre is in Kalasin town. Occasional 
reference will be made to other villages in the area, notably Nong Kaw 
an upland village lying outside the irrigated area which li;eswithin the 
same village cluster as Ban Na Chuak Nuea, and Ban Turn, the centre of 
another village cluster of the Yang Talad district.
The Lam Pao Irrigation Project
The Lam Pao irrigation scheme in Kalasin Province is one of the 
largest in the North-east. The Lam Pao is one of the major tributaries 
of the Lam Chi river, which together with the Nam Mun drains the greater 
part of the region south-eastwards to the Mekong. The irrigation scheme 
was designed both to control flooding, and to supply irrigation water 
to about 54,000 hectares during the wet season, and 40,000 hectares 
during the dry season. Construction of the scheme began in 1953 with 
the building of a 7-kilometre earth dam across the course of the Lam 
Pao. This dam was completed.in 1968, and in 1969 irrigation water was
18
Map i The Lam Pao Irrigation Area
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first sent down to the villages in the Northern tract of the irrigation 
area. This project is part of a scheme for the development of the 
Lower Mekong basin, under the auspices of the Mekong Committee of the
c u t d  .S o c  'i c\ |
Economic^Commission for Asia and the Pacific, As part of this programme 
a research team from the Department of Geography, the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London, undertook to conduct research 
within the irrigation project area in order to monitor and evaluate the 
socio-economic changes occurring under the impact of irrigation. Research 
was conducted by this team between 1971-1976. Annual fieldwork periods 
were conducted, of approximately three months (with the exception of a 
review period in 1974), Structured questionnaires were administered to 
a third of the households heads in seven villages, each chosen as repres­
entative of a certain tract, within the Lam Pao area. Under this schedule 
five years of systematic data has been collected covering a wide range 
of topics: demographic features, crop production and disposal, land use 
patterns, off-farm employment, animal husbandry, fishing and handicrafts, 
standards of living, travel and contact, membership and development of 
credit institutions, loans, innovations, perceived changes, household 
income and expenditure, and irrigated farming experience. In 1975 and 
1976 an additional questionnaire was administered which concentrated on 
dry-season cropping patterns.
This study is the result of two years experience working with the 
Lam Pao team as a research assistant between 1974-1976. The thesis 
evolving out of this research situation is of a different kind to an 
orthodox post-graduate anthropological thesis. Fieldwork was undertaken 
for two consecutive years, each period for three months, March~3une.
Apart from working in the village chosen for this study Ban Na Chuak 
Nuea, as a member of the research team I worked in the six other research
20
villages. As well as periods of residence in Na Chuak Nuea I spent 
a short period living in an upland village outside of the irrigation 
area*
Fieldwork Aims
This thesis aims to contribute to our knowledge of a North-east 
Thai peasant community, both in respect of ethnographic illustration 
and theoretical discussion. I shall attempt to show that the ’loose 
structure' paradigm, as a general model, is inapplicable as a general 
model for Thai society, and I shall also consider some of the general­
izations made about ’peasant communities'. The thesis also aims to 
illustrate the way in which orthodox anthropological fieldwork, with 
long-term individual study periods, can, if at all, be re-organizBd and 
integrated with inter-disciplinary team-work. The issue is not whether 
the comprehensive understanding of a small-scale community is best 
achieved by one or other method. It is my opinion having concluded this 
research that a long, continuous fieldwork period of at'least one 
< agricultural cycle is necessary in order to fully grasp the basic 
principles of social organization in a community. However, at a time 
when financial constraints are reducing fieldwork budgets, and when 
development agencies, themselves geared to timetables and budgets, are 
accepting the important contribution which social scientists can make, 
the limits and parameters of the anthropologists' methods of fieldwork 
need to be explored.
The specific aims of the research were to understand the social 
implications entailed in the transformation from subsistence to 
commercialized agriculture, a transformation influenced by the recent 
introduction of irrigation, The time period 1971-1975 is too short to 
reveal marked changes, however the early signs and stages of change
21
(although frustrating for a researcher who may occasionally febl that 
little is happening) are important, and demonstrate the manner in which 
a previously balanced socio-economic system, (a system in which village 
communities had adapted themselves to the specific environmental setting) 
has become disrupted. Furthermore it is possible to indicate in which 
dimensions elements of change first occur. In the study village a 
certain proportion of the community was scheduled to receive irrigation 
water, which, the development officials argued, would enable them to 
increase their production, and extend their cropping patterns. A minority 
of the village, holding unirrigable land, would not benefit from this 
resource* The social implications of this differential allocation of a 
resource seemed worthy of attention.
Research Methods
The field-work village chosBn, Ban IMa Ohuak Nuea, lies in the 
Northern part of the irrigation area, and thus was one of the first 
villages to receive irrigation water. The analysis has been constructed 
from quantitative data, collected by the research team,^ some prior 
to my participation in the project, which has provided the context in 
which my own research: structured and informal interviews, and participant 
observation, was developed.
I will now offer a brief justification of the use of quantification 
in this thesis. Quantification has only recently become a respectable 
tool for anthropology, and as Mitchell notes:
"... the 'anthropological method1 has tended to be taken as 
synonymous with the intensive study of small communities through part­
icipant observation without use of quantitative methods2".
1 Members of the Lam Pao Research Team include Dr, Ronald C.Y. Ng, (Team 
Leader), Dr. Harvey Demaine (Deputy Team Leader), and Dr. Christopher 
Dixon (Senior Research Associate)
2 Mitchell, 0; "On Quantification", in Epstein, A? (ed), The Craft of 
Social Anthropology, London, 1967, p.17
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Quantitative data may be used to both indicate the general 
features of the community (already impressionistically perceived through 
participant observation) and it may be used to express the underlying 
relationships between phenomena, either by assessing them against some 
theoretical model developed on the basis of probability theory or by 
computing one of the various measures of correlation or association.^ 
Quantification, if used in Anthropology, needs careful handling. Gluckman's 
survey of the Lamba villages - a fieldwork training exercise, resulted, 
according to Gluckman, in quantitative calculations which showed the 
trees but not the wood. Furthermore, as Mitchell stresses, in anthropology 
the unit of analysis is not the individual but the social relationships 
in which he is involved,
"This introduces some knotty problems - a social relationship is essentially 
an abstraction from behaviour, and as such is notAseparable, isolated, 
and immediately perceptible phenomenon available for random selection"
The validity of applying quantitative methods of analysis clearly
depends on the researchers field of interest. Some aspects of social life
lend themselves to quantification more than others, but in the field of
economics quantification is an essential tool of analysis particularly
in studies of socio-economic change.
"the quest To t quantitative economic data makes heavy demands of the 
fieldworker ... But it can offer rich rewards in the form of a heightened 
understanding of the inner workings of a society, particularly one that 
is in the process of rapid social and cultural change1
In the thesis I refer to two analytical models, one utilized by
4
Sahlins in his work on primitive and peasant economics, and another by
5
Shanin, employed to -measure patterns of socio-economic mobility. Sahlihs*
1 Mitchell, 3; op.cit; p.43
2 Ibid; p.32
3 Epstein, A; The Craft of Social Anthropology. London, 1967, p.IBO
4 5ahlin,s,M; Stone Age Economics, London, 1974
5 Shanin, T; The Awkward Class. Oxford, 1972
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model which aims to construct intensity profiles which indicate the 
amount and distributions of surplus labour, requires simply collected 
statistical data* These intensity profiles can then be studied, and 
interpreted in social terms, for example in terms of the impact of a 
political or kinship structure on the productivity of a community.
For Sahlins, ’economy’ is a category of culture rather than behaviour, 
and his approach abandons the entrepreneurial and individualistic concepts 
of 'economy'as a means-end relationship. The merit of Shanin's simple 
model is that patterns of socio-economic mobility can be simply extracted, 
if adequate data exist. Furthermore it demonstrates that these patterns 
of socio-economic mobility can only be extrapolated from analysis at 
the household level. Observations at the community level present an 
incomplete picture of mobility. A simple point, but one frequently 
ignored.
The Definition of Peasantry
Shanin"*’ has identified four major conceptual traditions which
have influenced the contemporary analysis of peasant societies, Firstly,
the tradition of Marxist class theory, a tradition which has approached
peasantry in terms of power relationships2, i.e. the pealints as the
exploited producers of pre-capitalist society. Secondly, the 'specific
economy’ typology, which viewed social structure as being determined by
the specific type of economy; a family farm economy, a tradition developed 
3
by Chayanov . Thirdly the ethnographic cultural tradition which views
1 Shanin,T; (ed) Peasants and Peasant Societies, Middlesex, 1971, pp.13-14
2 Marx,K; and Engels,F; Selected Writings,vol.1, Moscow, 1950
3 Chayanov,A; The Theory of Peasant Economy. (Translation), D. Thorner, 
Smith and B. Kerblay (eds); Homeward III', 1966
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peasants as representatives of an earlier national tradition, preserved
' 1
as a 'cultural lag'. And fourthly a tradition originating from Durkheim's 
division of society into traditional (segmentary; uniform and closed) and 
modern (organic, based on the division of labour and the interaction of 
specialized units), Kroeber placed peasant societies in an intermediate 
position - partly open segments in a town-centred society, and the
3
tradition was further developed by Redfield, The difference in the 
definition of the peasantry depends largely upon the theoretical context 
in which the definition developed. Thus Shanin's 'general type' definit­
ion had developed from the review of a large number of peasant studies.
"The peasant family farm as the basic unit of multi-dimensional social 
organization ... Land Husbandry as the main means of livelihood directly 
providing the major part of consumption needs ... The underdog position - 
the domination of peasantry by outsiders"4.
While Dalton's characterization of the peasantry was developed through
a comparison of primitive and peasant economies,
"... most people have came to depend on production for s s I b as their 
primary source of livelihood. Market exchange has become the dominant 
mode of transaction; commercial production has became more important 
than subsistence production. (And) in peasant economies appreciable 
quantities of labour and land as well as produce are bought and sold; 
money prices and money incomes are familiar''^.
The relative nature of these distinguishing characteristics, the
primary source of, the dominant mode of, more important than, etc;
complicate the analysis. This point is illustrated with an empirical
example. In 1971, in the village of Ban Na Chuak Nuea a typical
1 Durkheim,E; The Division of Labour in Society, Glencoe, III, 1960
2 Kroeber,A; Anthropology.Harrap. 1940-.
3 Redfiel'ti,R;Peasant Society and Culture, Chicago, 1956
4 Shanin,T; (1971) op.cit; pp.14-15
5 Dalton,G; "The Development of Subsistence and Peasant Economies in Africa", 
in Tribal and Peasant Economies. New York, 1967, p.156
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household delegated the greater part of its labour and utilized the 
larger portion of its land for glutinous rice production, and approx­
imately 90$ of this production was consumed within the household. In 
1975 only 16$ of the crop was sold. Commercial production, while becoming 
increasingly important, cannot be considered more important than 
subsistence production. Equally, as I shall illustrate in the analysis 
that follows transactions which involve factors of production are still 
largely organized through relationships of kinship, and although market 
transactions of land and labour are increasingly important they cannot 
be considered the dominant mode of transaction. According to Dalton’s 
'ideal type' characterization of a peasant community, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 
in certain respects, is not a peasant village, although by Shanin's 
definition it fits comfortably into this category* Peasant societies 
fall historically in the intermediate period between tribal-nomadic and 
industrializing societies'*’. The community under study is undergoing a
transformation from subsistence to commercialized agriculture. This
the
analysis is primarily concerned with^social implications of this 
transformation, and not with a definitional discourse on the concept 
of peasantry. Throughout the analysis I refer to the village of Ban 
l\la Chuak Nuea as a peasant village, and to this end accept Shanin’s 
'general type’ characterization.
The thesis begins with an examination of the ownership, distribution 
and allocation of certain factors of production, and it continues with 
the analysis of the utilization of certain of these factors in a branch 
of agricultural production. Having discussed one specific branch of 
agriculutural production the argument broadens to cover other forms of
1 Shanin,T; (1971) op.cit; p.247
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economic activity, agricultural and non-agricultural, in the village.
The discussion here concentrates on patterns of response to economic 
opportunity, and the notion of choice as expressed in expenditure 
patterns, The argument then continues with an examination of patterns 
of socio-economic differentiation, socio-economic mobility, and the 
status system. It explores the possibilities of class-formation within 
the peasant sector.
"only a cross-disciplinary combination of both conceptual and factual 
studies may overcome the astonishing shortcomings in our knowledge of 
peasantry, in spite of the methodological difficulties involved.
Limping along main roads achieves more than strolling along side roads" .
1 Shanin,Tj "The Peasantry as a Class", in Shanin (ed) 1971, op.cit;p„262
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CHAPTER ONE
THE OWNERSHIP, DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOCATION OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
In this chapter the major factors of production: land, labour, 
water and livestock, are examined. The discussion begins with 
a review of different types of land, ownership of land, and its 
distribution, and it continues with an examination of the different 
methods of acquisition of land: inheritance, purchase, renting,
*free-use* and 1 self-clearance’. This is followed by an exam­
ination of household labour, the division of labour, labour 
exchange groups, and the increasing incidence of hired labour. 
Water, as a factor of production, and the organization of irrig­
ation are discussed, and finally the role of livestock for
village production.
Land Types
Lowland accounts for approximately 70% of all village land,
17% is composed of upland holdings and the remaining 13% accounts 
for houseplots, areas under fallow, small forest areas and
orchards. The upland plots (to the left of the Right Main canal,
see Map 1.1) are rainfed and cannot receive gravity irrigation; 
although predominantly used for the cultivation of cash crops, 
rice is still planted if rainfall is adequate. The lowland 
is composed of areas of land receiving gravity irrigation and 
an unirrigated belt bordering the Huey Yang river; separated 
from the other lowland by a natural levee, this area is partic­
ularly susceptible to flooding during the rainy season. Within 
the lowland area there are, however, small plots of land on a 
higher elevation, which cannot receive irrigation. 'Lowland1 
therefore is not strictly synonymous with 'irrigated land'
(see Fig. 1.1).
Figure 1.1 Profile of Land Types,Ban Na Chuak Nuea
natural
levee
irrigation 
canal
rainfed uplam
river lowlandi gravity irrigated 
lowland
no gravity irrigation i
I
i
I
Land Ownership
The 1954 Land Act, *Kodmaithidin'B .E . 24^7, made a three-fold 
distinction between the occupancy, utilization and legal possess­
ion of land. A reserve license or pre-emption certificate: 
baichong (N.S. 2) is a document showing authorization of the 
temporary occupation of land, which must be cultivated within 
three years. The exploitation document 1nangsu'chapchong 
thamprayot1 (N.S, 3) certified that the land had been put to use, 
and in order to obtain this document the N.S. 2 certificate had 
to be presented to the land official. The full title deed,
'chanotthidin* (N.S. 4) gave full rights of ownership to the 
holder. The land tenure system is complicated by the holding 
of another type of document, required by all farming families 
for the purposes of land taxation. This is the 1baepchaengkanthidin' 
(S.K. 1), and although technically irrevelant to the acquisition 
of land title deeds, Kemp'*' reports that in practice S.K, 1 has 
replaced the 1baichong1 certificate, and this certificate is 
believed by villagers to guarantee possessory rights for three 
years.
1 Kemp, J; "Legal and Informal Land Tenures in Thailand", presented 
at the Seminar on Concepts of Order and Disorder in Southeast 
Asia, Centre of Southeast Asia Studies, S.O.A.S,, March 1977
Ta
bl
e 
1.
1 
Fo
rm
s 
of
 
te
nu
re
 
by
 
la
nd
 
ty
pe
 
an
d 
ar
ea
. 
Ba
n 
Na
 
Ch
ua
k 
Nu
ea
, 
19
75
<D
&
EH
T3
R
ccS
HI
* s . i e i f q - o
*
tO
1 > 1 1
CM
lO
o 00 t o O
q . o i d  e s n o H o ' t >
rH
o rH
lO
CM
q . s e a o j
1
O *
1
CO
CO
t o
<M
m o t t ^ 1 •
o rH
CD rH
LO
p t r e t d n t > H CO CD
t o rH
i— 1
t o
p u B t ^ o ^ CO CO
t >
o>
l >
H
CCS
p ccS
o CD O O 00
p U • • • •
cci H H LO <M
CJ)
R
•H tO
•H O 00 CO
ccS ni • • •
CD U o t o CD tO
U 1— 1 CO CD (M
< o
rH
1— 1
rH
ccS CO
p o CM
«H 0 • • •
o t— 1 CO rH CD O
f t 00 rH
CO
p
o
<Hft
0*
S CO 00 C l t o
rH rH
rH
R
-"■S •H
CO ■d
■ • r l
bJQ CO ■H
R • X R
O P O
CD -- X R 'H
H R o ccS Pft •H f t » cd
R CCS p tx p
CD •H X! o R R
Eh X O K*! ft id
P - CCS cci s
CH P R Sh X .■—s 3
o o ^  CO f t O rH  O
R U ft .  og cci CO R B CD M  TS
X! .  ccS ccS ccS
o 0 S  R X X w  oft w  *- P w  Iz ;
29
p
o
rHft
0)
CO
c?o
X
0)
X
P
O
P
P
R
CD
O
CCS■i-:
X
ccJ
P
O
R
XS
H
ccJ
xo
H
O
30
Seth has reported that " large areas are reportedly held 
by farmers who hold neither license nor certificate nor title 
deed. They are, however, listed by statements signed by the
'kamnan' (commune headman) and their possession is thus
1 2 
informally recognized.” Furthermore, the same source states
that out of an estimated 67.5 million rai title deeds had been
issued for 15 million rai, exploitation testimonials for
11.25 million rai and reserve licenses for 2.5 million rai,
which left some 38.75 million rai uncertified.
Table 1.1 shows the di'sfrabution of different forms of tenure,
by land type and area for Na Chuak Nuea. The table shows that the
majority of village land (91%) is held under N.S.3: the exploitation
license, while only 1% of the land (10.75 rai) is held under full
title deed.
The distribution of Land
Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of holdings by area for
1971 and 1975. Although the shape of the histograms suggest
that there are a greater number of households with larger
holdings (notably in the 30-50 rai range), in 1975) no. statistically
significant changes can be demonstrated.
Land cannot be considered to be evenly distributed where
own
households in some cases/only 5 rai and others 65 rai, but the 
whole question of land distribution is complicated by the follow­
ing factors. Firstly, there is considerable variation in the 
fertility of different holdings, secondly a small irrigated 
plot is considerably more productive than a large unirrigated, 
holding, and access to roads is an important consideration in 
the grading of different holdings. Although differences in 
holding size are extremely relevant in discussing the very large 
holders and the very small, when considering the majority in- 
between the actual size of the holding (an important consideration
1 Seth, A; "Report on Land Reform in Thailand", in National Seminar 
on Land Problems and Policies in Thailand, Bangkok, 1970, p.152
2 Ibid; p.152
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Figure 1.2 Distribution of Land,Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971 and 1975
No. households
1971
0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69
Area in rai
No. households
0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39
Area in rai
40-49 50-59 60-6 9
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in pre-irrigation times) is now of less importance and now the
important factors to be considered are land location, accessibility
and availability of irrigation. Thus the villagers who previously
characterized the well-endowed as having a large acreage (mi lai rai)
now denote them as having water (mi nam ) or simply having good
land (thidin di) and when asked to clarify they refer to the position
of the land, its yields and access to water. Thus while no
significant change has occurred in the distribution of land, a
change is occurring in the evaluation of land. Land is now evaluated
in a different way due to the introduction of irrigation. Previously
the amount of land held was of paramount importance, a feature
common to most agricultural societies, Feder notes that "as
a simple rule, it can be affirmed that the greater the amount
1
of land owned, the greater the powers of its owners" . Shanin
makes the same point, "... position in the hierarchy of peasant
sub-groups is, to a large extent, defined by the amount of land 
„2
held.. The whole question of power deriving from resource 
endowment will be dealt with in a later chapter. Suffice it 
to say here that the size of a holding although important is 
now one of many factors to be considered in estimating differences 
in land distribution.
Acquisition of Land
A household may gain access to land through one of five 
methods: inheritance, purchase, rent, 'free-use', or 'self-clearance1. 
As Table 1.2 shows inheritance is still the most common method of 
acquiring lowland, while 'self-clearance' and purchase are becoming 
important methods of acquiring upland for cash crop production.
1 Feder, E; "Latifundia and Agricultural Labour in Latin America", 
in Shanin, T; (ed.) Peasants and Peasant Societies, Harmondsworth, 
1971, p.83.
2 Shanin, T; op.cit; p.241
Table 1.2
Manner of acquisition of plots (by percentage)
Lowland 1971 1975
Manner of acquisition
Purchase 12.2 12.6
Inheri ted 70.7 75.0
Rented 0.0 1.7
Free-use 17.1 2.7
Sell-cleared 0.0 8.0
Upland 1971 1975
Manner of acquisition
Purchase 36.4 37.8
Inheri ted 45.5 48.0
Rented 0.0 0.0
Free-use 9.1 2.8
Self-cleared 9.Q 11.4
Upland 1975 Kenaf Cassai
Manner of acquisition
Purchase 33.3 40.0
Inherited 53.7 45.0
Rented 0.0 0,0
Free-use 6.3 0.0
Self-cleared 6.7 15,0
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Inheritance
Table 1.2 shows that the majority of lowland has been 
inherited by the present owners, while approximately half of 
the upland has been obtained by other means. Traditionally, in 
Northeast Thailand men acquired land from their wife's parents.
While informants stated that both sons and daughters have equal 
inheritance rights, in many cases the sons of a household 
relinquish these rights. Division of the holding is often 
made before the death of the parents, and it is common on the 
death of the parents for the larger portion of the plot retained 
by the parents and the house plot, to pass to the youngest 
daughter: the "phu liang" (the one who cares for) and her husband 
who had remained in the parental household.
Demaine and Dixon comment on the uncertainty felt by the 
son-in-law concerning his inheritance:
"not only does he not know when he will get control of the 
land, but if he is one of several sons-in-law, he may not 
even know which part of the holding he will inherit."
Such uncertainties, the writers suggest, prevent the younger 
generation from planning ahead and puts a brake on their chall­
enge to the household head's authority. The inheritance rules, 
however, appear to be interpreted flexibly, and inheritance 
decisions are based on more than just the sexual status of the 
siblings. The present situation of each sibling is taken into
consideration; for example, whether or not a sibling has already
inherited from his/her parents-in-law; and of course the size 
and location of the land to be inherited are also important factors. 
This is illustrated by the following case study, in which both 
sons and daughters have inherited plots.
X A | 0
X X 5 5 5 X X A ~b
(A) (B) (16) (60) (95) (107) (96) (C) (97)
1 Demaine,H. and Dixon, C; "Land Tenure Patterns and Agricultural 
Development in N.E. Thailand: A Case Study of the Lam Pao 
Irrigation Area in Changwat Kalasin", Journal of the Siam Society, 
July 1972, Vol. 60, Part 2, p. 51.
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The father X, now in his seventies, remarried following the death 
of his first wife fifteen years ago and moved to a neighbour­
ing village: that of his new wife. When he left he divided
his three plots of land, totalling 50 rai between his living 
sons and daughters. Two sons, B and C had left the village 
on marriage, and the eldest son, A,- was dead. The three 
plots la, lb and lc, are marked on Map 1.1. The numbers used 
on the above genealogy refer to the plot numbers on this map.
Plot lk was considered to be the best portion; it lies close 
to the village, and is highly productive. This was inherited
by the first, third and fourth daughters. Plot lb farther away,
although a larger plot was subject to flooding and was less 
productive. This plot was inherited by the second daughter, 
whose husband had already inherited an upland plot from his 
parents. Plot lc, a small upland plot, was divided equally 
between the four sons, including the two who left the village.
B, C, (107) and (96) all sold their shares to their brother (96). 
Brothers B and C, living away from the village, had no use for 
their plots and (107) had already inherited a larger upland plot 
from his in-laws.
In this example the daughters have inherited the most import­
ant part of the holding - the lowland, and the sons, the upland,
1
which according to Demaine and Dixon , is considered marginal 
to the productive system. The three plots (2) on Map 1.1 are 
a case of equal inheritance of lowland by (65}and (61)^two brothers^ 
and their sister (110). In this case a large parental holding 
and a small number of children (one had died) were conducive to 
equal sibling inheritance.
As inheritance is the major channel through which access to 
lowland is gained, these lowland areas can be divided into kin 
blocks. The group of plots marked No. 3 on Map 1.1 illustrates 
this,
1 Ibid; p. ;.52
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Here there is a large cluster of female siblings. The eldest
brother (95), it will be rembered from the first example,
inherited from his in-laws.
In order to understand the different patterns of land 
and
tenure for the lowland upland it is necessary to briefly 
discuss the patterns of village endogamy. Table 1.3 shows 
the different rates of male and female village endogamy 
for 1971 and 1975.
1
Table 1.3 Village endogamy, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971 and 1975
Female spouses born in village Male spouses born in village
No. % No. %
1971 36 90 21 52
2
1975 43 86 24 48
While the female spouses have been predominantly born in the 
village, there is an almost equal balance between ma^e spouses 
born in the village and those not.
A male head of household, if born in the village, stands to
inherit land from his parents-in-law, and in certain circumstances 
from his own parents (depending upon the composition of his sibling
1 Married daughters and sons-in-law if resident in the household 
have been included in the calculations
2 The % for 1975 has decreased, while the numbers have increased
due to the different sample sizes. With a 30% sample in 1971
N = 35, in 1975 N = 44.
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group and on the amount of land to be divided between them).
A male head of household not born in the village can inherit 
only through his wife.
From the 1975 sample a difference^ emerges between males 
born in the village and males marrying into the village, with 
respect to the holding of upland plots. Of 21 male household 
heads born in the village 13 currently hold upland plots, and 
of the 12 male household heads marrying into the village only 
3 currently have upland holdings. On the upland there are 
a number of nearby or adjoining plots held by either pairs 
or a group of brothers (see Map 1.1, cases 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d).
For the majority of male household heads therefore low­
land is inherited affinally (through their wives) and upland, 
if inherited, is acquired through ties of consanguinity.
However, there are cases of males inheriting upland plots 
from their parents-in-law, particularly if the in-laws have 
little or no lowland or, as is sometimes the case, no sons.
Generally, on marriage a son-in-law will initially reside 
in the house of his wife's parents until such time as a new 
house can be built, often in the same compound.
Kemp'*' has shown how post-marital residence in the house of
the bride's parents is a common feature for most of rural Thailand,
and Potter states that: "Matrilocal residence  is a basic
2feature of almost all Thai village societies." In Na Chuak
Nuea, the 1975 sample records 17 resident son-in-law units, while 
no daughter-in-law units are reported. Of the few cases known 
to the writer of virilocal post-marital residence in the village, 
obvious demographic imbalances (few or no daughters in the groom's 
parental household) had clearly influenced the choice of post- 
marital residence. In attempting to explain the preference 
for matrilocal marriage, Kemp mentions the special bond between 
parents and their daughters. When parents grow old they need 
to be cared for, mostly by women, and there is likely to be less 
conflict between the parents and their daughter than with their
1 Kemp, J; "Initial Marriage Residence in Rural Thailand", in 
In Memorium, Phya Anuman Rajadhon, (eds.) T.Bunnag and
M. Smithies, Bangkok, 1970
2 Potter, J; Thai Peasant Social Structure, Chicago, 1976, p.156
daughter-in-law1. The villagers of Na Chuak Nuea explained 
the preference for uxorilocal residence by stating that sons 
were strong and independent; they were able to leave their 
parents to find new land, but daughters needed protection.
Within the village there are clusters of married daughters 
of a household living with their husbands and children near 
the wife's parents household.
The high rate of uxorilocal residence, the clustering of 
compounds of close female kin, and the pattern of lowland in­
heritance by daughters explains the correspondence between the 
areas of lowland held by close kin and the residential grouping 
(see Maps 1.2 and 1.3). These maps also illustrate how certain 
residential clusters hold marginal plots of land: plots on the 
boundaries of the village land (see clusters marked blue and 
brown). Furthermore, those residences not marked on Map 1.2 
(either because they are landless (No.102) or because they hold 
plots far from the village), are located on the perimeter of the 
village. The land tenure map is itself a reflection of the 
social organization of the village, and this correspondence 
will continue for as long as land is transmitted from one 
generation to another, regulated through the systems of kinship 
and marriage, rather than through market transactions. While 
the lowland tenure map reflects the residential clustering of 
close kin, the same correspondence between residential and land 
groupings does not obtain for the upland areas, west of the 
canal; except perhaps an area of land to the extreme west which 
corresponds to a residential grouping from the north of the 
village. Purchase and self-clearance are now important channels 
through which upland is obtained
1 Kemp, J; op.cit; p.83
Map 1.2 Residence Map
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Purchase
R.C.Y. Ng^ writes, with reference to the study area -
"..purchased land is mostly located in close proximity 
to the settlement, and transactions involve only fellow
villagers with the advent of irrigation, most villagers
have become reluctant to part with their land and land 
purchasing has virtually ceased in the last few years."
Map 1.4 shows the location of lowland plots that have been 
purchased; they tend to be situated to the east of the village 
and many of them border onto the track.
There is evidence that certain farmers, aware of the im- 
por-tance of irrigation have begun to speculate in land. One 
large land-owner has in the last few years shifted the main 
focus of his agricultural activity from the traditional family 
holding X, on the upland (No.108) to land east of the village^Y, 
purchased as forest from his brothert eight years ago, and 
slowly cleared. As Table 1.2 shows some 37% of the upland 
has been purchased and the amount purchased and self-cleared 
together exceeds the number of plots inherited. Land prices 
vary considerably, depending on productivity, and for the low­
land its accessibility. From my recorded cases, upland fetches 
around 1,000 baht a rai, and a good piece of irrigated lowland 
between 3-4,000 baht per rai. While land purchases between 
villages is found in the peripheral areas, especially in the 
south of the village,where Ban Na Chuak Nuea villagers own 
land intermingled with land held by a village to the south 
(see.Map 1.4), many of the land transactions involve siblings 
and close kin.
Other Methods of Acquisition
These other methods of access to land include land-renting,
self-clearance and free-use arrangements. In these cases a
household gains access to the use of land, but rights of owner- 
2
ship are held by a third party. These forms of access are
1 Ng,R; "The Land Holding Pattern". Lam Pao Report Series No. 2, 
1974, p.17
2 Although it was noted in a previous section that only 1% of land 
is legally held under full time deed, the N.S.3 within the village 
is held to be a title of ownership
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the most fluid, and in many cases are temporary arrangements. 
Table 1.2 indicated that there is an absence of land renting 
on any large scale. This is an important point, and a feature 
found generally in the N.E. although there are regional variat­
ions. For example, within the whole irrigation area there is 
a low incidence of renting of land, although one village was 
remarkable in this respect, with 36% of its agricultural land 
obtained through renting arrangements. This high incidence is 
related to particularly high population presure. It is this 
generally low incidence of tenant farmers which distinguishes 
the Northeast farmer from his counterpart in the Central Plains. 
Renting arrangements are made between two different types of 
farmer: on the one hand the small holders needing to supple­
ment the production from their own land, and on the other 
households already well endowed with land seeking to further 
maximize production. A case to illustrate the latter type is 
the former village headman, who had the foresight to rent land 
from the village school teacher at the outlet of the canal.
There are also cases of renting arrangements between villages.
The usual renting arrangement is for payment of one third of 
the total production, but because of quite large variations in 
yield, no standard rent can be given per rai. As land pressure 
increases and as the opportunity to clear new land declines there 
will almost inevitably be an increase in renting arrangements. 
Self-clearance was the traditional method for a young married 
couple to acquire an independent plot. A recent motivation 
to clear much of the forest was the kenaf boom, but before this 
forest areas were cleared for the cultivation of traditional 
upland crops such as the mulberry for domestic silk weaving.
As the transition from subsistence to commercialized 
agriculture progresses, land as a factor of production will 
become to a greater extent a marketable commodity and inevitably 
there will be changes in the institutionalized methods of trans­
mission and allocation of land. Table 1.2 suggests one area of
45
the allocation system which does appear to have altered 
substantially between 1971 and 1975: the 'free-use* of
land. The Table shows that the area of land under free-use
arrangements has been reduced, especially for the lowland.
1Ng writes:
"as the irrigation programme is being implemented and 
with the almost certain consequential revaluation of the 
irrigable land, it is most likely that this type of rent-free 
tenancy will give way to a more formal type of tenancy."
These free-use arrangements are usually made between kin 
and are often inter-generational within an extended family, 
for example, where a son-in-law unit has recently become an 
independent household. This form of free-use often precedes 
actual partition. Recently there have been an increasing 
number of households growing a dry-season crop on irrigated 
land under free-use arrangements. As dry-season cropping 
increases and becomes an economically viable alternative to 
other forms of dry-season occupation, especially wage labour­
ing outside the village, it is to be expected that irrigated 
households will be less disposed to offer free-use of land 
under these arrangements. While these free-use arrangements 
appear to be devoid of any notion of commercialism being based 
rather on an ethos of kinship-sharing, a notion of return is 
often implied. Thus a son-in-law with access to a small parcel
of land is often required to contribute his labour to his father-
u *
in-law's main plot. In one example a son-in-law had free-use 
of a 10 rai plot, but was required to spend 4 hours each day for 
30 days ploughing his father-in-law's 37 rai paddy plot; and 
a further 30 days, with his wife, transplanting. However, if 
this labour is valued at the going-rate for wage labour (12 bahts 
per day, 6-8 hours), it is only 10% of the productivity of the 
10 rai plot and cannot be compared with a rent transaction which 
usually equals 20-30% of the production. In another example, in
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which a notion of return is implied, a farmer gave out 10 rai 
of uncleared upland on a free-use basis, but he calculated 
that he was saving 40 baht per rai as the land was cleared.
In this section the channels through which one factor of 
production, land, is transmitted and allocated have been 
examined. Acquisition through inheritance: the right to land 
based on kinship status, is still the most important channel 
and kinship relations can be found behind many other forms of 
allocation, especially the free-use arrangements. Furthermore, 
the land holding pattern for the lowland because of the in­
heritance and residence patterns, has been seen to be a 
reflection of the social organization of the village. The two 
different branches of village agricultural production: lowland 
paddy cultivation and upland cropping, contrast in the ways in 
which they articulate with village social structure.
Human Labour
"The ties between producers tend to reach out beyond the 
common interest in the act of production and its rewards alone.
A production relationship is often only one facet of a social 
relationship." *■
A feature of primitive and peasant economies is that there 
are no durable social units based solely on productive activities, 
and the bonds which structure families, clans and kindreds are
2
more often than not the bonds which organize economic activities . 
In this section human labour as a factor of production is 
discussed; its organization and the means by which it is acquired 
are examined.
In the village the basic unit of production is the house­
hold which may consist of a simple nuclear family with two 
adult workers, or an extended three-generational household with 
attached son-in-law units. While the simple nuclear family is 
easily identifiable as a productive unit, the extended type may 
bifurcate into two or more productive units: a son-in-law working
1 Firth, R; "Elements of Social Organization", London, 1951, p.136
2 Nash, M; "The Organization of Economic Life" in Tribal and 
Peasant Economies,(ed.) Dalton,G; New York, 1967, p.5
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one plot, the father-in-law another. However, before 
partition, ownership is held by the elderly household head 
who retains control over all the land, and the products from 
all plots are communally held.
Division of Labour
Within the household females contribute substantially to 
the labour force.
"It is well known that the contribution of female labour 
in Thai agriculture is among the highest participation rates 
in the world, and it is clear that women, although they do not 
help with heavy ploughing, are full-time workers except when 
family affairs or pregnancies prevent them from taking part." ^
Furthermore, children from the age of 10 years are also making 
an effective contribution to agriculture, and village schools 
are closed during the labour peaks. Household labour require­
ments for agriculture vary according to the crop and each 
agricultural process. Generally, one or two household members 
are involved in ploughing, for transplanting at least two, more 
frequently three or four, and for harvest most family members 
are employed. Figure 1.3 illustrates the participation of 
males and females in paddy cultivation, upland cropping and 
livestock rearing. It can be seen for paddy cultivation and 
upland cropping that female labour participation is almost 
identical to male participation, with the exception that the 
male working life is longer. For livestock rearing although 
females participate when they are young (under 20 years), males 
participate to a greater extent.
Labour Exchange
In Na Chuak Nuea and indeed in the region as a whole, the 
traditional labour use pattern is influenced by the erratic 
climate. Glutinous rice production accounts for approximately 
74% of total man-days expended on agriculture and certain processes
1 Demaine, H; "The Use of Labour Resources", Lam Pao Report Series 
No. 4, 1964, p.9
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in the paddy cycle have to be completed within a short period 
of time. Traditionally the productive units, composed of 
households, combined at certain stages of the agricultural 
cycle to form labour exchange groups. These labour arrange­
ments are not found for the upland cropping sector and generally 
for paddy cultivation they are on the decline. Two forms of 
labour exchange arrangements are to be found in the village. 
Firstly 'longkhaekj the joining together of large bands of 
kinsmen mostly for harvesting but also sometimes for trans­
planting or even house construction'1'. These bands would work 
on each others fields in turn, the recipient household on each 
occasion providing food and refreshment. 1Longkhaek' arrange­
ments are found in the other regions of Thailand and are well 
known for their festivity. Another arrangement involves small- 
scale 'mutual help groups': transfers of labour usually between 
two households, where one is suffering a labour shortage. These 
arrangements are made between kin or neighbours and may or may 
not involve reciprocity. Table 1.4 shows the decrease in the 
incidence of these labour arrangements between 1972-1975.
Table 1.4 Labour exchange, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1972 and 1975
1972 1975
Longkhaek 
No. of households 
No. of persons 
No. of days 113
12
8 (22% of sample)
37
11
9 (20% of sample)
Mutual help groups 
No. of households 
No. of persons 
No. of days 198
25
12 (32% of sample)
87
10
9 (20% of sample)
1 In other villages in the area 1longkhaek* bands still form for 
fishing expeditions
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It is necessary to examine some of the possible explanations
for the decrease in these traditional forms of labour exchange
arrangements. Referring to the 1longkhaek* arrangements,
1
Amyot writes that there is a correlation between the level
of economic development and the persistence in villages of
these traditional arrangements. He maintains that they are
most developed and institutionalized in underdeveloped areas
with a low-level subsistence type of economy, and the reliance
on them declines when the economy progresses to one of surplus
2
production for the market. Demaine suggests that the adoption 
of semi-improved varieties of rice which have replaced many 
of the local Northeast strains may have contributed to the 
decline of 1longkhaek1. Previously a farmer would have planted
a whole variety of different rice types each maturing at a
different time thus staggering the harvest period. Furthermore, 
the increased participation in upland cropping has also removed 
a certain amount of labour which before may have been contrib­
uted to the assistance of their fellows.
As Demaine suggests: the general network breaks down when the
system diversifies. When everyone grows the same crop reciprocal 
labour arrangements are no problem. The general trend is there­
fore a move away from labour groups organized on principles of 
kinship, residence and reciprocity to the commercial hiring of 
labour. Furthermore, the introduction of irrigation can be
seen to have contributed to the decline. Irrigation imposes
/ 4a strict regime on the farm routine with each turn-out receiving
are
water in rotation. Farmers with adjoining plots, who/therefore 
very probably kinsmen, are likely to receive water at the same 
time, and are unlikely to have spare time to help others.
1 Amyot, J'; Provisional .Paper on Changing Patterns of Social 
Structure in Thailand, 1851-1906, Delhi, 1964, p.105
2 Demaine, H; op.cit; p.16
3 Ibid; p.17
4 Gate through which water passes from the Main Canal to the 
subsiduaries. For an explanation of the irrigation system 
see next section
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While these labour exchange arrangements have declined, the 
incidence of hired labour has increased. While in 1972 25%
of the village households were using hired labour, in 1975 
this figure rises to 54%. Table 1.5 shows the number of 
households wage-labouring in the village for years 1972 and 
1975.
Table 1.5 Ban Na Chuak Nuea households wage-labouring in 
the village, 1972 and 1975
1972 1975
No. of households 5 (13% of sample) 10 (22% of sample
No. of persons 6 17
No. of man-days 61 138
Of those 17 villagers wage-labouring for their fellows in 1971 in 
the village 9 were employed for weeding, 7 for harvesting and 
1 for transplanting. Table 1.6 shows the numbers of villagers 
hired for agricultural work by Na Chuak Nuea households in 
1975.
Table 1,6 Number of persons hired for agriculture, by process
Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975
Rice crop Upland crops
No. persons No. of persons
1st ploughing 15 1st ploughing 4
2nd ploughing 18 2nd ploughing 2
Transplanting 40 Planting 20
Weeding 10 Weeding 16
Harvesting 56 Harvesting 41
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The data from which this table is drawn does not specify 
whether the labourer hired is from outside the village, or a 
fellow villager. Nor does it indicate whether any labourer 
is hired for mere than one process, although it is common to 
hire the same labourer throughout the agricultural season 
if the labour is required. However, as only one person from 
the 1975 sample reported that he was hired in the village to 
help with transplanting, and from the same sample 40 persons 
were reported as being hired, it can be deduced that a large 
number of wage-labourers are coming in from other villages.
This was confirmed during interviews in a neighbouring upland 
village, Nongkaw, situated outside the irrigation area.
Here it was reported that 30-40 villagers regularly come down 
to Na Chuak Nuea every year. Nongkaw is one of many upland 
villages facing acute drought conditions. In the 1974-75 
crop season only 57% of the households were able to grow rice 
as a result of the drought. The majority of these households 
produced only 500-1,000 kg of paddy, equivalent to 2-4 rai of 
normal paddy production on the lowland. Drought conditions 
affect upland village production approximately once in every 
three years. The upland villages therefore, under present 
circumstances provide a ready labour force for the irrigated 
lowland villages such as Ban Na Chuak Nuea.
A distinction should be made between those villagers hiring 
in labour during labour peaks, for one or two processes, and 
those farmers who employ hired labour throughout the paddy 
season from ploughing to harvesting. Here there is a distinction 
between households who use hired labour to supplement their 
own labour force at peak periods, and those where the hired 
labour component is an integrated part of the labour force (see 
(Table 1.7).
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Table 1.7 Households hiring labour by the number of processes
No. of processes No. of households
1 13
2 11
3 6
4 11
5 1
Those households who hire labour throughout the season 
have higher ratios of consumer/worker (2.1, village average 1.9) 
and higher ratios of rai/worker (8.34, village average 5.2). It 
seems therefore that hired labour is a function of the in­
adequacy of the domestic labour force. There is also an 
emergence of hired labour to replace the household labour, 
which is then free to engage in other activities. One example 
of this is the village headman, who employs two resident wage- 
labourers throughout the paddy season, he himself contributing 
very little labour.
Furthermore, there are fine distinctions between the types 
of labour hired. These types include resident adolescent wage- 
labourers, fellow kinsmen and villagers and non-villagers. In 
1975, 4 households (7%) had a permanent wage labourer resident 
in the household. These were children, aged 10-16 years, male 
and female, all born in the village. They were not considered 
to be adopted children, and were called 1khonrapchang* ( a wage- 
labourer). In all these cases the child had been resident 
in the household for two or three years, and in two cases the 
child had received no formal education. The usual payment was 
in the region of 1,200 kg of rice. Exchange of labour of this 
sort was between rich and poor households}with large families with 
small holdings sending children to work in rich households, often 
with members working outside the village. In other cases, adol­
escents are sent to live and work in other households for the
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duration of the paddy season. The village headman, for
example, employs his eldest sister's son and son-in-law
from another village during the paddy season. The headman's
two sons, similar in age to the two labourers, left for school
each day, while their cousins left to work the rice land.
In some cases there are obvious reasons for adopting adolescent
labour. Either the receiving household has few children or
or
they lack children of one/other sex. In two cases it was 
stated that the children were likely to become the future 
son or daughter-in-law.
Manning Nash writes that among the Mexican Tepoztlan 
hiring a fellow member of the community for labour is a 
"delicate social job", and the transaction must not appear as 
a strictly economic one'1'. Within this Thai village a large 
number of households employ fellow kinsmen. While in the 
above cases some form of status distinction occurs between 
households loaning children and households receiving, for the 
most part the hirers and the hired cannot be regarded as diff­
erent status groups. If whole households were hired maybe 
some form of status difference would emerge, however, at the 
present time a household hiring a labourer for a peak period 
may also hire out a household member to another household at 
another period. 16% of the households hiring in labour also 
had one or more members being hired for a few days by another 
household. The incidence of hired kinsmen for paddy cultivation 
can be regarded as the 'commercialization' of the traditional 
'longkhaek' and mutual help arrangements. If the hiring of kin 
labour was such a delicate job one would expect to see a trend 
towards hiring non-kin. Rather it seems that the kinship 
principle of sharing labour persists but the impossibility 
of reciprocating in kind (returned labour) has resulted in the 
payment of a wage, often in rice.
1 Nash, M; op.cit; p.6
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If labour is scarce in the village, men will recruit labour 
from other villages; mention has already been made of Nongkaw 
in this respect. It is in these cases that status differences 
are most evident. The lowlanders feel a definite sense of 
superiority, and the relationship between hirer and hired is on 
a strict commercial basis.
It has been found therefore that the basic production units 
in the village are not self-sufficient and need at certain times 
to acquire labour from outside the household. Recent divers­
ification of cropping and the introduction of irrigation has 
changed the institutional means of acquiring this extra labour, 
and kin group sharing is being replaced by hired labour. But 
the importance of kinship ties still persist, and much of the 
recent hiring of labour within the village can be seen as the 
commercialization of the previous arrangements. Extended kin 
still work together but returned labour is replaced with a wage. 
While status differentials can be seen to be emerging between 
the hirers and the hired, especially those hired from outside 
the village, the persistence of exchanges of kinsmen balances this 
trend. Those hired out from households are often the younger 
members, and there are many examples of young members of the 
richer households contributing the odd day here and there for 
wage-labouring.
Water
Another important factor of production is water. Although 
the annual rainfall of the Northeast is not substantially lower 
than the other regions, it is erratic and the porosity of the 
sandy soil make the region a marginal area for paddy production, 
and some degree of flood or drought damage has been accepted as 
a natural phenomenon by most farmers. In 1971, 22% of the paddy 
crop was damaged by drought and 19.5% by flooding and approximately 
4.5% of the kenaf was similarly affected. It was to these erratic 
climatic conditions that the subsistence rice production was geared.
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Traditionally, a holding was composed of scattered plots, each 
plot on a different type of land "to ensure a crop in any year 
which might produce either drought or serious flooding, owner­
ship of land at different elevations is the best safeguard 
against uncertainty." ^
The pattern of land holding favoured plots which as far 
as possible extended over different elevations, the plots were 
sinuous in shape and were sub-divided accordingly. This is 
well illustrated on Maps 1-4 especially plots lying to the 
north of the village.
2
As Demaine and Dixon comment, such a system of land holding 
arising in response to climatic unreliability is sure to be 
challenged by the presence of irrigation water which will remove 
the rationale of the system. The climatic conditions also 
necessitated a form of extensive cultivation.
"(The farmer) would reason that floods and drought would 
affect meticUBusly planted fields as much as crudely prepared 
ones. The winning strategy was to maximize the harvest 
yield." 3
The Organization of Irrigation
The construction of an irrigation system has enabled approx­
imately 60% of the village households to receive irrigation water 
ideally in iregular and adequate amounts throughout the year.
All those farmers receiving irrigation water are required to 
become members of the * Samakhomphuchainam1, the 'Water Users 
Association1 ^ .which was established seven years ago. At present 
the entrance fee is 10 baht, and no water charge is levied. 
Members of the W.U.A, elect a committee composed of a president, 
who at present is the local 'kamnan'(commune headman), an 
accountant, a secretary and village representatives. Every
1 Ng, R; "Rural Change in South East Asia", Geography, Vol. 59, 
Part 3, July 1974, p. 253
2 Demaine and Dixon, op.cit; p.56
3 Ng,R; op.cit; p.254
4 Subsequently referred to as W.U.A,
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50,000 rai of irrigated land is under the supervision of a
*
Nai Truat Conprathan: the Chief Engineer, and to every 10,000 
1
rai a 'zone-man' is appointed. Both holders of these offices
village level there is a ' pfaui cftuai chonprathan1 : 'the common 
irrigator' elected by the village who organizes a number of 
'nai truat na*: 'ditch-riders', who are responsible for each 
'turn-out'. Ditch-riders are elected by farmers whose 
land lies within the area irrigated by each 'turn-out'. Both 
the above appointments must be approved by the R.I.D. The 
ditch-rider, under the supervision of the common irrigator 
works in liaison with the zone-man, and is responsible for 
canal maintenance and water-sending (see Fig. 1.4).
Figure 1.4 The Organization of Irrigation
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction Area in Rai
2
are employees of the Royal Irrigation Department . At the
Total Project Area 110,000
Royal Irrigation I Chief Engineer 50,000
Department
Zone Man 10,000
Water-Users
Association
Common Irrigator
Ditch Rider
Whole village
Variable depending upon 
length of the canal
1 This term has been incorporated into the vernacular
2 Subsequently referred to as R.I.D.
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The irrigated lands of Na Chuak Nuea falls under the 
control of four gates, or 'turn-outs' (see Map 1.5). Water 
from the Right Main Canal passes through the gate into a smaller 
canal, the 'khlongsoi'; from this canal water is passed into 
a smaller ditch khlongnam'by regulating a smaller gate. Regulation 
of the main gate, the 'banbitfeoet1is the responsibility of both 
the zone-man and the ditch-rider, but the ditch-rider must consult 
with the zone-man before opening the gate.
Figure 1.5 Water Sending
The R.I.D. is responsible for the construction of the Main 
Canal and the 'khlongsoi's J and although this department surveys 
the farm ditches they are left to the farmers to build.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the way in which water is passed 
from the Main Canal to a certain farmer, B. Permission to open 
the main gate is sought from the ditch-rider who consults with 
the zone-man. When the water is sent, B must temporarily block 
the 'khlongnam* in order to direct water into his plot, thus 
cutting off irrigation from C and D.
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Disputes and disagreements related to irrigation and
water-sending occur at two points in the organizational structure.
The first critical point occurs between the R.I.D, and the
W.U.A. (see Tig. 1.4). The W.U.A. to which the villagers of
Na Chuak Nuea are affiliated, has a membership catchment area
of 70,000 rai and so the members from Na Chuak Nuea compose
only a small part of the membership and the committee is
composed of representatives from each village. Large meetings
are held twice a year; but in the event of a major dispute
arising, emergency meetings may be proposed. Each meeting
of the W.U.A. is attended by an R.I.D. observer. The main
areas of dispute between the R.I.D, and W.U.A, relate to the
allocation of responsibilities. The R.I.D. maintains that once
the canal is constructed, responsibility for repair lies with
the villager. The villager, however, when confronted with
broken concrete linings caused by bad survey work, technical
miscalculation and budget cutting construction work, argues
that he has neither the tools nor the capital to tackle the task.
The R.I.D. claim that the villagers misuse the irrigation system
by allowing their buffalo to wallow in the canals and by chopping
up wooden bridges for firewood, using explosives to fish in the
main dam, and damaging the canal by constructing illegal pipes
and pumps to siphon off water, offences for which 10,000 baht
1
fines can be imposed . This last problem is common amongst 
villagers such as X (on Fig. 1.5), whose plot adjoins the canal, 
but whose access to water is less direct than, for example, farmer 
B, lying further away, due to the positioning of farm ditches. 
Furthermore, the irrigation system has been imposed upon an 
existing pattern of land tenure without much consideration for 
the organization of that system. In some places the canal has 
cut across established cattle trails, with no provision for 
crossing made. In the south of the village certain villagers 
in order to receive irrigation water must reach agreement with
1 The chief engineer told me of three recent cases of villagers 
(not from Ban Na Chuak Nuea) tampering with the Main Canal. In
these cases fines were not imposed, but the offenders were
required to repair the damage.
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land owners from another village.
The second point of conflict relates to disputes arising 
at the lowest level of the organization structure between the 
farmers themselves. In a preceding section it was noted that 
close kinsmen are likely to hold adjoining lowland plots, and 
inevitably many of the disputes now occurring are between kins­
men. As Fig. 1.5 illustrates, in order for water to reach 
villager B, the co-operation of other farmers in adjacent 
plots is required. Water can only pass to B through A's land, 
and if A needs to irrigate his plot he must block the canal 
temporarily. According to one informant, refusal to send water 
down to a lower plot is the most common type of disagreement.
If a case arises, the zone-man and ditch-rider are called and 
a 200 baht fine imposed on the offending farmer. Another 
area of dispute relates to the inheritance of plots by siblings.
An earlier case cited at the beginning of the chapter (case 1,
Map 1.1) is an illustration of this. Here the second sister 
inherited a large but flood-prone plot (lb), since the introduction 
of irrigation this plot has become highly productive. Disputes 
between kin arise because once again there has been an imposition 
of a new system on a previously existing system based on kinship 
status, with its pattern of defined rights and obligations.
In certain respects the old system articulates with the new; 
for example, the village headman is the elected village repres­
entative for the W.U.A. and is also one of the ditch-riders.
Another ditch-rider is one of the two village ritual officiants, 
who traditionally had special powers to mediate with the gods 
in bringing rain. Serious disputes also arise between different 
villages, especially in the south of the village where land 
from two villages is irrigated from one 'turn-out'. While
disputes between kin involve bitter arguments, those between
different villages have been known to involve physical harrass- 
ment.
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This series of conflict points can perhaps be compared 
1
With Evans-Pritchard's notion of lineage segmentation, where 
a segment of the structure in one context is united and in 
another opposed, and consequently some form of cohesion results. 
For example, irrigated villages (see Fig. 1.6) contrast them­
selves with the upland non-irrigated villages, from which they 
draw much of their hired labour. The W.U.A. unites to oppose 
the R.I.D. on certain issues, and different villages of the 
W.U.A. conflict cm certain matters. Within a village, especially 
Na Chuak Nuea, there is a distinction made between those who 
have irrigation water, and those that do not. The four gates 
in the village sometimes create dispute groups, especially in 
1975, when one gate, No. 3 was virtually unoperational and 
therefore members of this group were without water. And then 
as mentioned above disputes commonly arise between members 
of the same gates.
Figure 1.6 Levels of Opposition
Irrigation Area Non-irrigated villages
R.I.D.
W.U.A.
Village X Village Y 
irrigated villagers - non-irrigated
villagers
Gates 1 2  3 4
Farmer
1 Evans-Pritchard, E; "The Nuer'.' London, 1940.
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At any one level therefore there is group cohesion and 
solidarity between certain parties which at another level 
dissolves and disintegrates into disputes. In the north of 
Thailand government projects have been built in areas with a 
long history of traditional irrigation. Potter1 describes 
how Chiangmai villagers participate in three separate irrig­
ation systems: a traditional type, a modified traditional type and 
a: . new government irrigation system. In describing the trad­
itional irrigation system, Potter writes:
"The successful completion of maintenance and repair tasks 
requires the co-operation of large numbers of men; the supervision 
of these men and the co-ordination of their activities requires 
leaders who have authority to make decisions. These leaders 
also need effective sanctions to ensure that each member of the 
irrigation association fulfills his obligations. Such a system 
of authority has existed for centuries in the Chiengmai valley." 2
The lack of such a tradition of communal irrigation in the
Northeast is a crucial factor, although it cannot be strictly
inferred that the conflicts arising within the irrigation system
are necessarily related to the lack of traditional irrigation
for. as. Potter mentions • there are levels of opposition
and conflict within the traditional irrigation system of 
3
Chiangmai village .
Perhaps the most important consequence of the introduction of 
irrigation is that it has linked the village into a wider official 
administrative body. This is not to say that previously the 
village was an isolated unit, administrative political machinery 
enmeshed the village some time ago. But the irrigation system 
has directly imposed itself upon the agricultural production 
system of the village which previously was organized according 
to different criteria^.
1 Potter, J; Thai Peasant Social Structure, Chicago, 1976, p.82
2 Ibid; pp 88-89
3 Ibid;p. 100
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Livestock
The livestock to be found in the village include water 
buffalo, cows, a few pigs and poultry - chickens, ducks and geese. 
Most of these animals are kept in kraals beneath the house, although 
the buffalo and cows are taken out to graze during the day.
Water buffalo are an important factor of production in agriculture 
as work animals, both for ploughing and for pulling the tradit­
ional wooden carts used for transporting crops from the field.
While in 1971, 95% of the village owned at least two water 
buffalos and some as many as thirteen, in 1975 this figure has 
dropped to 80%. There is an apparent trend towards special­
ization, with those owning herds owning large ones, and this
can partly be explained by the reduction in available pasture
1
land since the introduction of irrigation, and also by the in­
creasing incidence of cattle theft. A group of cattle rustlers, 
rumoured to be led by the Indian meat sellers in Kalasin market, 
are active in the area. Another factor to be taken into account 
is the availability of labour for herding; for the most part the 
cattle minders are children and adolescents of both sexes.
The village headman himself does not own a water buffalo as both 
his sons are attending secondary school. Although primary educ­
ation is technically compulsory for all children, a number of 
under-twelves in Ban Na Chuak Nuea are regularly out of school 
tending the herds. The headman's household is typical of many 
who now rely on renting arrangements when animal labour is required 
for agriculture.- In some cases the animals are lent out with no 
return, but the usual rent paid is approximately 250 kg of paddy 
per month. From the 1975 sample there was only one case of rent 
being paid in cash (300 baht for one month). There are also cases 
where both buffalo and owner are hired as a work team.
1 This is particularly felt during the rainy season, and
increasingly during the dry season as second cropping develops.
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As well as an important factor of production in agriculture, 
livetock in the Northeast have been traditionally raised for sale. 
Recently, there has been a decrease in the demand for water 
buffalo, mostly sold to the Central Plains, due to the introduction 
of tractor ploughing in that region. Investment is now directed 
into the rearing of an American breed of cow; these snow white 
'Brahmin* cows are much valued above the local brown breed.
While cows are never used for ploughing, the local browns and 
occasionally the 'Brahmin' breed are employed for draught purposes. 
The sale price of the local breed varies, depending upon age, 
between 2,000 - 4,000 baht. While a pure bred white 'Brahmin* 
bull can fetch between 110,000 - 150,000 baht.
The number of pigs raised in the village has increased 
substantially from a herd size of around 10 in 1971 to one of 80 
in 1975. Ng'1' comments that the total number of pigs raised in
the village is a function of the rice requirement of the community 
as the pigs thrive on the bran from domestic milling. However, 
the marked increase in pig-rearing cannot be attributed solely 
to any increase in rice consumption, and pig-rearing has now 
become an important branch of investment.
Most households also keep the odd chicken or duck beneath 
the house, and poultry although not a daily item of diet, are 
kept for ceremonial feasting. Some households specialize in 
poultry, keeping as many as 50 chickens, ducks or geese and 
selling the eggs and chicks in the local market. However, a 
recent poultry disease has drastically depleted the chicken 
population. A few villagers, the headman included, raise 
fighting cockerels used in village contests and contests further 
afield.
Livestock technology in the village is underdeveloped when 
compared with other pastoral communities, and this is related to 
the role of livestock in village production. Although an import­
ant factor of production in the subsistence branch of production, 
as labour, cattle are rarely slaughtered in the village, thus hides 
and horns etc., have not been used for the variety of purposes
1 Ng, R; "Rural Change in Southeast Asia", Geography, Vol.59, 
1974, p.253.
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to which they could be put. Furthermore, cattle are never 
milked, although cattle dung is used as a natural fertilizer.
Livestock are acquired predominantly through purchase, but 
on the death of a household head a herd may be distributed among 
all the children resident in the village, depending of course on 
the number of cattle. Generally, if only one buffalo or cow 
is owned, the youngest resident daughter inherits. There are 
other means of acquisition, in one case a household agreed to 
tend and pasture another household's buffalo in return receiving 
the calf from that animal.
Livestock raising as a branch of production is to be con­
trasted with other agricultural branches of production in the 
village in respect of division of labour. Pre-adolescent and 
adolescent labour is used for cattle tending and the trading 
transactions involving cattle are predominantly conducted by 
adult males.
In this chapter the ownership, distribution and acquisition 
of certain factors of production were examined. It was found that 
inheritance is still the major means by which lowland is obtained. 
While the ideology of inheritance directs the transmission of land 
through the daughters of a household, in the empirical case factors 
such as the size of the holding to be allotted, the demographic 
composition, and the present land holding position of the sibling 
group become the major factors influencing allocation. However, 
less than one haldE of the upland has been acquired through inherit­
ance, and purchase is becoming an important method of acquisition. 
Upland and lowland cultivation, as two different branches of agri­
cultural production articulate differently with the social structure. 
The close correspondence between kin groups and residential 
clusters reflected in the lowland tenure pattern, contrasts with 
the lack of such a correspondence on the upland, where the pattern, 
if one emerges, is one of groups of brothers holding adjoining or 
nearby plots. The differences between upland and lowland cultiv­
ation with their associated tenure patterns are fundamentally much 
more than a difference in types of crops grown, the crop cycles
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and the labour in-puts. Both branches of production, because 
of the different patterns of social relations of allocation 
articulate differently with the socio-economic system.
The decline of traditional labour arrangements: 'longkhaek' 
and mutual help groups was noted together with the increasing 
incidence of labour hire. A number of factors influencing this 
trend were discussedj the introduction of irrigation, with its 
strict regime of water-sending, and the use of new rice varieties, 
both of which remove the flexibility of the previous system.
A distinction was made between the different types of hirer: 
those hiring labour in response to sporadic household labour 
shortage, and those beginning to replace their own labour with 
hired labour. Different types of hired labourer were discussed: 
the resident adolescent labourers sent from a poor household, the 
prospective son-in-law labourer, the kinsmen (which the writer 
suggests is the commercialization of the previous *longkhaek* ) 
and the labourer coming in from another village. In evaluating 
any status distinctions between the hirer and the hired it was 
argued that the diversity of different types of relation between 
the two preclude any over-riding status differentiation.
The introduction of the irrigation system was analysed as 
an imposition of a new system, requiring new forms of cooperation, 
onto a pre-existing system based on the autonomy of the household 
(an autonomy which nevertheless traditionally broke down at peak 
periods under labour exchange arrangements). Certain areas of 
conflict within the hierarchy of the organization of the water- 
sending system were discussed, and it was illustrated that certain 
levels within the structure conflict in one context, to coalesce 
in another.
In discussing livestock, as both a branch of production: the 
rearing of cattle for sale, and as a factor of production:animal 
labour for ploughing, a trend toward specialization was noted and 
the associated increase in buffalo renting arrangements. The under­
development of livestock technology was briefly discussed and this
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was related to the position of livestock rearing in the village 
economy, as one of a set of the factors of production in the 
subsistence branch, or as a source of investment when the sub­
sistence branch of production furnished a surplus.
Throughout the chapter the discussion has attempted to show 
that the previous balance between the different factors of production 
has been altered. The discussion now proceeds with an analysis 
of resource utilisation.
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CHAPTER TWO
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING THE UTILIZATION OF .. RESOURCES
"Kinship, chieftainship, even the ritual order, whatever 
they may be, appear in the primitive societies as economic 
forces. The grand strategy of economic intensification 
enlists social structures beyond the family and cultural 
superstructures beyond the productive process." ^
In the previous chapter the distribution, ownership and 
allocation of certain factors of production were examined. It 
was noted that the basic production group was the household; and 
the most important branch of production was the cultivation of 
glutinous rice. Having reviewed the distribution and allocation 
of factors of production, the discussion is now focussed on the 
use of certain factors. The variations in production intens­
ities between households and the socio-economic factors which 
explain these differences will be discussed.
In Section 1, I briefly review the fundamental character­
istics of the Domestic Mode of Production and the notion of 
surplus, and comment on Sahlins* argument concerning the basic 
orientations of primitive and peasant production. In Section 2 
the differences in production levels between households in the 
study village between 1971-1975 are examined, and the socio­
economic factors influencing these variations are discussed.
I also briefly comment on changes in the disposal of the surplus.
1. The Domestic Mode of Production 
' A species of anarchy '
Sahlins refers to the domestic mode of production as a 
2
species of anarchy : a unit of production, independent of other 
units working to satisfy its own wants and needs.
1 Sahlins, M; Stone Age Economics, London, 1974, pp 101-102
2 Ibid; p.95
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"The domestic mode anticipates no social or material
relations between households except that they are alike....
The social economy is fragmented into a thousand petty 
existences, each organized to proceed independently of the 
others and each dedicated to the homebred principle of
looking out for itself......  In principle each house retains,
as well as its own interests, all the powers that are wanted 
to satisfy them. Divided thus into so many units of self­
concern, functionally uncoordinated, production by the domestic 
mode has all the organization of the so many potatoes in a 
certain famous sack of potatoes."
This is the essence of the domestic mode of production, but 
as Sahlins notes, in the empirical case the household is linked 
to other households and to other social institutions which work 
to counterpose these tendencies.
The domestic mode of production has the following features: 
it is essentially 'production for use', it generally displays 
an under-use of labour power, and it is imposed upon by forces 
of a higher order: kinship systems, political structures, and 
in the case of the peasant domestic mode of production, economic 
forces such as the Market.
Production for use
One of the distinguishing features of a peasant society 
is the production of a surplus over and above the household units 
basic requirements. It is by selling this surplus that the 
peasant household becomes engaged in the market system, and 
thereby enters the monetary economy. As in tribal and primitive 
economies, the basic unit of production is the domestic group.
The essential quality of a subsistence mode of production is that 
it is production for use, rather than production for exchange.
The household was required to produce enough to reproduce itself, 
that is to satisfy its consumption and social needs. Therefore 
its aim or limit was defined and its activity discontinuous.
"The domestic mode of production entertains limited economic 
goals, qualitatively defined in terms of a way of living rather 
than quantitatively as an abstract wealth, work is accordingly 
unintensive, intermittent, and susceptible to all manner of 
interruption......ranging from heavy ritual to light rainfall."2
1 Ibid; p. 95
2 Ibid; p.86
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The unit of production is therefore a social unit and 
inherently contains an anti-surplus principle in so far as once 
the socially required level of production has been reached, 
production ceases.
Sahlins maintains that the domestic mode of production in
peasant societies is a cousin to Marx's scheme of the simple
1
circulation of commodities : C  M  ► C 1, where the manu­
facture of commodity (C) is sold in the market in order to 
obtain (M) money for the purchase of other specific commodities 
(C1). The exchange in this formula is directed towards con­
sumption. This circulation of commodities is the opposite 
of the bourgeois entrepreneur with his interest in exchange
value, characterized by the formula M  ---► M' : the
transformation of a given money sum into more of the same by 
way of a commodity. The distinction between exchange value 
and use value is important. In the first formula the commodity 
was exchanged for another and the exchange was orientated to 
livelihood and consumption; in the second formula the exchange 
is motivated by gain.
"Livelihood and gain 'production for use', and 'production 
for exchange' pose thus contrasting finalities of production and, 
accordingly contrasting intensities of production." 2
The distinction between these two types of exchange is by 
no means clear cut, for although Sahlins speaks of the motivation 
of gain as directed towards some kind of accumulation of 'abstract 
wealth', wealth in peasant societies is as much directed into 
consumption as investment. Sahlins' statements tend to obscure 
the heterogeneity of peasant types, which indeed include the 
peasant entrepreneur, but this is a topic of a later chapter.
Here the structure of a peasant subsistence economy is examined, 
a structure which Sahlins maintains shows certain profound 
tendencies of the domestic mode of production.
1 Ibid; p.84
2 Ibid; p.83
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",... a fragmented peasant economy may more clearly than 
any other primitive community present on the empirical level 
certain profound tendencies of the In the primitive
case these tendencies are concealed and transfigured by general 
social relations of solidarity and authority. The peasant 
domestic economy, articulated rather to the market by exchange
than to other households by corporate kinship ....  manifests
to inspection the deep structure of the D.M.P.l It manifests in 
particular an under-use of labour power." 2
The under-use of labour
This under-use of labour was the central theme of much of
A. Chayanov's work on pre-revolutionary Russian peasantry, and
led to the formulation of Chayanov’s Rule which states that the
intensity of labour in a system of domestic production for use
varies inversely with the relative working capacity of the
producing unit. Therefore the smaller the relative proportion
of workers the more they must work in order to reach a certain
level of livelihood. The Chayanov curve can be regarded as a
line of normal intensity, and what is regarded as normal intensity
is physically and socially defined. Thus:
"A social system has a specific structure and inflection 
of household labour intensity, deviating in a characteristic way 
and extent from the Chayanov line of normal intensity." 3
Production profiles and social structure
In his analysis Sahlins presents a method of depicting an
intensity profile using the Chayanov Rule to present a curve of
normal intensity: the domestic labour intensity increasing by a
factor of the customary consumption requirement for every increase
of 1.00 in the domestic ratio of consumers to workers. Sahlins
then attempts to relate different intensity profiles to specific
social structures. In one example Sahlins uses Thayer Scudder's
4
'data on cereal production in the Valley Tonga village of Mazulu . 
He shows that here the Chayanov Rule holds in a general way: the 
acreage cultivated per gardener increases proportionately in rough 
relation to the ratio of consumers/gardeners. Furthermore, the
1 Domestic Mode of Production
2 Shanin, M; op.cit; p.89
3 Ibid; p.103
4 Scudder, T; The Ecology of the Gwembe Tonga, Manchester, I960
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analysis showed that certain households were cultivating above 
their consumption requirements. Sahlins argues that the sub­
intensive production of some households cannot be isolated from 
the surplus production of others, and he suggests that certain 
households may not have made it precisely because they thought 
they could depend on others. The intensity profile of the 
Kapauku of New Guinea who accumulate pigs and sweet potatoes, 
whose sale and distribution are major factors in status barg­
aining, presents a different picture. The data does not initially 
show a Chayanov trend, but indicates rather that the community 
falls into two very different groups of producers. One group 
conforms to the normal intensity curve, with intensity increasing 
with the ratio of consumers/producers. The other group was far 
more labour intensive in proportion to their working capacity. 
Sahlins related these differences to the prevailing Big-Man 
system. The latter group of producers, working at a higher 
level of intensity, represented the Big-Man and his followers, 
whose production is intensified in order to be converted into 
status. The former group conforming to the Chayanov curve were 
those not presently’- or directly involved in any political 
machinations.
I
Sahlins analysis therefore studies production intensity 
profiles in terms of their orientations. He argues that the 
domestic mode of production is essentially orientated or directed 
by the values and political demands of the wider society.
Sahlins calls the D.M.P. a "disarray lurking in the background, 
always present and never happening."'*' The D.M.P. orientated 
as it is to satisfying the immediate needs of the family, with 
its inherent anti-surplus principle, is linked to other social 
institutions:
"everywhere the petty anarchy of domestic production is 
counterposed by larger forces and greater organization, institutions 
of socio-economic order that joinr one house to another and submit 
all to a general interest. Still these grand forces of integ­
ration are not given in the dominant and immediate relations
1 Sahlins, M; op.cit; p.101
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of production .....  and if in the end anarchy is banished from
the surface of things, it is not definitively exiled/., it continues, 
a persistent disarray lurking in the background, so long as the 
household remains in charge of production.
Sahlins states that the economic impact of the kinship system
2
is less dramatic than the impact of the political structure . In
dealing with the influence of different kinship systems on
production intensity he argues that labour intensity will be
higher among societies with classificatory kinship systems, e.g.
the (Hawaiian system, than societies which categorically isolate
the immediate family, e.g. the Eskimo kinship system. "The
Hawaiian system should develop more social pressures on house-
3
holds of greater labour resources." In discussing the influence
of the political structure on the domestic mode of production
Sahlins points out that the political economy cannot survive on
that restrained use of resources which for the domestic economy
4
is a satisfactory existence . Furthermore, he argues that it is
possible to isolate certain formal qualities of leadership
5
structure that imply different degrees of domestic productivity . 
Thus, in the Melanesian Big-Man system a leader moving beyond 
his own household constructs a following whose production may 
be harnessed to his ambitions. The leader must not only show 
personal industry, but he must be able to extract the labour of 
others. In other systems, e.g. the Polynesian, where political 
office is ascribed not achieved as in the Melanesian case, and 
where leaders are accorded tribute payment, different production 
intensities are to be found.
But what of the peasant domestic mode of production ?
Sahlins says that it is articulated to the market rather than 
to other households by corporate kinship or subsumed beneath a 
chieftainship^. Do market forces operate similarly to counter­
1 Ibid; pp 95-96
2 Ibid; p.123
3 Ibid; p.123
4 Ibid; p.135
5 Ibid; p.135
6 Ibid; p.89
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act the inherent 1 anti-surplus' force within this mode of 
production ? This is what needs further analysis, but it 
should be clear that while the market principle may become 
a dominant external force, the social structure of peasant 
communities is still characterized by important kinship 
relations and social institutions which orientate the domestic 
production of households. Sahlins* earlier statement that 
peasants articulate with the market rather than to those social 
institutions is too simplistic; the peasant domestic mode of 
production attempts to articulate with both and consequently 
contradictions arise.
2. Glutinous Rice Production in Na Chuak Nuea in 1971 and 1975
"The task of research is not finished by the drawing of 
an intensity profile, it is only thus posed. Before us stretches 
a work of difficulty and complexity matched only by its promise 
of an Anthropological Economics and consisting not merely in 
the accumulation of production profiles but of their inter­
pretation in social terms." 1
In this section I attempt to apply Sahlins' analysis, 
albeit somewhat modified, to production data from Na Chuak Nuea.
By studying the variation in domestic production it is possible
2
to determine the economic co-efficient of a given social system .
I intend to use data on glutinous rice production collected 
from a sample of households in 1971 and 1975. Firstly a number 
of methodological difficulties need to be discussed.
Definition of surplus
Most of the reports and documents relating to rice production 
and consumption in the N.E, of Thailand use per capita figures: 
a mechanical division of household size by number of household 
members. In a small-scale study it is essential to refine the 
analysis as much as possible. Consumption units have therefore 
been calculated on the following formula, used by Sahlins:
1 Ibid; p.121
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adult males (1.0)
adult females (0.8)
preadolescent children (0.5)
Consumption figures for 1971 for Na Chuak Nuea were not available.
The 1975 figures give an average consumption per unit Of 551 kg,
1
A report by Dixon , in 1973 suggests a per capita consumption 
figure of 327 kg, but this figure was derived from a sample of 
seven villages, and some variation is to be expected. Rice 
is also required for seed,temple contributions, barter, live­
stock feed, and gifts. Dixon's report of 1973 showed that 
households retained between 25-300 kg of rice for seed (average 
application 7 kg per rai). Daily rice offerings to monks and 
ceremonial gifts of rice to the temple were made by most house­
holds. It was found that half the village of Na Chuak Nuea were 
giving rice to relations, amounts ranging from 50-3,000 kg.
These include cases of poor families being supported by richer 
ones, for example, a widowed or divorced spouse with young 
children being supported by a large kin-unit. Livestock feed 
averaged out at 200 kg of rice. The paddy required for these 
other purposes was found to be 27% above the average consumption 
figures. It is apparent that through the five-year study period 
there have been changes in the distribution of paddy, in partic­
ular there has been an increase '.in the amount of paddy used for 
labour payments. In order to compare surplus production in 
1971 and 1975, given the incomplete data, the 1973 figures 
contained in the Dixon report have been utilised, with the 
exception of the consumption figure which was extracted from 
1975 data relating to rice consumption in Na Chuak Nuea. For 
the analysis, deficit producers are defined as those producing
below the amount required for consumption purposes: 551 kg per 
. 2
consumer unit . Balance producers are those producing between 
551-800 kg per consumer unit, and surplus producers those
1 Dixon, C; "The Pattern of Rural Paddy Production and Consumption", 
Lam Pao Report Series No. 5, 1970, p.11
2 551 kg per consumer unit converts to 411 kg per capita
The consumer unit figures for Na Chuak Nuea when converted into 
per capita figures are 0.2 kg/day higher than Dixon's per capita 
consumption figures for all villages contained in the 1973 report.
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producing more than 800 kg. The deficit producers therefore 
need to obtain more rice to satisfy their consumption needs 
and lack the extra amount for temple contributions and 
barter etc. The balance producers obtain enough to eat, 
and to satisfy with a small margin the other rice requirements 
while the surplus producers are producing a sizeable amount 
of rice above all those requirements.
Defining the marketable surplus is still problematic.
The data for 1971 obtained information on market sales but not 
on the amount held in store. 25% of the farmers were recorded 
as having sold paddy but other surplus producers may well have 
been waiting for a later date and higher prices. Nor does the 
data take account of rice held in store from the previous crop 
season, so that some surplus producers are selling all of this 
years production and may well be using paddy in store to 
satisfy their consumption and other needs. Despite these 
methodological difficulties I believe that the limits selected 
are valid, and the following analysis appears to support their 
validity.
The relationship between surplus/deficit production and 
labour intensity also needs careful consideration. In his 
examples Sahlins equates labour intensity in one case with 
surface cultivated per gardener and in another with production 
per worker. In both instances he acknowledges that a certain 
error is introduced1, as for example, in the latter case 
different workers expend unequal efforts per unit weight of 
out-put. Man-day units were recorded in the Na Chuak Nuea data; 
however these calculations were based on farmer re-call and no 
allowance was made to the length of the working day which varied 
according to the time of year. Even an accurate measurement 
of actual man-days cannot truly be seen as a measure of labour 
intensity as differences in land type and size of holding influence 
the labour intensity. The use of hired labourers and the incid­
ence of relatives and neighbours contributing their labour 
further complicates the analysis. With the data at hand 
it is possible to present a production profile and distinguish 
between surplus, balance and deficit groups, but these various
1 M; op.cit;p. 115
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production performances per se cannot be equated with intensity 
of labour. Rather than to attempt to depict intensity of 
production it would be better to concentrate on levels of 
production. The task then remains to study the relationship 
between a number of socio-economic factors and the different 
levels of production in the village.
The socio-economic factors influencing production
In 1971, 48.5% of the sample households were surplus producers, 
23% balance and 28.5% deficit. Analysis was done to see whether 
any differences emerged between surplus production and non­
surplus production (balance and deficit) with respect to a range 
of economic factors; size of holding, areas planted, yields, 
incidence of hired help, availability of irrigation, livestock 
size, and income, and a series of social factors: the age of
household head, household size, natal birthplace and household 
composition.
For the analysis of household composition households have 
been classified as follows:
I simple nuclear: married couple with young school-age children 
(under 12 years)
II simple nuclear: married couple with school-age and resident 
unmarried adult children
III simple nuclear: married couple with unmarried resident adult 
children
IV extended: married couple with one or more resident sons-in-law, 
married daughters, younger unmarried children and grandchildren
V extended: married couple with one resident daughter and son-in-law 
and grandchildren
Households containing widowed heads of household (mostly females) 
have been classified together with households in which both the 
head of household and his spouse are present. While acknow­
ledging that important distinctions can be made between these 
respective types the overall classification attempts to encompass 
the developmental aspect of household structure. Accordingly,
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rather than grouping households with widowed heads of house­
holds into one category, in each case they are classified 
according to the demographic composition of the other house­
hold members.
The distribution of household types for 1971 and 1975 in 
Na Chuak Nuea is as follows:
Table 2.1 Household composition. Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971 and 1975
1971 1975
Type No. % No. %
1 12 34 ) 6 14
2 8 23 > simple; 68% 13 29
3 4 11) 8 18
4 8 23\ extended 32 10 23
5 3 9) 7 16
Variations in 1971 2 households of Type 3, 2 of Type 4 and 2 of
Type 5 contained widowed female heads of household. 1. house­
hold of Type 4 contained a divorced female head of household.
'2,>, o households of Type 1 contained elderly resident couples,.
In 1975 2 households of Type 3, 3 of Type 4 and 6 of Type 5 
contained widowed female heads of household.
Table 2.2 shows that for 1971 there are significant differ­
ences between the producer groups with respect to the area of 
land planted (p = 0.1) and the structure of the household 
(p = 0.05). The surplus producers tended to plant larger areas 
to rice, although in respect of total land owned no significant 
difference between the producer groups emerges. Furthermore, 
the surplus producers were predominantly simple-type households: 
a married couple with unmarried children, and the deficit 
producers group contained more households of an extended type: 
three or even four generational families.
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In 1975, 48% of the households were surplus producers, 14% 
balance and 38% deficit. Table 2.3 shows that there are signif­
icant differences between the producer groups with respect to 
the availability of irrigation water (p = 0.005), the use of 
hired labour (p = 0.01), the area of land planted (p = 0.05) 
and the yields obtained (p = 0.1). Surplus producer's in 1975 
tended to plant larger areas, receive higher yields, use hired 
labour and receive irrigation water. Table 2.1 indicated 
that the % of extended type households has increased and 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that the age of the household head 
has increased since 1971. This indicates that some changes 
may have taken place in the rate of household formation between 
the two years. Figure 2.1 shows that the rate of household 
formation has in fact decreased between 1971-1975. The average 
age of the head of household has increased from 40 years in 
1971 to 48 years in 1975. Hence in Fig. 2.1 the larger number 
of heads of households in their 20's in 1971 and the incidence 
of resident elderly couples residing with their daughter and 
son-in-law, the son-in-law being designated the head of household.
If the factors influencing production levels in 1971 and 
1975 are compared, it is apparent that the influence of house­
hold structure on production levels, while evident in 1971, is 
not a significant factor in 1975. In this year the most important factor 
appears to be irrigation. However, the two sample years 1971 and 
1975 are not entirely comparable; an environmental factor - the 
amount of rainfall—needs to be incorporated into the analysis.
1971 was a comparatively wet year and 'rain-fed' upland plots 
received an adequate water supply for paddy cultivation. In 1975 
however, drought conditions prevailed and the rice production of 
unirrigated upland plots was seriously affected. It could there­
fore be argued that the impact of irrigation is only a significant 
factor in influencing production levels under drought conditions 
and that under adequate rain-fall, differences between surplus and 
deficit producers with respect to irrigation would not emerge.
Figure 2.1 Household structure, age of household head and
production levels
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In order to test this hypothesis production levels for 1976 
were examined, as the data for 1976 - a wet year, is more 
comparable with that of 1971. Table 2.4 shows a significant 
difference ( \2 = 10,3 p value=,005) between surplus and deficit
producers with respect to irrigation: surplus rice producers
hold predominantly irrigated land and deficit producers hold 
predominantly unirrigated land.
Table 2.4 Irrigated and non-irrigated land holders:
Surplus and deficit rice production Ban Na Chuak Nuea 
1976
Surplus
producers
Irrigated Non-irrigated
20 8
Deficit
producers
3 12
Table 2.5 Household structure and surplus deficit production 
Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1976
Surplus
Simple Extended
14 14
producers
Deficit
producers 8 7
Table 2.5 shows however that no differences emerge between surplus 
and deficit rice producers with respect to household structure.
Before the introduction of irrigation the location and the 
elevation of plots were an important factor influencing levels 
of production. In a year with plentiful rainfall upland plots 
would receive an adequate water supply for paddy cultivation,
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while some lowland plots would suffer from flooding. In a 
dry year with poor rainfall, low-lying land would receive 
adequate water but upland plots would suffer from drought.
The erratic nature of the rainfall therefore influenced prod­
uction levels in different ways. The introduction of an 
irrigation scheme has altered the relationship and now house­
holds owning lowland are tending towards surplus production 
irrespective of the environmental factor.
The discussion now returns to Sahlins' contention that the 
Domestic Mode of Production has in its deeper structure an anti­
surplus principle and that the internal forces at work, are 
essentially centripetal isolating the domestic group from the 
wider society. The rationale of the D.M.P. Sahlins argues 
is the satisfaction of consumption needs. Production over and 
above this level can be explained by outside forces working to 
extract the surplus. The data shows that the incentive to increase 
production levels is something more than the quantitative assess­
ment implied in the ratio of consumer to labour units. The ratio 
of consumer units to labour units is not significantly different 
between the different production groups for 1971 and 1975.
If any Chayanov curve appears at all it appears to reverse 
itself with surplus producers in 1975 having slightly lower 
ratios of consumers to labour units'*'. The analysis should 
rather concentrate on the composition of the producing units, 
especially the relations of authority between the head of the 
household and his domestic labour group. I would argue that 
in 1971 the composition of households played an important role 
in determining production levels. Before the impact of irrig­
ation, production incentive while quite obviously related to 
the nature of the resources at hand, appears as a function of the 
natural developmental cycle of the family. Higher levels of 
production were a feature of households in the process of expansion
1 1971 surplus Cu/Lu = 1.3, deficit Cu/Lu = 1.2 
1971 surplus Cu/Lu = 1 . 9 deficit Cu/Lu = 2.03
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which lasts from the marriage of two people until the completion 
of their family of procreation; "In structural terms it corresp­
onds to the period during which all the offspring of the parents 
are economically, affectively and jurally dependent on them."^
Lower production levels were found among households during the 
phase of dispersion or fission: "This begins with the marriage
of the oldest child and continues until all the children are 
2
married" and also of replacement, "which ends with the death
of the parents, and replacement in the social structure of the
3
family they founded" (See Figure 2.1, p.
The domestic domain, the domestic producing unit and the 
wider society are not discrete entities, but are closely inter­
connected - a central theme of Goody's analysis. Thus he writes:
"One might put it that the domestic domain is the system of 
social relations through which the reproductive nucleus is 
integrated with the environment and with the structure of the 
total society."^
"Classificatory kinship institutions, unilineal descent 
corporations, age-sets and the great variety of institutions and 
organizations through which the medium of citzienship is 
exercised, are the structural lines between the two domains"
(The domestic and juro-political or wider society)
It is on this issue, the interrelationship between the
domestic group and the wider society that the analysis now returns
to Sahlins' argument concerning the external forces operating on
the D.M.P. I would argue that the influence of the external
domain on the domestic group is not only the extraction of
surplus laboour from favourably endowed households through
pressures of the existing kinship structure^ - a quantitative
consideration, but is closely related to a system of social norms and
values.
"The differentials in this structure (the domestic group) are
in part inherent in the procreative relationship .....  But their
character is also decisively regulated by politico-jural norms''^
1 Goody, J;"The Developmental Cycle", in Goody (ed.) Kinship, 
Harmondsworthiu 1971, p.89
2 Ibid; p.89
3 Ibid; p.89
4 Ibid; p. 92
5 Ibid; p. 91
6 Sahlins, M; op.cit; p.123
7 Goody, J; op.cit; p.96
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Thus Goody speaks of the 1 pushes' and 'pulls' determining 
each phase of the developmental cycle, which come from the 
domestic and from the external structure of society. In Na Chuak 
Nue& during the expansion phase all forces converge on 
supporting the paramountcy of the parents in the domestic 
domain. Cultural norms require children to be obedient and 
respectful. During the dispersion phase children's rights 
to some measure of jural and economic independence become 
operative. Sons leave the household on marriage and a 
temporary son-in-law unit takes up residence for a few years, 
then leaves often to be replaced with a new temporary son-in- 
law unit. Production levels in 1971 in the village can perhaps 
best be seen as the expressions of the authority of the parental 
generation as sanctioned by the wider society, and it is this 
relationship of authority between the head of the producing 
unit and his team which leads to important differences between 
different household types.
During the expansion stage of the developmental cycle, the 
head of household from the time at which he establishes his 
independent household, is directing his efforts towards 
accumulation. He stands to inherit land from his parents-in-law 
and when he obtains this land the production from it must exceed
t
the consumption needs of his young family if the households 
aspirations are to be realized. The expansion stages of the 
developmental cycle must be accompanied by expansion in the 
productive cycle; and the needs of a village household are 
more than just the satisfaction of nutritional requirements.
Cash is required for medical and educational expenses and for 
a variety of other consumer needs: the desire to own a watch, 
radio or build a new house, but this is a topic of a later 
chapter. At the dispersion and replacement stages of the 
developmental cycle many of these aspirations have been met, 
and savings of some sort, if not in a bank account then under 
the mattress, have been accumulated.
88
Glutinous rice production although the most important 
branch of production, is no longer the only means of livelihood. 
Cash crop production, and wage-labouring outside the village 
have developed into important economic alternatives. The 
analysis therefore, not accounting for these other methods of 
livelihood is perhaps unbalanced. Nevertheless, glutinous 
rice production is the primary economic base and in the majority 
of cases other forms of livelihood complement the traditional 
subsistence sector. Villagers prefer to grow their own rice 
rather than purchase it, and rice growing is still socially 
valued above most other occupations. Household labour is still 
the primary labour source for paddy cultivation, and the structure 
of this household domestic group needs to be incorporated into 
any analysis of domestic production.
"A domestic group comprising only two successive generations 
is at a different stage from one made up of three generations; 
and so is one in which all the filial generations are pre­
adolescent as compared with one with some or all children of 
the marriageable ages. The developmental factor is intrinsic 
to domestic organization and to ignore it leads to serious 
misinterpretation of the descriptive facts."
In 1975, access to irrigation water seems to be of para­
mount importance in influencing production levels. This is a 
factor at once deriving from the external domain (the political 
system constructing the dam and encouraging increased production 
through agricultural extension workers). High production levels 
now appear to be a factor of favourable resource endowment. But 
in 1975 there is a difference between production levels and natal 
birth-place, with surplus producers tending to be born in the 
village. The reasons for this pattern remain unclear, although 
it can be speculated using Sahlins' argument that those heads of 
households born in the village have a greater proportion of 
kinship units outside of the domestic domain which may be working 
to raise production
1 Ibid; p.87
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Maps 2.1 and 2.2 indicate the way in which surplus and 
deficit producers are located in respect of land-holding 
patterns. From the available cases at hand, the location of 
surplus and balance/deficit producer plots have been marked.
While in 1971, no clear pattern emerges, in 1975 the surplus 
producers form a central core, with balance/deficit producers 
located at the periphery.
I conclude this section with the following contention.
The introduction of irrigation has had a significant effect
on the production levels of households. Production levels 
in the early data were seen to be a function of the develop­
mental cycle, and in this respect can be regarded as fluid, 
although the environmental factor - the amount of rainfall 
contributed to variations in production levels. Under the 
impact of irrigation, production levels become a function of 
resource endowment, and as such the production profile of the 
village has become crystallized, surplus and deficit producer 
groups forming permanent groupings.
The nature of the analysis: an attempt to examine a complex
set of variables over a period of time utilizing simple
statistics cannot inspire great statistical confidence. Sahlins 
himself, in his own analysis maintains that: "the aim is merely 
to suggest a feasibility and not to prove a p o i n t . T h e  
theoretical analysis presented here is likewise offered as a 
proposition. Only an intensive study of household production 
which overcomes the methodological difficulties of measuring 
labour intensity, combined with the deeper analysis of house­
hold structure, especially the nature of the relationship between 
the household head and his family production team can validate 
the propositions offered here.
1 Sahlins, M; op.cit; p.106
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The disposal of paddy
I now turn to a consideration of changes which are occurring 
in the distribution of the social surplus. By social surplus I 
refer to that part of the product (paddy) not consumed by the 
domestic producing unit nor sold in the market. While information 
is lacking on the disposal of paddy for 1971, the disposal patterns 
between 1973 and 1975 show certain trends which warrant discussion. 
The extraction of data relating to disposal is itself problem­
atic, and only rough measures can be provided by the farmers.
The main patterns of disposal, given this methodological problem, 
were as follows:
Table 2.6 The disposal of paddy, as a percentage of total 
production, Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1973 and 1975
% Disposal of paddy 1973 1975
Sale 13.5 15.0
Future sale 10.6 3.0
Seed 2.1 2.0
Livestock feed 0. 9 2.0
Paddy for labour hire 1.2 7.0
Paddy for buffalo hire 1.4 0.6
Consumption 60.2 61.1
Given to relatives 6.5 7.7
Given to temple 2.6 1.7
There has been a substantial increase in the amount of paddy 
used to hire labour, and this is in keeping with the increased use 
of hired labour in the village. A number of households with
surplus production are using this surplus to buy labour. In a 
number of cases households with a deficiency of household labour, 
mostly through illness, are engaging hired labour, the surplus 
production meeting the labour costs.
Returning again to Sahlins' contention that kinship and 
the ritual order appear as economic forces in primitive societies
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working to extract a surplus from the labour of each household^ 
can these forces be seen to operate in Na Chuak Nuea, and further­
more, can it be demonstrated that as the market force becomes 
a more important orientation for household production, that these 
above mentioned social factors (the kinship and social order) 
decline in importance ? Table 2.6 shows that no significant 
changes have occurred within two years in the proportional 
distribution of the paddy product. It may well be that two 
years is an insignificant period of time to measure any degree 
of change of this sort. However, some changes have occurred 
which can only be appreciated in the amounts of paddy extracted 
by the higher orders of kinship and the social order. Tables 
2.7 and 2.8 show^ the amounts of paddy contributed to the temple, 
and recorded as being given to relatives respectively.
Table 2.7 Percentage distribution of paddy contributions to 
the temple, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1973 and 1975
None 0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100-150 150-200 200-300 300+ kg
1973 22.5 5 27.5 5 10 2.5 10 12.5 5
1975 18.6 38.5 27.2 — 2.2 2. 2 6.8 — 4.5
Table 2.8 Percentage distribution of paddy contributions to 
relatives, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1973 and 1975
None 0-50 50-100 100-200 200-400 400-600 600-1,000 1,000+ kg
1973 55 - 2.5 17.5 - 10 7.5 7.5
1975 61 4.5 2.2 4.5 6.8 9.6 6.8 4.6
1
Table 2.7 shows that there has been a significant change in the 
amount of paddy contributed to the temple by each household with 
a larger proportion of households donating small amounts (under 
25 kg)
1 Kolmogovov-Smirnov test, d = 0.29 significant at .05 level 
(critical value .27)
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This does not imply that contributions to the temple have 
declined in importance. Money contributions have become 
commonplace and on a number of ceremonial occasions, bank 
notes assume ritual importance. In 1975 every household in 
the sample was in addition to any paddy given, contributing 
money sums to the temple, sums ranging from 30-500baht( 15-250 kg 
of paddy). A further 36.4% of households were involved in 
expenditure on ceremonies of various kinds; ordinations, 
marriages, etc., with sums of money ranging from 40-1100 ~baht 
(20-550 kg of paddy). The ritual order in this village cannot 
be seen as a powerful factor contributing to the extraction of a 
surplus through paddy production for as Table 2.6 shows the 
paddy contribution to the temple is only 1-2% and the expend­
iture on merit-making and ceremonies accounts for only 3.7% 
of total village expenditure.
In respect of paddy given to relatives (see Table 2.8) 
a larger percentage of households are giving no paddy to kinsmen 
at all, and the amounts given appear to have declined, although 
no significant change can be demonstrated. The ethic of kin­
ship generosity codified within a system of social values is 
well documented in the ethnography, so too the ethic of re­
distribution: the social mechanism whereby accumulation by
individuals is hampered so not to create dysfunction in the 
social system. In primitive societies these values are strongly 
enforced. Radcliffe-Brown^ notes that among the Andaman Islanders
all food obtained is evenly distributed through the whole camp
2
and Evans-Pritchard notes that among the Nuer, kinsmen must assist
each other: "if one has a surplus of a good thing he must share
it with his neighbours, consequently no Nuer ever has a surplus."
3
Firth, commenting on the Maori, states that at a time of short­
age individuals did not as a rule keep to themselves the product
of their labour but shared it among the village.
1 Radcliffe-Brown, A; The Andaman Islanders, Glencoe; 1948, p.43 
(first published 1922)
2 Evans-Pritchard, E; The Nuer, Oxford, 1940, p.183
3 Firth, R; Economics of the New Zealand Maori, Wellington, 1959, p.162
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This ethic is still present among peasant societies, even
if it is in a state of erosion, and its importance as a social
value may be seen as a function of the degree to which the
community have emerged from subsistence to commercialized 
1production. Nash comments that peasant as well as primitive 
societies have a way of scrambling wealth to inhibit reinvest­
ment in technical advance, which prevents the crystallization 
of class lines on an economic base.
For Na Chuak Nuea, in 1975 it was found that 70% of those 
households giving rice to kinsmen were from the surplus producer
group. So some kind of ethic is prevailing whereby the better-
2
off redistribute a portion of the product. However, as Dixon 
comments:
’’the whole question of gifts to relatives becomes 
complicated by the fact that they may conceal repayment of 
debts, actual loans, or payment for land or labour'.'
The ethic of sharing is not confined to one's own village 
community, and there is evidence of deficit rice producers in 
the village giving small gifts of purchased rice to villagers 
from the neighbouring upland, who plagued by drought for the 
past four years, sometimes come down to beg in the lowland 
villages.
In this chapter the analysis has focussed on the utiliz­
ation of certain resources: land, labour and water in glutinous 
rice production. Sahlins' theory: that each social system has 
its own economic coefficient was reviewed, and the factors 
influencing production levels were discussed. The analysis 
departs somewhat from Sahlin£‘-in stressing that production levels 
are not necessarily a measure of labour intensity. In 1971 a 
difference between surplus and deficit rice producers in respect 
of the demographic composition of their households was noted.
In 1975 a difference emerged between the above producer groups 
with respect to the availability of irrigation water. The writer
1 Nash, M; op.cit; p.9
2 Dixon, C; op.cit; p.9
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proposed that surplus production, although previously related 
to resource endowment, was also a function of the developmental 
cycle, pertaining in this instance to the relationship of 
authority between the household head and his household labour 
force. While the developmental cycle will continue to influence 
production levels of household^ it was argued that differences 
emanating from the developmental process will be subsumed under 
differences relating to differential resource allocation: those 
households receiving irrigation water and those not.
Continuing on the theme of factors external to the household
working to encourage surplus production an analysis was made of
the
certain changes in/distribution of the paddy product. The 
higher percentage of paddy used for labour hire in 1975 was 
mentioned, also the changing pattern of paddy contributions 
to the temple (although the percentage of total village paddy 
donated to the temple is of a similar order). It was found 
that many households are now donating smaller amounts of paddy, 
and money contributions are now an important component of temple 
donations. The amounts of paddy distributed to kinsmen has 
not significantly changed during the study period.
The discussion now broadens, with an examination of other 
types of economic activity in the village, both agricultural 
and non-agricultural, and specifically with an analysis of 
patterns of response to new economic opportunities.
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CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITY RESPONSE
"The money economy is generally hailed because it fosters 
entrepreneurship which it is argued will produce development. These 
entrepreneurs, possessing the capitalist spirit, or the need for 
achievement, or a creative personality, or some other presumably 
essential quality, are thought to maximize their economic efforts, 
and this supposedly rebounds to the benefit of all"^.
In the previous chapter changes in the Domestic flodB of Production
were discussed, and the analysis focussed on those forces operating to
boost household production. Little has yet been said of individual
2
decision-making, Alavi believes that the structural-functional approach 
with its implications of a role performer constrained by certain norms, 
is inadequate for a study of peasant societies. It is inadequate because 
it ignores the thrust and direction of social processes that reflect 
competing pursuits of incompatible values and goals by members of 
different classes in a society. Anthropologists turned to an alternative 
approach ~ which focussed on the purposive action of individuals: 
methodological individualism, which predicates that the individual, 
given his disposition in society, engages in social action appropriate 
to the attainment of his goals. The individual rather than being 
governed by a set of rules, determines the social action. Here the 
individual is the manipulator rather than the conformor of the structural 
functionalist approach, Alavi criticises both approaches for object­
ifying society and externalising it from the individual.
1 Stavenhagen, Rj "Agriculture: Resources, Power and Change", in 
Bernstein, H; (ed) Underdevelopment and Development. The Third World 
Today, Harmondsworth, 1973, p.89
2 Alavi, H; "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties", Journal of 
Peasant Studies, vol.l, No, 1, 1973
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"The human significance of being, implicates a whole system of 
social relationships which envelop and define the individual 
person".^ In order to study peasant societies adequately Alavi 
maintains that the two approaches must be reconciled, for each 
individual is a decision-maker engaged in a series of social 
relations which generate diverse loyalties*
In the last chapter, glutinous rice production was 
examined, and also the ways in which each household is influenced 
by a set of external forces, forces originating from within the 
village community, and forces external to it, e*g. the market*
What requires consideration now is the response of the individual 
to opportunities and to choice. Different households respond in 
different ways to economic opportunity. While glutinous rice 
production is still the predominant branch of agriculture, recently 
upland cash-cropping and dry-season second cropping have become 
increasingly important agricultural activities. There are also 
opportunities for off-farm employment outside the village, in Na 
Chuak Nuea for example, the employment of full-time irrigation 
guards. Similarly, just as each household chooses between a set of 
different activities through which to obtain money income, they 
choose between a set of alternatives in spending this income, some 
choosing to purchase predominantly consumer items, others choosing 
to reinvest. Choice and the different responses to opportunity in 
this peasant community need to be investigated.
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Entrepreneurship
first, two ideal types, the 'entrepreneur1 and the '.conservative1 
need to be defined. These two terms are not mutually exclusive, for 
as Alexander'*' remarks
"entrepreneurs can be innovative, conservative, aggressive, willing to 
live and let live and so on. The patterns - one may speak of typologies 
- cannot easily be formulated in terms of precise, quantifiable relation­
ships" .
The term entrepreneur is used here to denote the type of villager who 
innovates, he readily reorganizes his production activities to novel 
ends. Conservative1 here denotes the villager who fails to respond to 
economic opportunity preferring to continue his production along trad­
itional well-known lines.
A number of models have been used to explain entrepreneurship. Some
2
are psychological models, e.g. McClelland's model which focussed on the
3'need for achievement', others are sociological, e.g. Parsons' model 
based on the criteria of ascription and achievement. McClelland's model 
isolates a psychological factor at the root of entrepreneurship. The'need 
for achievement' is the desire of certain individuals to do well, to 
improve themselves and to excel*. He defines a person with a high need 
for achievement as someone performing challenging tasks, where skill is 
involved, who takes moderate risks; they search out positions of respons­
ibility, namely action areas where they feel their individual efforts 
influence the group. McClelland's definition should be considered 
relatively, for of course every farmer, even the most subsistence- 
orientated^ can be seen to perform challenging tasks involving skill and 
a risk element. Parsons' ascription-achievement model has been used as a 
sociological tool to explain entrepreneurship* Finney argues with 
reference to Polynesian and Melanesian societies that differences 
in their status-mobility systems (the extent to which
1 Alexander, A; "The Supply of Industrial Entrepreneurship", Explorations 
in Entrepreneurial History. No. 4, 1967, p.136
2 McClelland, D; The Achieving Society* Princetown, 1961
3 Parsons, T; and Shils, E; Toward a General Theory of Action* Massachusetts
1959
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a social system emphasises achievement or ascription) results in
different styles of entrepreneurship#
The Goroka, a Melanesian people, operate in an 'open-society'
where achievement is emphasised# Their involvement with the market
economy began with the introduction of coffee as a planatation crop
and "hardly had the Gorokans begun to eqrn money from their coffee 
than they began t<j> cast around for ways to invest their newly- 
acquired wealth" •
Finney notes that the Gorokans were more investment orientated than 
consumption orientated, and capital items were their first buys.
Leading this plunge into the cash economy were a group of local 
entrepreneurs of varied backgrounds: ’big-men of business’, ’pioneering 
entrepreneurs' who perceived new market opportunities and exploited 
them by combining the means of production in new ways. Some of these 
men were established leaders, but most were enterprising young men.
In Tahiti, a stratified society emphasizing ascription, the first 
men after European contact who can be identified as entrepreneurs were 
a group of important chiefs. ThesB chiefs rather than using commerce 
to achieve leadership status, used their chiefly positions to dominate
trading relations.
2
Alexander argues that in societies where ascription is the rule 
the entrepreneurial class is liable to be small and lack dynamism because 
economic activity is unlikely to be a status-conferring variable.
Where achievement is stressed the entrepreneurial group is likely to 
be both large and dynamic as there will be many people who seek to
3
achieve higher status through economic activity. Geertz in his study
1 Finney,8 ; "Big-Men, Half-Men and Trader-Chiefs: Entrepreneurial Styles 
in New Guinea and Polynesia", in Epstein, T; (ed), Opportunity and 
Response f London, 1972, p.120
2 Alexander, A; op.cit; p.117
3 Geertz,C; Pedlars and Princes. Social change and Economic Modernization 
in two Indonesian Towns. Chicago, 1963
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of the Indonesian economy suggests that entrepreneurship occurs in
a well-defined homogenous group which has crystallized out of a
larger traditional group which has a long history of extra-village
1
status and inter-local orientation* He seems to support Hagen's 
theory that economic development is initiated by individuals and 
groups marginal to the accepted social order. Parsons' ascription- 
achieVBment model may explain differences in styles of entrepreneurship 
between different social systems, but it does not offer any explanation 
of differences in economic response within any one community.
The innovators and their non-innovative counterparts in the 
village of Na Chuak Nuea will now be discussed in an attempt to 
delineate any particular socio-economic characteristics which may 
explain the different- responses to economic opportunity. The following 
entrepreneurial types may be identified:
1. Agricultural innovators, i) The second croppers
ii) Upland farmers initiating the 
change from kenaf to cassava
2. Itinerant merchants
3. The village 'gamblers'
4* The guards
1. Agricultural Innovators, (i) The second croppers
With the introduction of irrigation it has become possible to 
cultivate a second dry-ssason crop on the rice land. In 1971, 17^ of 
the sample households were producing a second crop, mostly cucumbers, 
on a small-scale, usually less than 1 rai. A small amount: 10-20 kg 
would be consumed by the household and the remainder, about 125 kg 
sold in the market. In 1975, 57^ of the sample households were 
practising second-cropping, again mostly cucumbers, with some water­
1 Hagen, 5; On the Theory of Social Change. Illinois, 1952
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melons, peanuts and a variety of vegetables.
In Na Chuak Nuea the irrigated farmers can be divided into three 
groups. From the 1975 sample there are those households who began 
second-cropping immediately, that is in the same year that irrigation 
water became available, there are those villagers who had delayed 
second-cropping for a number of years, and lastly those who although 
in receipt of irrigation water have not yet begun to make use of it 
for dry-season cropping. One feature which distinguishes these groups 
is the structure of the household. Table 3.1 shows that there is a 
significant difference between the two groups with respect to the 
response pattern, simple household types tending to delay their response 
to the new opportunity, while extended households on the whole responded 
immediately.
Table 3.1: Household Structure and Response to Dry-season Irrigation,
Ban Na Chuak Nuea. 1975
Immediate Delayed or
response no response
n - 19 n = 18
No. % No. %
Simple Households 7 36 13 72
Extended Households 12 64 5 28
X. ^ = 4.65 (p value - 0,05)
The whole question of response is complicated by the fact that
different households received irrigation at different times with some 
households first receiving water some 7 years ago. However, if only 
those villagers receiving water in 1972 are examined the same pattern 
of response related to household structure emerges (see table 3.2).
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Table 3*2t 1975 Sample Households receiving Irrigation in 1972
Immediate Delayed starters 
No* No.
Simple Households 1 5
Extended Households 5 0
Again, it must not be inferred that differences in the household 
composition between the groups are only differences in labour availability, 
as the ratio of labour units to the unit area cultivated to rice is the 
same* In certain cases, particularly the newly formed household with 
young children and only one adult male worker, labour shortage may 
explain why a household is not second-cropping in the dry-season, which 
traditionally was a favoured period of off-farm employment. In 1971, 
when second-cropping was being practised on a very small scale, most of 
the labour was contributed by the women. In 1975 this division of 
labour is no longer apparent, and of those households second-cropping 
males are now making a large contribution* If second-cropping is 
regarded as a novel form of economic activity involving a certain amount 
of risk-taking and uncertainty, certain households are clearly in a 
more favourable position to experiment in this direction than others.
The simple household under the over-riding authority of one male 
responsible for raising a family is less likely to consider changing 
its traditional dry-season activities whatever they are, than the 
extended established household directed by an older man, perhaps less 
reluctant to leave the village in the dry-season in order to wage- 
labour.
ii. The innovating upland farmer
Until five years ago the predominant upland crop was kenaf, 
accounting for 30$ of the cultivated upland area* Cassava was then 
introduced as a new cash crop. In Na Chuak Nuea in 1971, 51$ of the
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village were growing kenaf, but no-one in the sample had yet begun 
to cultivate cassava. By 1975 cassava growing had become as important 
as kenaf and in the 1976 sample there is only one farmer continuing 
to grow kenaf. The major upland crop is now cassava.
Table 3.3. Kenaf and Cassava Cultivation. Ban Na Chuak Nuea,1973-1976
Kenaf__________ Cassava
1973 1975 1976 1973 1975 1976
Planted Area 
in rai 103 77 1 31 106 119
Harvested Area 
in rai 72 76 1 29 103 108
Averaqe Yield/ 
rai 129 91 200 11*59 827 1092
Total Village 
Production 9.350 6.980 200 34,500 85,000 118,000
Averaqe Price/
J<a 2.6 2.7 2 0.2 0.2 0.4
Kenaf is considered to be a difficult, smelly crop; it has to be 
soaked in water, retted, and then stripped of the fibres. Uhile the 
price of kenaf is dropping, cassava prices doubled between 1975-1976. 
Another advantage with the new crop is that cassava companies, which 
have recently been built in the area, hire groups of labourers to go and 
harvest the cassava crop in the fields, transporting the produce back 
to the factory by lorry.
In 1972 two of the sample households w b t ©  growing cassava. Both 
households were of the extended type, both with the heads of household 
in their forties, with resident son-in-law units. In 1973 six households 
were growing this new crop, four of these were households of the extended 
type, again with household heads in their forties. Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 
show that a pattern emerges which is related to both the structure of 
the household, and the age of the household head. Newly formed house­
holds of types 1 and II (if growing an upland crop), are still growing 
kenaf. The most developed type of simple household III and the extended
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types, if growing cassava in 1972 and 1973 have heads of household 
predominantly in their forties. In 1973 the heads of extended households 
continuing to grow kenaf are predominantly in their fifties and sixties. 
Here therefore thB categorization of household types needs to also take 
account of the age of the household head. It was found that the newly 
formed household with a young head is persisting with his traditional 
upland cropping pattern, so too are the younger and much older heads of 
the extended households. Those innovating with cassava in 1972 and 
1973 are men mostly in their forties.
Pig. 3.1. Cassava Growers. Ban Na Chuak Nuea. 1972 and 1973,
Household Structure *■
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Fig. 3.2. Kenaf Growers. Ban Na Chuako Nuea. 1973
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* For the key to household types see page 78,
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Another pattern which emerges is that the upland innovator is 
more likely to be a rice deficit producer. In 1975 the rice surplus 
producers, predominantly farmers with irrigation, are for the most part 
still growing kenaf; of those growing cassava, all but one are also 
continuing to grow kenaf. The majority of rice deficit producers however, 
have completely dropped kenaf cultivation, and are concentrating on 
cassava. A similar pattern emerges with second-cropping: rice deficit 
producers in 1975 are more likely to grow a second-crop than to cultivate 
kenaf. In this year all those deficit rice producers who have irrigation 
water are second-cropping, and those who do not have gained access to 
irrigated land (mostly by free-use). However, only 38^ of the irrigated 
surplus rice producers are growing a second crop. These patterns of 
participation, (see Fig. 3*3), suggest that those households successful 
in the traditional sector - glutinous rice cultivation - are displaying 
a traditional attitude to one form of agricultural innovation: the 
cultivation of new crops.
Diffusions of innovation
Diffusions of innovation have been shown to display a series of 
recurring traits. The most easily observed is the curve of cumulative 
growth'*'. If individual adopters are measured over time an S-shaped curve 
normally appears. The Gurve indicates a slow take-off stage, an inter­
mediate stage of rapid growth, and a final stage of declining growth.
1974 data for Na Chuak Nuea is not available; however the available 
data for 1971-1973 and 1975-1976 indicates that the adopter distributions 
for cassava cultivation and second-cropping are somewhat dissimilar. Ihe 
curve for cassava cultivation (Fig, 3.4) conforms to the S-shaped curve, 
while for the second-croppers there is a composite curve, with an increase 
in adoption between 1971-1972, a decrease between 1972-1973, an increase
1 Pemberton, H; "The Curve of Culture Diffusion Rate", American 
Sociological Review. 1, 1936, pp 547-556
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Figure 3.3
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Figure 3.4 Adoption of Innovations: Cassava and Second Cropping, 
Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971-76
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in 1974, followed by another decrease in adoption in 1975, The devel­
opment of second-cropping has been somewhat erratic, and can be partially 
explained by the poor market for dry-season crops, erratic prices^, and 
technical problems relating to water-sending.
The different stages of diffusion of innovation can normally be
2
shown to have a spatial distribution • The theory suggests that in 
the initial stages adopters are usually concentrated in a small cluster 
or set of clusters. In the intermediate stage of expansions adoption of 
the innovation is more likely to occur in the vicinity of existing 
adoptions, although sometimes a jump occurs and a new centre of dispersal 
may be formed, Map 3,1 indicates the location of plots of those households 
growing cassava in 1972 and 1973 (the initial stage) and also of households 
growing cassava in 1975 (the intermediate stage), A certain spatial 
distribution is apparent; and two of the farmers cultivating in 1973 
(nos, 59, 36) hold adjoining plots close to the two early adopters 
(nos, 3, 28), Furthermore, in 1975 many of those households growing 
cassava hold adjoining plots of upland.
This spatial distribution of adopters is perhaps more evident on 
Map 3.2; the initial cassava adopters form two residence clusters, with 
those households beginning to cultivate the crop in 1975 (the intermediate 
stage) emanating outwards from these centres. The map also shows that 
cassava adopters are for the most part resident to the north of the 
village.
From the 1975 sample there are nine households who have resisted the 
change in the upland cropping pattern, and despite the general trend they 
are continuing with kenaf cultivation. Map 3.^2 shows that they form a
1 Average Price of 1 kg cucumbers: 1972 1.9 baht, 1973 0.3 baht, 1975
1,9 baht, 1976 1.6 baht.
2. Hagerstrand, T; "Quantitative Techniques for Analysis of the Spread of
Information and Technology", in Anderson, C; and B o w m a n ,  M; (eds) 
Education and Economic Development, Chicago, 1965.
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relatively close residence cluster in the central and northern sections 
of the village, fig* 3,5 shows that a number of the households marked ’ 
on the residence map are kinsmen of varying degrees of relatedness. One 
of the initial adopters (no, 28) is a member of the village temple 
committee and the other (no. 3) is the divorced sister-in-law of the 
village headman. The two assistant village headmen (no. 7Q^128) have 
both resisted the change to cassava cultivation. Many of those farmers 
still cultivating kenaf are growing this crop on upland areas within 
the lowland, (See Map 3.1) while it is apparent that the bulk of the 
new cassava cultivation is confined to a section of upland proper to 
the west of the irrigation canal. It could be argued that the location 
of plots is a decisive factor here, particularly accessibility. However 
the two households continuing to grow kenaf in 1975, who were also 
enumerated in 1976 (no. 70, 119) had in 1976 changed to cassava 
cultivation.
The discussion now turns to a consideration of the non-agricultural 
innovators in the village.
2. Itinerant traders
Within the village there are a number of individuals engaging in 
trading activities of some kind; they are best termed sporadic because 
their trading activities are in many cases on an irregular basis and in 
all cases these villagers devote part of their time to the family farm. 
The range of their activities is such that no precise typology of 
activities can be offered. Some trade in agricultural produce, others 
in livestock and others in consumer goods. Sometimes the transactions 
are on a regular basis, for example one woman buys toys and sweets from 
Kalasin which she exchanges around the villages for scrap metal which 
she then sells in Khonkaen? a neighbouring provincial capital, 80 km 
away. She makes four trips annually, netting 4QQ baht profit, not an 
outstanding sum; and in order to finance the venture she originally
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borrowed 1,000 baht. In another transaction recorded, a villager 
exchanged two cows valued together at 12,000 baht for a car which he 
then sold for 14,000 baht. There is also a livestock dealer buying and 
selling cattle on the same day; with the profits he purchased himself a 
truck and he runs a pick-up service down the irrigation access road 
which links many of the villages to the main road to town.
Compared with the agricultural innovators, these occasional 
traders conform more exactly to the classical entrepreneur. While the 
agricultural innovator can be seen to reorganize his traditional means 
of production to novel ends, these individuals in most cases are 
devising novel means to an end. Tj-|8y operate as individuals outside 
the context of the village, often far afield. Their ventures are 
uncertain, depend on extra-village contacts, and require a sense of 
financial calculation. Most of these individuals are in their fifties, 
or older. They are heads of either large simple households with adult 
unmarried children, or extended households, and for the most part they 
have large land 1 holdings. The range of profits from the various 
ventures is between 400-20,000 baht. In many cases they act as money 
lenders, charging interest rate of 10^ a month. Map 3.5 shows that 
these villagers can be found in two residence clusters - one to the 
north and one to the south of the village.
3. The Rambler1
The entrepreneur figure involved as he is in risk-taking ventures 
is often called a gambler. In a discussion of the different types of 
entrepreneurship in thB village the ■village gambler’ should be 
examined. Gambling with cards and dice appears to be becoming popular 
in the village, although as yet only small sums of money are involved. 
Another very popular form of gambling, involving considerably larger 
sums of money is cockerel fighting. A few of the villagers own fighting 
cocks, a good one costing between 2,000-3,000 baht. The village headman,
Map 3.3 Residence Clusters: The Guards and Traders 1975
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owner of five fighting cocks, holds the village licence and is 
entitled to ±Q% of all stakes placed in the village. Owners also take 
their cockerels to other villages, or even other North-east provinces 
for matches; the winnings often amount to hundreds of baht. Cock-fighting 
is entirely a male sport; women never own fighting cocks, and are never 
spectators at village contests.
4. : The guards
With the construction of irrigation works in the area, opportunities 
arose for off-farm employment, and a number of male villagers now work 
part-time as construction labourers. A number of villagers have also 
been employed as irrigation guards, and receive monthly salaries of 
between 700-2,000 baht. Dressed in khaki uniforms, these villagers 
together with the village headman symbolically bridge the gap between 
the peasant villager and the government official. The irrigation guards 
are included in this discussion on economic response because these 
individuals have chosen to re-organize their livelihoods; they have 
exchanged a role of full-time farm management for salaried office in 
an administrative structure outside of th8 village. While some continue 
to supervise their farms, others have rented out their land to other 
villagers. Guards were first employed by the Royal Irrigation Depart­
ment in 1963. Recent regulations stipulate that employees must have 
completed military service, but in 1963 employment was open to any able- 
bodied males. This opportunity was advertised through a poster displayed 
in the irrigation engineer's office, and news of it spread by word of 
mouth down to the villagers. Na Chuak Nuea, lying close to the dam 
site, has at present thirteen villagers employed as guards, and nine of 
these were first employed between 1963-1965. For the most part the 
guards are heads of households, in their forties, although there are 
two young men in their thirties, who are still living with their in­
laws. Among the group there are four pairs of brother, and in one kin
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group two sons, the mother's brother and the mother's sister's son- 
in-law are all guards. Furthermore, a certain residence cluster is 
apparent (see Hap 3.3). Three of these guards are considered to be 
the wealthiest members of the community; they are large landowners, 
one owns a village rice mill, and their holdings are worked by hired 
labourers. Many of the guards are money-lenders, charging 10% monthly 
interest rates. Most of those not lending money are themselves receiving 
loans, their salaries proving good credit,
Socio-Economic factors influencing Innovation
Returning to Hagen's notion of social marginality, it is necessary 
to determine whether there are any individuals or groups in the village 
that can be considered marginal to the social order, if so, can it be 
demonstrated that these individuals or groups are leading the plunge into 
the monetary economy either by initiating agricultural innovation, devel­
oping trading activites, or displaying any forms of entrepreneurial 
activity?
In some respects females can be considered to occupy marginal roles 
in village society in that they never occupy roles of formal leadership, 
they are excluded from joining the religious order of the Sanqha, and 
in certain contexts they are considered as a defilement'*'. In reality 
the authority of the female, both at the household and the village level 
is not insignificant. The headman's wife performs informal duties, 
acting as consultant and intermediary, takes a vocal part in village 
meetings, and is herself referred to as 'phuyaiban', (village headman). 
Furthermore, the social structure though based generally on bilateral
1 A Buddhist monk becomes 'polluted' if in physical contact with a 
woman, and requires ritual cleansing.
2 Which as one informant suggests may be related to the ineffectiveness 
of the Headman, who is constantly conducting 'business in town'.
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principles of kinship has a marked matrilineal bias expressed through 
matrilineal residence, matrilineal inheritence and the structure of 
kinship terminology* Therefore, although women occupy marginal roles 
within certain dimensions of the social order - the formal roles of 
authority in the political and religious domains; any tensions emanating 
from this marginality are certainly counteracted by other principles 
of the social structure.
Within the village a distinction can be made between thoss males 
born in Na Chuak Nuea and those who have been resident only since 
marriage. It could perhaps be argued that those males coming into the 
village on marriage are more marginal to the social order, composed as 
it is by ties of kinship; and it has been postulated that in-marrying 
males with their extra village orientation are more likely to be innov­
ators.^
Relative age is another factor of great importance in village life. 
Throughout all Thai society social respect accrues with age. Traditionally 
a junior must subordinate himself to his Blders, who excercise political, 
jural and economic authority over him. Formal leadership positions were 
the traditional monopoly of the village elders.
From the discussion of response to opportunity and entrepreneurial 
activity no general pattern emerges which indicates that groups marginal 
to the social order are being encouraged to enter into new ventures. 
However, analysis has shown that there are different types of entre­
preneurship - there are the agricultural innovators, both on the lowland 
and the upland, the itinerant traders, thB part-time 'gamblers', and 
those who had sought permanent salaried positions outside the village.
0, Ng, R; "The Demographic Pattern". Lam Pao Report Series No. 1. 
1974, p.4
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Those involved in upland innovation were for the most part 
farmers without access to irrigation water (therefore marginal in respect 
of the allocation of a resource), and,it could be argued, marginal to 
the social order, in that the social order itself is expressed through 
the landholding pattern. However, even if the theory of social 
marginality can be shown to be the decisive factor in entrepreneurship, 
it is a complex concept to deal with in an analysis of a peasant village 
such as Na Chuak Nuea, where there is a rapid erosion of gerontocracy 
due to education, where marriage patterns are being transformed, 
resource distribution profiles changed, and where in short, basic 
principles of organization are being altered.
To review the main points: in the village of l\Ja Chuak Nuea 
different types of entrepreneur can be identified. The term entre­
preneur has been employed loosely to cover a range of activities: 
agricultural innovation (initial and imitative), both on the upland and 
lowland, trading activities, off-farm employment and occasional 
gambling.
It was found that innovation within the traditional branch of 
the village economy was a function of household structure: simple 
nuclear households delaying in their response. Innovation on the 
traditionally marginal upland was a function of household structure, 
the age of the household head and resource availability. Those 
villagers unsuccessful in the traditional branch: lowland rice 
production, (now more a function of lack of irrigation), were leading 
the upland innovation. It was noted that older heads of households 
well-endowed in land were conducting various trading ventures, and 
large landowners, utilizing kinship links had monopolised jobs offered 
by the Irrigation Department.
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Earlier the various theories purporting to explain entrepreneur­
ship, were briefly mentioned including McClelland's model which sought 
to explain the phenomenon psychologically. The domains of psychology 
and social structure are of course not discrete, and the social values 
of a society become a part of the psychology of the individual. Equipped 
with neither a method for measuring psychological indices such as the 
"need for achievement", nor the theory of the discipline I conclude 
by emphasising that while psychological factors may play an extremely 
important part in determining economic response, a variety of social 
and economic factors such as household structure, residence patterns, 
kin relations and the household's position and standing in the system 
of resource distribution are still important factors influencing 
patterns of response to new economic opportunities. Furthermore it is 
necessary to distinguish between different forms of entrepreneurship: 
agricultural innovation on the lowland is to be distinguished from 
innovation on the upland, and the agricultural innovator reorganizing 
his traditional means of production is again to be distinguished from 
the individual seeking new opportunities outside the village, whether 
as a trader or as a low-grade government official.
The Development Potential of the Village
The previous discussion was concerned with the different 
responses to opportunity within a peasant community. It is now
necessary to consider the problem on a wider comparative level. Much
has been written on the development potential of different societies, 
that is the degree to which the established social order of a
community is inimical to change. This problem was the theme of a
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collection of papers edited by Epstein and Penny .
"All our contributors have found that the social system each 
studied is composed of a set of socio-economic variables some^of 
uihich helped to promote development while others hampered it" .
Epstein argues that the development process consists of the suitable
interaction of three major sets of factors; resource endowment, type
of social system, and manner of external contact* External variables
operating on any particular social system are of major importance*
The importance of agricultural extension work on Highland New Guinea
coffee growers, the influence of Dutch colonialism on the Karo Batak
of Indonesia, the stimulus that European business firms provided for
Tahitian elites, or the impact of the foreign ideology of socialism
3
on the Burmese socio-economic system are cases in point. Epstein
concludes this study by categori2ing a certain number of variables
relating to resource endowment, the social system and the manner of
external contact as contributing to either high or low development
potential* An abbreviated version of Epstein’s summary is presented
in Table 3.4. The table presented on page ^122 is inevitably simplistic
covering as it does such a large range of factors.
"The study of development requires the simultaneous analysis 
of a large number of variables and relationships on both the individual 
and the social level, and in several major institutions of any ^ 
community ... To focus on only one aspect is to invite distortion" *
Epstein remarks on the almost impossible task of constructing a
general model of development,
"there are so many different factors to take into account, each of 
which has a range of possible qualities, that it seems impossible
1 Epstein, T; and Penny, D; Opportunity and Response. Case Studies 
in Economic Development* London, 1972
2 Ibid; p. 245
3 Ibid; p.245
4 Ibid; p.241
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Table 3.4
Abbreviated version of Epstein's ’Dimensions of Rural Development ,1
Resource Endowment
High Development 
Potential
Low Development 
Potential
Land
area under 
society1s 
control
Labour
working
population
Capital Goods
tools and 
equipment
Technology 
and skills
Economic
Productive
unit
Entrepreur-
ship
Largely exceeds subsistence 
needs
Not fully employed in 
subsistence
Readily available
At a sophisticated level
Traditional Social System
Small, socially integrated
Stress on innovation
Specialization Division of labour
Exchanges
Consumption
Savings and 
investment
Social
Generally accepted means of 
transaction
Falling short of output
Thriftiness an important 
prestige criterion
Organization
Status
Egalitarian 
Achieved 
Kinship system Patrilineal
Family structure Three generation joint-family
Residence Patrivirilocal
patterns
Land tenure Individual tenure
Just meets subsistence 
needs
Fully employed in 
subsistence
Absent
Crude
He terogen tous
Stress on conformity
Most tasks performed 
by most.families
Barter
Absorbing total production 
Conspicuous consumption
Hierarchical 
Ascribed 
Matrilineal 
Nuclear family 
Avuncovirilocal
Vague group tenure
1 Ibid p.248
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Table 3.4 continued
High Development 
Potential_____
Inheritance Main property intact
Reciprocity Group members supporting their
economic leader
Leisure Readily forgone
Time horizon Long term effects considered
Prestige
criterion
Religious
beliefs
Political
Independent 
state
Factions
Leadership
Qualities of 
Leadership
Cash crops 
Crop prices 
Marketing
Shop goods
Transport
facilities
Conspicuous investment
Sanctioning thriftiness
Stress on economic growth
Encouraging rival leaders 
to greater achievements
Based on individual qualities
Able men interested in achiev­
ing common good
External Contact
Sound world markets
Stable or steadily increasing
Efficient, large scale arrange­
ment
Amply available 
Network of roads
Low Development 
Potential_____
Fragmentation
Group members acting 
as drag on ambitious men
Valued highly
Short term gains only 
taken into account
Conspicuous consumption
Encouraging lavish expend­
iture on feasts and 
places of worship
Overriding emphasis on 
social factors
Diverting leaders' 
interests from economic 
matters
Hereditary succession
Selfish men out only to 
maximize their own welfare
Strictly limited outlets 
Declining or fluctuating 
Individual small traders
Unobtainable or scarce
No roads linking villages 
with marketing centre
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to advance any all-embracing development hypothesis" «
However Epstein's analysis, constructed as it is from a number of 
research papers on New Guinea, Indonesia, Malaya and Burma offers a 
good starting point in any attempt to assess the development potential 
of a social system* How then does the village of Na Chuak Nuea rate in 
terms of developmental potential?
Resource endowment, the Social System and External Contact, Na Chuak Nuea.
Land. The average land holding is considered more than adequate 
for subsistence needs; but recent population pressure has exhausted the 
forest margins, and little land remains to be cleared. The size of a 
holding however, is a somewhat crude measure and land productivity needs 
to be considered* Crop damage, flooding and drought are still major 
problems to many farmers. 'Second-cropping', - one of the main aims 
of the development officials, implies an extension of the agricultural 
cycle throughout the whole year. Thus, response to this opportunity 
does not require land over and above that required for subsistence 
cultivation. In 1972, 61% of the village had upland plots (with an 
average holding of 3 rai) suitable for the cultivation of cash crops, and 
4% of the village held fallow land. The labour requirements of subsistence 
agriculture need not conflict with those for dry season crapping, except 
in certain cases of early rains where the harvesting of a second crop 
may converge with the ploughing of the paddy. Nor need there be any 
conflict between labour requirements for upland cropping and rice 
cultivation. A conflict does emerge however, between labour for dry 
season cropping and the traditional dry season off-farm labouring. Wage- 
labouring opportunities outside the village are increasing, and many
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young people enjoy this opportunity to leave the village and meet new 
people. Tools, equipment and inputs are readily available but 
financial constraints, especially the cost of fertiliser are impediments 
for large scale adoption. Many farmers still carve their own wooden 
ploughs, although most households are now making annual purchases of 
hoes and metal plough heads. The land holding pattern, with the 
traditional system of raised dykes (bunds), and the inaccessibility of 
much of the land are barriers against adoption of tractor ploughing.
The level of traditional technology can be said to be highly adapted to 
the environmental settingj but the imposition of the irrigation system 
can be seen in many ways to conflict with this traditional adaption.
The traditional land-holding pattern: elongated plots, extending through 
different elevations,is not best suited to irrigated agriculture, and in 
somB nearby villages land consolidation programmes are being introduced. 
Furthermore, the traditional system of paddy cultivation favoured 
extensive cultivation, while irrigated agriculture requires intensive 
cultivation.
The productive unit, the household, is small and socially 
integrated. The head of the household, in his role as husband, father 
or father-in-law manages the farm unit. In discussing patterns of 
innovation it emerged that those villagers without irrigation are more 
ready to experiment with agriculutural innovations than those receiving 
irrigation. There is little division of labour in agriculture, although 
men traditionally plough. Certain villagers can be considered livestock 
specialists, others skilled housebuilders, but apart from this there 
has been no great degree of specialization nor technical division of 
labour within the village. The Thai baht is a generally accepted 
medium of transaction, although barter and payments in rice still 
constitute important items of exchange. There has long been a traditional
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ricB surplus far many households although for some consumption still 
absorbs total production. 5av/inqs and investments, traditionally in 
the form of gold, jewellery or livestock were necessary insurances 
under such erratic climatic conditions, where flooding or drought 
could deplete production. Conspicuous consumption, the building of 
a fine new house, the ownership of watches, radios and a set of town 
clothes have an important prestige value.
The social organisation of the village can be described as 
egalitarian, it lacks a strict hierarchical arrangement of status groups, 
and nothing resembling a caste system can be identified. Certain status 
distinctions between lay and clergy, male and female and in particular 
senior and junior are important indicators for role behaviour and they 
structure most social relationships. Status in the village community 
is based on achievement, as was to be expected under a pioneering system 
where a young man would leave his village on marriage to clear his own 
land. There are no hereditary offices, either in secular or religious 
leadership. Economic status will increasingly depend upon inheritance 
and therefore ascription, as land pressure increases, and as the value 
of irrigated land rises. The kinship system is bilateral with a matrilat- 
eral bias; this was well suited to a pioneering spirit, the sons 
leaving to clear land, the daughters inheriting the parental plot.
However, as the irrigation programme is implemented these patterns are 
likely to change, and already sons in the village are less willing to 
leave, and are keen to jointly inherit the parental plot, especially if 
it is irrigated. The household structure is characterized by both 
nuclear and joint extended families, but recently the rate of household 
formation has declined. Residence patterns are strongly uxorilocal, 
there is individual land tenure, and a general process of fragmentation 
of property through the traditional system of inheritance. The economic 
efforts of an individual are to no great extent constrained by his duties
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of kinship real or fictive. Certain mechanisms of redistribution 
operate, especially through the temple, but the product so distributed 
is small. Reciprocity of kin labour enabled some households favourably 
endowed with land to produce above their own labour capabilities.
Leisure is highly valued, "Pai thiaw". to travel around other villages, 
to take trips into town, especially during the dry-season, is a much 
favoured, and not easily relinquished, pastime associated with much 
merry-making* Much of the dry-season is devoted to ritual and ceremonial 
festivities, especially during the New Year when festivals can extend 
through two months. The village time horizon has traditionally been 
geared to one agricultural season. In any subsistence economy short­
term considerations - the satisfaction of immediate consumption require­
ments - necessarily were of overriding importance. Recently, cassava 
production has increased substantially on the upland, although some 
agriculturalists have argued that the upland cultivation of cassava will 
in the long term drastically reduce soil fertility. However, some 
farmers who have speculated in land prior to the implementation of 
irrigation certainly considered the long term effects of their actions. 
Prestige is associated both with the ownership of consumer goods: a o b w  
house, watches, radios and town clothes, but also with investment - for 
example, ownership of livestock. As Buddhists and animists there is 
nothing in a villager’s religious values system comparable to the 
Protestant ethic which sanctions thriftiness. There is a certain amount 
of expenditure on religious ceremonies and the village as a whole supports 
the abbots, monks and novices supplying food and clothing and constructing 
and repairing temple buildings.
The Government of Thailand’s main target for the North-east is 
economic growth which,it is argued, will foster political stability. 
Leadership is based on individual qualities, but the styles of leader­
ship are changing as village headmen, now salaried Government
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employees are drawn more and more out of the village into the local 
administrative centre. The role of the headman has changed from that 
of a village father figure to an administrative intermediary. The 
position of headman now more than ever brings with it opportunities 
to maximise their own economic standing, ^he production of the cash crop 
kenaf was in response to the failure of a jute harvest in Bangladesh, Its 
importance as a cash crop has declined and has been replaced by cassava 
from the roots of which a type of flour is extracted, which is an 
important export. Villagers complain of a lack of a local market 
for the dry-season vegetables which can explain to a degree the slow 
development of this cropping practice. Prices for most crops are rising 
although there are fluctuations. Marketing arrangements are various, the 
most organized system is for cassava, where companies hire labourers to 
come into the villages to harvest the crop. Villagers Bither transport 
their own rice to the market or traders purchase the crop in the village. 
Shop goods in ample supply in the local town find their way into the 
village shop and travelling merchants sell goods in the village. The 
village is reasonably accessible, pick-ups transport villagers to the 
main road and the journey to town tak^s approximately half an hour.
Table 3,5 offers an abbreviated summary of the analysis.
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Table 3.5. Development Potential, Ban Na Chuak Musa.
Land
Labour
Tools
Technology & skills
Economic 
Productive unit 
Entrepreneurship
Specialization
Exchange
Consumption
Savings and
investment
Social
Social Organization 
Status
Kinship system 
Family structure
Residence Patterns 
Land Tenure 
Inheritance 
Reciprocity 
Leisure
Time horizon *
Prestige criteria 
Religious beliefs
High Potential
Resource Endowment
Area adequate for subsist­
ence needs
Wot fully employed in 
subsistence
Readily available
Highly adapted to envir­
onmental setting
Traditional Social System 
Small, socially integrated
Certain sections of the 
community readily accepting 
innovations
The baht generally accept- 
form of transaction
Generally falling short of 
output
Egalitarian
Achieved
Bilateral
Increase in extended 
households
Individual tenure
Declining
Low Potential
Increasing land pressure, 
soils marginal
Traditional off-farm 
dry season labouring
Capital constraints
Conspicuous investment 
(livestock and land)
Little specialization
Conspicuous consumption
Uxorilocal
F ragmentation
Highly valued
Traditionally 'short­
term' gains only taken 
into account
Recently prestige assoc* 
iated with ownership of 
consumer goods
Expenditure on feasts 
and the templB
continued:
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Continuation; 
Table 3.5;________
Political 
Independent State 
Leadership
Qualities of 
leadership
Cash crops
Crop prices
Marketing arrange 
ments
Shop goods 
Transport
High Potential Lou Potential
Stress on economic growth
Based on individual 
qualities
Increasing opportunities 
for leaders to maximise 
their economic standing
External Contact 
World markets
Rising Fluctuations
Various, no efficient 
large scale arrangement 
except for cassava
Readily available in 
town
Road links to town
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Ulhat may ba concluded from this excercise? It first suggests
which dimensions of the social system are suited to development, and
which on the other hand are likely to impede it, and, for the social
scientist, it indicates in which areas of social life conflicts are
likely to arise. Those factors under the heading of the traditional
social system (see Table 3.5.)which are labelled of low development
potential include the lack of specialization, residence and inheritance
patterns, and certain aspects of the value system of the community: the
importance of leisure, the traditional time-horizon, prestige criteria
and religious beliefs. The patterns of inheritance and residence, and
the values of the community were adapted to the traditional village
socio-economic system, based as it was on subsistence cultivation;
however, many aspects of the traditional system can be seen to accommodate
themselves to economic development'*', even to foster it. The model, as
2
Epstein is quick to point out, needs more refinement . Actual social 
relations rarely enable precise categorization, A variable is not 
entirely one thing nor another (for example status is often ascribed 
and achieved). Nevertheless the model as it stands is important as it 
illustrates the way in which a traditional social system contains 
elements which are likely both to foster and impede economic development, 
and it indicates in which areas of social life, conflict is likely to 
be engendered through economic change.
Choice
Response to economic opportunities often but not always involves 
a choice between alternatives. Whether to continue a well-tried, 
traditional branch of agriculture, or to try one's hand at a newly 
introduced crop or method, is but one example. Of course the choice 
may not be open to certain villagers; if a household's land is unirrigated, 
and if access to such land through other means is not possible, the 
choice to second-crop or not is not open to them. Another area in which 
choice becomes an important concern is in village expenditure. Previously 
when surplus rice from a good harvest was sold in the market the small
1 Economic Development here specifically referring to the transformation 
from subsistence to commercialized agriculture
2 Epstein op cit. p, 246
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amounts of income received were enough to purchase small consumer items, 
or to convert into investments such as livestock or jewellery. As rice 
production is boosted, and as cash cropping and dry-season cropping 
increase in scale, larger sums of money enter into the household, 
sometimes, in the case of the village salary owners, on a regular 
monthly basis. The choices excercised in the spending of this income, 
whether to purchase predominantly consumer items, or whether to re­
invest in the productive cycle say a great deal about the primary values 
of the village community.
A household re-investing in the productive system should not be 
regarded as behaving more rationally than another household donating a 
larlge sum of money to the temple, or spending their income on a fine 
new house; these are all different types of investment. The first is 
investment in the economic sphere, the second in the religious sphere 
(increasing merit, believed to be a guarantee for the next life) and 
the third, investment in the social sphere through ownership of prestige 
items. Furthermore, these different types of investment often complement 
each other. Investment in the religious sphere: a donation to the 
temple, or the organization of a ceremony, may be made with the expect­
ation of an increased yield during the next season* Investment in the 
economic spheres the purchase of improved seed, or the application of 
fertilizer, may be calculated to raise a household's income and savings, 
soon to be directed into thB purchase of a new house, or radio. 
Furthermore, the use of capital in-puts (re-investment in the production 
cycle) does not necessarily go hand in hand with the notion of the 
commercial farmer. The commercial farmer purchasing in-puts reckons to 
increase his productivity for a maximum money return. While in the 
village there are households doing exactly this, there are others beset
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by a particularly disadvantageous situation who reinvest their income 
in the productive system in order to maximise a poor perhaps even 
subsistence production. There are many^cases where insecticide has 
been purchased and applied at the last minute in a usually futile 
attempt to save a bad crop. In other cases a chronic household labour 
shortage may be met through the hiring of labour. The patterns of 
village expenditure for 1975 will now be examined, in order to ascertain 
whether any patterns emerge relating to the choices excercised in the 
spending of household incomes.
Consumer Goods
House construction
The standard of house construction found in the village varies 
considerably. There are small flimsy constructions of rough wood, 
bamboo, rattan, dried leaves and rushes (see Photograph 1). Items such 
as these can be collected around the village, and houses of this type 
require a minimum of skill and time to construct. Host dwellings of this 
sort are found on the margins of the village, ^he most elaborate houses 
are large, with three or four rooms, a kitchen area, and a large sitting 
area. Still predominantly built of wood, they have sturdy corrugated iron 
roofs, staircases, often elaborately carved, and shuttered windows (see 
Photographs 2 and 3). In some cases the traditional style of the North­
east Thai house is being radically altered. Some houses are now 
built on ground level with a concrete floor (the traditional house is 
raised on stilts) and there are internal staircases. These houses offer 
more security against thieves - an important consideration now that items 
of value: radios, cassettes and watches are owned by most villagers. The 
style of a new house is a development towards privacy and must have some 
impact on the tone of social life, traditionally characterized by open­
ness .
Styles of House Construction
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Certainly the ownership of a new-style house is considered to 
be an important status symbol by many villagers* In 1975 the new 
headman frequently displayed his shame at owning a small house, built 
by his in-laws some 3D years ago* Within a year he had purchased a 
new house from his brother-in-law, emigrating from the village. The 
construction of a new house may take as long as fifteen years, but the 
usual time period is three and it seems that much prestige is associated 
with speedy construction. One of the village irrigation guards, for 
example, constructed a new house in three months. The speed of construc­
tion is of course related to the availability of capital. The cost of 
a new house is estimated to be between 20,000 - 30,000 baht* A tin roof 
would cost about 3,000 baht and each wooden post approximately 200 baht. 
The increasingly high standard of village house construction is likely to 
cause same conflict in certain areas of the village ideological system. 
Traditionally, certain natural phenomenon such as lightening striking a 
house, are considered to be inauspicious omen. If any house met such a 
fate it was immediately dismantled, and the author witnessed such a 
case in 1975. When houses could be reassembled swiftly with little 
effort or expense, no great hardship or financial loss was entailed. 
However, when houses are valued at 30,000 baht compliance with tradit­
ional beliefs will surely be questioned. Previously, villagers 
constructed their own houses with kinsmen and neighbours lending a hand. 
Now it is more common to employ a skilled house builder of which there 
are two or three in the village, but craftsmen are often employed from 
other villages, ownership of a fine new house is not always an
indicator; of economic standing nor of capital availability, A number 
of households are said to have obtained wood illegally and kinsmen still 
contribute their labour, so hired labour costs need not be a factor.
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However, generally the standard of house construction is an approximate 
indicator of economic standing* Turton comments in his study of a 
Northern Thai village:
" a large and well-built house is the most conspicuous evidence of 
uaalth differences in the village"!.
Other consumer goods
Consumer goods purchased include clothes, radios, watches and 
bicycles. All these items are associated with the widening contact 
of the village with the outside. Clothes and watches are only worn on 
special occasions in the village and are mostly kept for trips to town. 
Radios are an important channel for communication and bicycles, owned 
mostly by the irrigation guards, are an important means of transport.
The purchase of clothing from the town has increased recently but mostly 
among the younger villagers. Everyday wear for village women is still 
the cotton sarong, often woven on a home loom and a simple cotton blouse, 
and for men a 1pakhamaf, a strip of cotton tied round the waist and 
between the legs. Photograph 4 shows the village headman setting off 
after the rains to clear a blocked ditch in the village. Photograph 5, 
the same man returning from a trip to town. Around his neck he wears a 
string of lucky charms to protect him from evil spirits and bullBts while 
out of the village. The percentage ownership of watches, rgdios and 
bicycles for 1971 and 1975 is given in Table 3.6.
1 Turton, A; Northern Thai Peasant Society. A Case Study of Jural and 
Political Structures at the Village Level and Their Twentieth Century 
transformations, (Ph.D) London, 1975f p.|70
137
The Village Headman Dressed for Village Work
The Village Headman Dressed for Town Business
138
Table 3.6, The ownership of certain consumer items, Ban Na Chuak Nuea,
1971 and 1975
1971 1975
No. owning % no. owning %
Watch 17 49 19 43
radio 17 49 35 79
bicycle 10 29 18 50
Re-investment in Production
Almost eTOryone in the village is investing to some extent in 
the productive system. Village expenditure on fertilizer, seeds, 
insecticide and labour and tools per household ranges between 
18-8000 baht. It is also common for villagers who rent out their land 
for a share of production to provide seed and fertilizer. Information 
from a supplementary questionnaire in 1975 indicated that of those 
farmers growing glutinous rice no-one had used purchased seed, nor had 
any households used tractors for ploughing. Fertilizer had been applied 
to 60% of the area under glutinous rice, and insecticide to 15$£ of the
area. Insecticide was clearly being applied to already badly affected
crops, as those farmers using insecticide obtained substantially lower 
yields. There is a greater use of agricultural inputs for second- 
cropping. All those households growing a second-crop had used purchased 
seeds, fertilizer and insecticide. Villagers generally expressed the 
opinion that fertilizer and insecticide are only required for dry-season 
cropping, and are of little value during the paddy season. ^ or upland
cultivation a small number of households had hired tractors for ploughing,
and insecticide was used by one household, but purchased seed and 
fertilizers had not been used.
In 1975 the majority of the village - Q7% - were re-investing
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part of their income in livestock. Sums of money of between 25-31,000 
baht were spent, mostly on poultry and cattle. One household purchased 
two white brahmin cows costing 15,500 baht a head. Livestock has 
traditionally been an important form of investment, and as noted in 
Chapter 1, there has been a recent trend towards livestock specialization. 
Although a number of households who have no access to lowland are 
specializing in livestock as a viable alternative to rice cultivation, 
there are a number of large landowners on the lowland who are still 
re-investing income from the sale of their rice surplus into livestock.
Other Expenditure
Other items of expenditure include medical expenses (ranging from 
20-40,000 baht), education (15-4,000 baht), repayments of loans (100-
11,000 baht) and the purchase of food and rice (30-4000 baht).
Table 3.7. Expenditure patterns: Percentage Distribution, Ban Na
Chuak IMuea, 1975.
Food and Rice 11.12
Medical 19.15
Education 1.85
Making Merit & Ceremonies 3.70
Clothing 10.99
Consumer Goods 5.63
House Construction 3.88
Repayment of Loans 7.75
Agricultural inputs and
Equipment 11.59
Livestock 22.45
* The sum total is not equal to 100,00 due to rounding.
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Table 3,7. shows that the expenditure for medical treatment, education 
and food purchases (32.13^ of total expenditure) is not far short of 
expenditure on production (agricultural inputs, equipment and livestock) 
34.05^. Consumer items: clothing, housing and other goods account for 
20,5%, Looked at in this way the village is re-investing more in the 
productive process than spending for consumption.
When the analysis is focussed at the household level it is 
difficult to identify within the village any clear distinction between 
the consumer spenders and the re-investment orientated spenders* In any 
one year a household may make a heavy expenditure on consumer items, and 
in another on livestock or capital inputs. It is important in this 
respect to appreciate that the range of consumer goods available for 
purchase is limited in a certain way. There is within the village a 
ceiling to material aspirations. Watches, radios, a set of town clothes 
and a new house virtually exhaust the range of items found in the 
village. Some form of transport may be purchased if a household has 
a member working on a regular basis outside the village. Consumer 
aspirations are limited by the social values and the present circumstances 
of village life. This situation will undoubtedly change in the near 
future when the village becomes electrified. In a nearby village, Ban 
Turn, which has recently received electricity, there has been a marked 
increase in consumer spending, led by the headman, who purchased a 
fridge and a television as soon as his cables were laid. At the present 
time in Na Chuak Nuea many villagers are re-investing a larger proport­
ion of their income into thB productive system rather than on consumer 
spending, not I would argue because they are more 'investment oriented' 
but because their immediate consumer needs are satisfied. Consumer needs 
in a peasant society cannot be considered infinite, as in western society, 
but are limited by the circumstances of village life.
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Credit
Another opportunity available to the villagers are loan facilities. 
The availability of loans from both institutional and non-institutional 
sources, and the uses to which the loans are put, will now be considered. 
Within the area there are a number of farmer associations* Their main 
functions have been the supply of credit, agricultural inputs, and the 
marketing of farm produce. Table 3.8. shows the membership of various 
institutions for Na Chuak Nuea in 1971 and 1975.
Table 3.8. Membership of Farmers1 Associations, Ban Na Chuak Nuea.
1971 and 1975
Agricultural 
Credit Associat­
ion
Land Co-op
Farmers Group
Water Users 
Association
1971 
No. %
1 2*9 Multi-purpose
Co-op
2 5.7 Land Co-op
2 5,7 Farmers Group
7 20 Water Users
Association
1975
No.
7
%
20
12 27
1 2.2 
25 57
In order to apply for co-operative membership a farmer must be
in possession of the N.S. 3 certificate, or have two other society
members act as guarantors. For the Land Co-op one guarantor is required
for a loan up to 5,000 baht but the loan must be no more than 60/£ of
the total annual value of his farm produce. Oemaind-comments that
’’such regulations on participation and the fact that only 25?S of the 
farmers interviewed ... were members of farmers’ associations lead to 
the hypothesis that co-operative societies at work are tending to 
restrict their activities to a select group of farmers, usually the 
richer ones with the larger holdings'^.
1 Demaine, H; The Role of Farmers Associations in Agriculutural 
Development. A Case Study from N.E. Thailand. S.O.A.S. Occasional 
Paper 1976, p.17. (Reprinted from the 1974 Yearbook of Agricultural
Co-operatives).
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In his analysis Demaine shows that there wars significant differences 
between members of the co-ops and non-co-op members. Co-operative 
members were typically owners of larger holdings, and they also held 
larger paddy areas. ^hey were also richer with higher total incomes, 
and incomes from crop sales. Demaine concludes
"the co-operatives seemed only to be used by those most capable of 
increasing their agricultural production through further capital 
investment out of their own resources ... in this way they have been 
helping to increase income disparities at the local level and to create 
rifts in the traditional society"1 .
Some of these propositions will now be examined with reference to 
Na Chuak Nuea. Land Co-operative. The former village Headman was 
president of this co-operative, and one of his assistants was also an 
early member* All those farmers (from the samples) who have joined the 
co-operative since 1971 are close relatives of either the old Headman or 
his Assistant, with the exception of one case. Five members of the 
co-operative are related to the former Headman, through his wife’s 
mother, and four of the members are related to the assistant (see fig. 3.6),
Fig. 3.6. Members of The Land Co-operative, from the 1975 sample, by year
of entry, Ban Na Chuak Nuea 
Year of Entry
1971 Thongcan (former Headman)
Khamta (Assistant Headman to both former and
present Headman)
PaBnq (Khamta’s Father’s younger brother)
1972 Phutta (Nonq  ^ of Thongcan)
1973 Bua (no kin relation)
Sing (Phi^ of Khamta)
Pirn (Nong of Khamta)
1974 Nae (Nong of Thongcan)
Wandi ■ (Nong of Thongcan)
Somorn (Nong of Thongcan)
Paenq (Nong of Thongcan)
Udom (Phi of Khamta)
1 Ibid; p.18
2 Nong denotes a younger classificatory sibling, 
Phi denotes an elder classificatory sibling.
143
From the sample, seven households were kinsmen of the former Headman 
and all but two were Land Co-op members. While some of these Co-op 
members can bB considered the rich of the village with large land 
holdings and high incomes, half of them do in fact have below average 
incomes, and four of them are smallholders. Kinship relations, here 
with the Headman or his Assistant seem to be^important factor* further­
more the former Headman was known to have distributed free co-op 
fertilizer among certain of his relatives who were not Co-op members.
Six of the Land Co-op members in 1975 had unpaid loans (with an 
interest rate of 12^). The former Headman obtained the largest, 10,000 
baht, for the purpose of land clearance. The other loans were all 
in the region of 3,000-5000 baht. Those in receipt of loans were the 
wealthier members, although there were two cases where small holders 
received loans for non-productive purposes (a 2,000 baht loan for 
general consumption, and a 4,500 baht loan for house repairs). If 
membership of the Multipurpose Co-op is examined no clear pattern of 
close kinship ties between members emerges. Another distinction between 
this Co-operative and ths other is that while the majority of Land 
Co-op members derive their largest source of income from traditional 
sources: crops and livestock, the Multi-purpose Co-op members, for 
the most part, derive most of their income from off-farm sources, and 
in fact have below average crop incomes. Five of these Multi-purpose 
Co-op members have received loans of between 600-10,000 baht (again at a 
12% interest rate), ThB purpose of these loans included purchase of 
agricultural equipment and inputs, land development, labour hire, and 
in one case, land purchase; so many of those who have been earning 
income from extra-village sources are ultimately investing these incomas 
in the village.
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In the years 1971-1974 there has also been an increase in the 
number of people loaning sums of money to their relatives. In 1971, 
20^ of the samplB, compared to 3Q% (13) in 1975 were receiving interest- 
free loans from their kinsmen. In 1971 the average loan was 442 baht 
A and in 1975, 1,213 baht, an increase approximately equal to the increase 
in village incomes (bearing in mind the inflation rate) within this 
period. A small number of loans are made from traders, with interest 
rates varying from 5-10$£. While many of those receiving loans from 
kinsmen can be categorised as the 'poorer-relatian’ - small-holders 
with at present no access to the co-operative associations - there 
are a number of wealthy families making use of these loan arrangements. 
In 1975, one of the richer farmers with 4,500 baht in a bank account 
borrowed 500 baht from a relative for a one month period in order to 
purchase livestock. Another wealthy farmer, a member of the Land C6- 
operative, borrowed 1,000 baht each from three sets of relatives, all 
repaid within one month, one loan to cover medical expenses, another 
for livestock purchase, and another to help repay a 3,000 baht loan 
from the Land Co-op. While the majority of loans from the Co-operative 
institutions were used for production, those from relatives were 
utilized mainly for consumption purposes (See Table 3.9). Only 4 
out of a total of 20 loans are for productive purposes. The procedures 
involved in obtaining a co-operative loan are often lengthy and kinsmen 
are still an important source of ready cash to meet sudden cash needs.
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Table 3.9. Loans by source and by purpose. Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975.
Land purchase
Land Co-op Multi-purpose
2
Relativ
1
Land development 2 1 -
Tractor hire 1 - -
In-puts - 1 -
Hiring labour 2 1 1
Livestock purchase - - 2
General consumption 1 1 11
Medical expenses - - 4
House repair 1 1 -
Loan repayment - - 1
The period of loans made by kinsmen varies from 1-12 months depending 
in the size of the loan. UJhile a figure in the region of 80,000 baht 
had been borrowed from the co-operative institutions and an 18,000 baht 
from kinsmen, 8 members of thB 1975 sample (18^) were holding in total
52,000 b.aht in bank accounts, sums of money ranging between 5,000-10,000
v
baht. The whole question of savings is difficult to examine due to the 
fact that in many cases money is saved ’under the mattress’. Amounts 
of money held in the home are usually small, usually under 500 baht.
Fear of theft usually deters most householders from keeping larger sums 
of money. Those keeping bank accounts are usually saving for a particular 
purpose, to buy livestock and in one case a tractor. Once the required 
sum is obtained the money is withdrawn and the account closed.
In this chapter certain patterns of response to opportunity were 
examined. Different types of opportunities, both agricultural (cash 
cropping and second cropping) and non-agricultural (trading activities 
and salaried employment outside the village) were discussed, and for 
each different type of opportunity a different pattern of response 
emerged. The different patterns related to a number of factors: 
structure of the household, the age of the household head, the wider
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kin group, residence clusters and resource endowment. Those 
innovating on the upland were predominantly extended families, and 
the first adopters were predominantly men in their forties. Those 
households marginal to the traditional subsistence system, namely 
those deficit in their rice production, were displaying a higher 
response to agricultural innovation, both in changing to the new 
cash crop and in their experiments with second-cropping. Those 
successful in the traditional sector, namely the surplus producers, 
displayed a traditional attitude towards agricultural innovation, and 
many of these households were participating either in trading activities 
outside the village, or had monopolized certain opportunities for 
salaried office with the local irrigation department.
Having considered a number of socio-economic factors influencing 
opportunity response within thB village the discussion continued with 
an analysis based on Epstein's model of those elements in the socio­
economic system inimical or conducive to economic change. It was shown 
that certain features of the social structure: the residence and 
inheritance patterns, and certain ideologies: the value of leisure, 
the traditional short 1time-horizon*, and the expenditure on ceremonials 
and places of worship were inimical to development. The chapter cont­
inued with an examination of choice, as expressed through village 
expenditure patterns, and it was argued that no clear distinction can 
yet be made between investment and consumer-oriented spenders. The 
membership of agricultural co-operatives in thB village was examined, 
the conclusion being that the new ;opportunity of institutional credit 
in the village may well have been limited under certain circumstances 
to restricted groups, namely certain clusters of kinsmen.
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The rangB of choices now open to villagers, both in the methods 
of acquiring money income, and in spending it, have recently been 
expanded. An explanation of the patterns of response to choice and 
opportunity must take account of basic principles of social organization: 
the demographic composition of households, residence patterns, and kinship 
networks, as well as economic factors relating to resource endowment.
The various responses to new opportunities can never adequately be 
explained by psychological factors alone.
CHAPTER FOUR
ECONOMIC CHAMGE AMD CHANGING PATTERS OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION
ThB discussion so far has been concerned with certain changes 
that have been occurring in a village community during its transformation 
from subsistence to commercialized agriculture. Innovations, whether 
the use of irrigation, the introduction of a new crop, or whatever, 
modify pre-existing institutions and radically affect the complex network 
of relationships between them. It is useful here to recall the 
distinction between structural changes: changes in the character of 
the social system when conflicts are not resolvable in terms of the 
existing values of society, and Firth’s concept of organizational change, 
changes in ways of doing things, which themselves continue to be done 
and in the extent and range of particular complexes of social relation­
ships which remain formally unaltered.'1' Firth's concept of organizat­
ional change does involve some change in the nature of social relation­
ships and so in their structure. So as Beattie comments:
"a decision as to the point at which organizational change, which may 
be gradual and cumulative, becomes important enough to qualify as 
structural change, must to some extent be arbitrary1’2,
Beattie suggests that these two types of change arB  best considered as
two different stages of the same process. In this study of a Northeast
Thai village change for the most part is at an early organizational
stage. This chapter discusses certain specific implications of these
changes for the community under study.
1 Firth, R; Social Change in Tikopia, London, 1959
2 Beattie, 3; Other Cultures, London, 1964, p.247
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It has often been argued that economic advance, the increased 
division of labour, the establishment of market relations and the 
accumulation of capital necessarily leads to a continuing cumulation 
of economic advantage and disadvantage with a polarization of peasant 
society into rich capitalist farmers and poor small land-holders, or 
wage labourers* Ng, speaking of the transition from subsistence to 
commercialized agriculture writes:
"The obvious result of this rapid transition is a basic transformation 
from the harmonious village community into a divisive society with 
large land owners and landless share-croppers, money lenders and chronic 
debtors"!.
The Measurement of Socio-Economic Change
Patterns of Socio-Economic Nobility in Peasant Communities
First of all it is necessary to present an analytical model of
socio-economic change, for the major conceptual sub-divisions most
generally accepted as aptest for the analysis of stratification relate
2
to a man's position in the socio-economic system. Shanin , delineates 
four basic types of peasant mobility expressible on two major scales 
of possible change,
a) an aggregate shift expressing general bettering or worsening of the 
socio-economic position of a peasant society as a whole;
b) differentiation, the processes expressing changes in the socio­
economic differentiation of the society.
An aggregate upwards or downwards (see graphs (i) and (ii), will be 
recorded as a movement of the second curve to the right or left 
respectively. Polarization, see graph (iii) will flatten the second
1 Ng, R; "Rural Change in South-east Asia", in Geography. Vol.59, Part 3,
July 1974, p.256
2 Shanin, T; The Awkward Class, Oxford, 1972
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Figure 4.1 Types of Mobility in Peasant Society 
(Graphs of Socio-Economic Change)^
(i) Aggregate shift upwards (ii) Aggregate shift downwards
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Figure 4.2 Changes in Household Income. Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975
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Income
1 Source: Shanin; T; op.cit; p.51
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cutvb (more households at either end of the scale) and levelling 
(see graph (iv) will round the curve (a higher concentration of 
households in the middle range).
In the empirical case there is often a combination of aggregate 
movement and differentiation* Fig. 4.2. illustrates the changes in 
household income for Na Chuak i\luea 1971-1975. Here there is no clear 
cut pattern of total aggregate movement^. polarization or levelling.
The curve in 1975 appears flatter, indicating a relatively higher 
degree of polarization. However, some polarization can be identified 
in 1971 with a clear gap between the mass at the lower end and a small 
group of rich at the upper end. The 1975 curve flattens but with a 
shift to the right indicating a movement of lower middle range house­
holds to the higher end of the scale. Change may be expressed in 
this way: from the viewpoint of the total community, or alternatively, 
the analysis may focus on the individual household:. Shanin argues that 
the mobility of individual households in a peasant society is multi­
directional in character and consists of opposing movements of individual 
households which cancel themselves out when analysis is confined to thB 
study of the mobility of the society as a whole.
"The net mobility of a peasant society can be seen as the tip of an 
iceberg, the summary results of socio-economic changes of much greater 
magnitude"1.
Furthermore, Shanin argues that there is a strong centripetal mobility 
of peasant households in relation to the median wealth of a particular 
society with rises of poorer households and descents of wealthier ones* 
Thus, he argues:
1 ibid? P*74
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"given the existence of demonstrable centrifugal forces in a society 
in which socio-ecobomic stratification does not disappear, it follows 
that centrifugal tendencies must be operating to countervail the centri­
petal forces. A complex multi-dimensional mobility involving centripetal 
and centrifugal tendencies simultaneously operating among peasant house­
holds is at work and underlies the gross differentiation process in 
peasant society" !.
Work on the pre-revolution Russian peasantry also indicated 
that there was some cyclical mobility with certain households consistently 
fluctuating between different stratas. Shanin argues 
that multi-directional and to a lesser extent cyclical patterns of 
mobility at work check the crystallization of the Russian peasant 
socio-economic strata into classes.
Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility in Ban Na Chuak Nuea.
The use of categories representing the various socio-economic 
strata permits the identification of socio-economic mobility within the 
village of Na Chuak Nuea over a period of four years. The following 
factors are used: the area planted to rice, rice production, herd size, 
off-farm income, the number of working males in the household and the 
household size. In Fig.4.3, the figures in squares A,A', B,B' ....
E,E' indicate those households which are in the same category for 1971 
and 1975. Those figures falling to the left of the diagonal bar 
represent those households in various degrees of descending mobility, 
and those to the right of ascending mobility. A weakness of the model 
is that it does not take aGCountof cyclical mobility. For example, a 
household who has not changed stratum may well have fluctuated in the 
intervening years. In Shanin's analysis, data with a ten year interval 
was used.
1 Ibid; p.74
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Figure 4.3 Household mobility. Land planted to rice
A' B' C' D' E
No. of households 1975 2 2 7 4 4
1971
A = Nil 0 xO \ 0 0 0 0
B = 1-10 rai 1 0 \ o \ . 0 1 0
C = 11-20 rai 7 1 I"'X^i^x O 1
D = 21-30 rai 6 0 1 3 ^ \ 2 \ > 0
E = 31+ rai 5 1 0 0 1 \ .  3
(10 changes in strata)
A B C D E
1971 0 1 7 6 5
1975 2 2 7 4 4
Changes = (+2) (+1) (0) (-2) ("
Figure 4.4 Household mobility. Rice production
A' B' C' D' E
No. of Households 1975 3 3 8 3 2
1971
A = Nil 0 \0 0 0 0
B = 1,000-3,999kg 7 2 ^ \1 0 0
C = 4,000-6.999kg 10 1 2 V \ 3 \ 3 0
D = 7,000-9.999kg 2 0 0 I s-x 0 \ 2
E = 10,000 + 0 0 0 0 0 \\ °
(15 changes in strata)
A B C D E
1971 0 7 10 2 0
1975 3 3 8 3 2
Changes = (+3) (-4) (-2) (+1) (+2) = 6
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Figure 4.5 Household mobility. Herd size
A 1 B' C f D 1 E* 
No. of Households 1975 3 0 12 2 2
1971
A s Nil 1 ^ 1 \ 0 0 0 0
B = 1 8 2 X\ ° \ 6 0 0
C = 2-4 4 0 o \ . 2 \ 2 0
D = 5-7 3 0 0 3 \ o \ \ °
E = 7+ 3 0 0 1 0 \ 2
(14 changes in strata)
A B C D E
1971 1 8 4 3 3
1975 3 0 12 2 2
Changes = (+2) (-8)(+8) (-1) (-1) = 10
Figure 4.6
% of off-farm to total income)
A = Nil
No. of households 
1971 
0
1975
B = 0-25% 7
C = 25-50% 10
D = 50-75% 2
E = 75-100% 0
A B C D E
1971 0 7 10 2 0
1975 3 3 8 3 2
Changes = (+3) (-4) (-2) (+1)(+2)
A 1 B' C' D' E
3 3 8 3 2
0 ^ \ 0 0 0 0
2 s' \ 4 0 0
1 2 ^ \ 3 0
0 0 -s2
0 0 0 c N \  0
(15 changes in strata)
Figure 4.7 Household mobility. The number of working males
No. of households A' B' c* D' E
1971 1975 0 8 6 2 3
A nil 0 0 0 0
B 1 11 \ 7 1 0
C 2 5 0 1 " " \ 3  '\ 1 0
D 3 2 0 0 0 " " \ 2
E 4+ 1 0 0 0 0 ^
(6 changes in strata)
A B C D E
1971 0 11 5 2 1
1975 0 8 6 2 3
Households changing (0) (-3) (+1) (0) ( +2)
Figure 4.8 Household mobility. Household size
No. of households A T B ’ C’ D
1971 1975 0 8 8 3
A 1-3 members 2 ^0 \ 2 0 0
B 4-6 7 0 \  4 \  3 0
C 7-9 7 0 2 "- • \ 0
D 10+ 3 0 0 O'''"\ 3
(5 changes in strata)
A B C D 
1971 2 7 7 3
1975 0 8 8 3
Households changing (-2) (+1) (+1) 0 (changes = 3 )
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It is apparent from the analysis that there is a high degree of multi­
dimensional mobility. In Fig. 4.3* the area planted to rice, it is 
apparent that an attempt to measure the mobility of the village by 
comparing differentiation in 1971 and 1975 would have indicated that 
15% of the group had- changed strata (3 cases) whereas an examination 
of individual household mobility indicates that 52^ of the group have 
in fact changed strata.
Table 4,1, Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility, Ban Na Chuak Nuea,
1971-1975
No Change Ascending Descending
Mobility Mobility
Land Planted
3ases % Cases % Cases %
9 47 2 10 8 42
Rice Product­
ion 4 21 9 47 6 31
Herd size 5 26 8 42 6 31
Off-farm
income
4 21 9 47 6 31
No. working 
males
11 58 7 37 1 5
Household size 12 63 5 26 2 10
Two of these factors: "Area Planted" and "Rice Production" will have 
been influenced by the environmental factor; in 1971 there was substantial 
rainfall, in 1975 drought conditions prevailed. Table 4,1. shows that 
the highest rate of mobility occurred with respect of rice production, 
with mobility in herd size of almost equal magnitude. In all cases, 
except the area of land planted, the rate of ascending mobility is 
greater than that of descending mobility, indicating a general pattern 
of an aggregate moVB upwards. The greater number of cases of descending
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Figure 4.9 Socio-economic Change in Ban Na Chuak Nuea 1971-1975
1975
A r e a  P l ant ed
=> 1 0 -
R i c e  P r o d u c t i o n
C l a s s
H e r d  Si z e
C l a s s  
O f f  F a r m I n c o m e
A B C D E  a B C D E
Class
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mobility in the case of an area planted is explained by the general 
trend of intensification of agriculture. "The number of working males" 
and "Household-size" showed the least number of changes between the two 
years.
These changes in the area planted, in the production, herd-size and 
off-farm income are expressed diagramatically in Fig. 4.9. The histograms 
I, II, ahd 11/ show that there has been an increase in the range of variations 
polarization (the histograms for 1975 on the right are horizontally wider) 
and for rice production and for off-farm income they show a movement of 
households into the higher classes, something of an aggregate shift up­
wards .
Table 4.2. shows the actual mobility of each of the households. It 
can be seen that there is no pattern of one-directional movement within 
each household with respect to the different classes; the household acquir­
ing another male worker does not necessarily increase area planted, 
production or its herd-size. There are only seven cases of households 
who have not descended in any of the strata (Nos. 1, 5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 19).
All these households except no. 19 are extended households with a resident 
son-in-law unit. The four households displaying the greatest rate of 
downward mobility were all of the simple nuclear type (see Fig. 4.10),
Fig. 4.10. Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility and Household 
Composition, (l) Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971-1975
Household Type *
Age of
Household
Head
I
—  5
II
i m p
III 
1 8 —
IV
-Extend
V
ed—
o^ 0 CO i -<— ► -4-- ►
501 s I ^ ^
40's \ \ ^— _► ---► —
30's M ^
20's
I downward mobility 
no change
* For an explanation of Household types s b s  page 7 8
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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able 4,2. Household Mobility, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1971-1975
.and Planted! Rice Prod- 
uction 
71 75 M*| '71 '75 1*1
Off-Farm
Income
’71 '75 N
No.Male
Workers
'71 '75 M
Household
Size
t 7T~'75 M
Herd
Size
'71 '75 M
D D 0
D 0 B 0
E 0
0 B
M - mobility 
0 = none
= ascending 
-  =s descending
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In Fig. 4.11. each household has been designated as showing predominantly 
upward mobility ( |) predominatly downward mobility ( |), no change (
or equally represented combinations, such as upward mobility and no
change ( !-►), upward, downward mobility and no change ( j*")*
Fig. 4.11. Patterns of Socio-Economic Mobility and Household 
Composition (il). Ban Na Chuak Nuea. 1971-1975
_______ Family Type <________________Age of
Household
Head
Ila lib
Simple ---------
Ilia Illb 
— Extended -----
60's \ M L
50»s t -
401 s \ — U
30rS 1 t — —
20 ’s
From this composite picture a pattern emerges of simple nuclear-type 
households tending to displayA static or descending pattern mobility and 
extended type households ascending or static patterns of mobility.
A number of generalhypotheses have been formulated to explain the 
mobility of households in a peasant society. The developmental cycle 
of the household, the cumulation of advantage and disadvantage, the 
random oscillation of peasant households, crises and strokes of luck play 
an integral part in peasant life. A detailed study of the causes of this 
mobility would be of value* An equally important consideration relates 
to the consequences of this mobility, and it is to this problem that the 
discussion now turns.
Dg^initions of Class and Status
"Social scientists Have been particularly interested in structural 
changes, i.e. those creating qualitatively new social structures and 
organizations. Yet the social significance of repetitions,, fluctuations, 
oscillations and cycles seems beyond doubt and time and time again has
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provided exciting and illuminating insights into social reality" .
The processes of socio-economic mobility will inevitably be 
affected through the transformation from subsistence to commercialized 
agriculture# The regulation of irrigation water, and an increase in 
the number of regular salary earners are just two features which will 
regulate the farm economies, and this in turn will to some degree alter 
the mobility patterns. In order to comment on the possibility of some 
form of class formation in the North-east of Thailand, it is necessary 
first to review briefly some of the main conceptual distinctions between 
the notions of social stratification, class and status.
Although problems of social inequality have been a major concern 
of social and political philosophers for thousands of years, most of 
the modern thinking on the subject has been influenced by Karl flarx.
Marx was concerned with the causes of inequality, and these causes he 
argued arose from man’s position in the productive system. Thus he 
argued that the objective differences in these positions and the differing 
interests which arise from these positions are the determinants of social 
aggregation, organization and conflict.
"The owners of mere labour power, the owners of capital, and the 
landowners, whose respective sources of income are wage, profit and 
rent - thus wage labourers, capitalists and landowners, constitute the 
three great classes of modern society based on a capitalist mode of
production"^.
By ’modern society’ Marx referred specifically to bourgeois society which 
developed historically from the Ancient and the feudal epochs. Further­
more, Marx argued that property is the essential condition that determines 
the mode of production of an epoch,
1 Ibid; p.116
2 Marx, K; Capital. A Critique of Political economy.vol.III. Moscow,
1959, p.862
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"The property question relative to the different stages of development 
of industry, has always been the life question of any given class"!„
The notion of property to be meaningful must, however, be comprehended
as an opposition between labour and capital, ThB basis of social classes
according to Marx therefore rested on relations of property and authority.
B^teille distinguishes between two aspects of social inequality:
the distributive and the relational.
"The first refers to the ways in which different factors such as income, 
wealth, occupation, education, power, skill, etc., are distributed in 
the population. The second refers to the ways in which individuals 
differentiated by these criteria are related to each other within a 
system of groups and categories''^.
The relational aspect of social inequality is an essential component of 
the Marxist conception of social class. Class, in the Marxist sense, 
implies a social ensemble characterized by its placB in the process of 
production, and characterized by a consciousness of itself in relation 
to other ensembles. Hence Marx’s dilemma is classifying the French 
peasantry:
"In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of 
existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their 
culture from those of other classes, and put them in hostile opposition 
to the latter, they form a class. In so far as thBre is merely a local
interconnexion among these small-holding peasants and the identity of their
interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organiz­
ation among them, they do not form a class''^,
4
Max Weber extended Marx’s theory of social class, for while 
conceding that control over productive property gives crucial control 
over life in general, he maintained that similar positions in the production 
system are not sufficient causes to motivate men to identify with each 
other and form common purpose groups
1 Ibid; p. 459
2 Beteille, A; (ed) Social Inequality, Harmondsworth, 1969, p.13
3 Marx,K; "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in Feuer, L; (ed)
Marx and Engels: Basic Writings,London, 1959, pp. 377-9 (First published
4 Weber, M; Class, Status and Power", in Tumin, M; 1852)
(ed) Readings on Social Stratification, Englewood Cliffs, l\I.O,, 1970
(article first published 1922)
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"the rise of societal or even of communal action from a common class 
situation is by no means a universal phenomenon"^-.
UJeber contrasted the notion of class with that of 'status group'.
A status group being a community determined by a notion of social honour,
"UIb wish to designate as 'status-situation' every typical component of 
the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or 
negative, social estimation of honour"2.
Weber argued that property is not always recognised as a status
qualification:
"very frequently every rational economic pursuit, and especially 'entre­
preneurial activity1 is looked upon as a disqualification of status"^ .
However the social evaluation of economic wealth varies with different
systems of social stratification, and Weber suggests that the predominance
of stratification by class or by status is related to general economic
conditions, specifically conditions of stability or change.
"When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relative­
ly stable, stratification by status is favoured. Every technological 
repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by 
status and pushes the class situation into the foreground’’^ .
Tawney likewise argues that social class formation is an inevitable
consequence of economic development, if such development is accompanied
by specialization.
"Clearly, the emergence of new social groups is a natural accompaniment 
of the differentiation of economic functions, of the breaking up, for 
example, of relatively simple and undifferentiated society into a 
multitude of specialized crafts and professions, each with its different 
economic metier"^.
1 Ibid; p.30
2 Ibid; p.32
3 Ibid: p.36
4 Ibid; p.37
5 Tawney, R; "Inequality and Social Structure" in Tumin, (ed) op.cit,
p.40
164
The principles of social stratification in Thai society will 
now be discussed, and the possibilities of an emergence of class 
structure, consequent to economic development, examined.
Social Stratification and the Thai Social System
A theory that runs through most studies of Thai social structure 
is the notion of a loosely-structured system. Embree^ described Thai 
social structure as lacking clear definition and rigid enforcement 
of role behaviour. The concept of 'loosely-structured’ served to 
contrast the Thai system with other systems not so loosely structured 
and in Amyot’s words,
"it remains particularly un-informative until the question rWhat kind 
of a loosely structured system?’ is answered"^,
Amyot characterises Thai society as a hierarchical ordering of status
groups, and he denies the existence of any class distinctions.
"Thai society today is organized into a hierarchy based on economic 
standing, political power and connections, education, outlook on life 
and family background ... The traditional division of Thai society 
into a ruling group, freemen and slaves has been modified into occup­
ational classes of government officials, merchants, artisans, and 
unskilled labourers, etc; However, consciousness is of status rather 
than class. Social status is graded, but there is no rigid line of 
class division"^
The absence of a class structure in the Thai social system is reiterated 
4
by Hanks , who argues that Thai society, with its hierarchy of fixed 
ranks describes a military organization more than an occidental class- 
type society. This system of ranks has its roots in the traditional 
’sakdi na1 system whereby Thais were assigned a numerical status index 
according to their position or occupation within this system of fixed
1 Embree,3; "Thailand: a Loosely Structured Social System", American 
Anthropologist, vol.52,1959, pp.181-193
2 Amyot,3; Provisional Paper on Changing Patterns of Social Structure 
in Thailand 1851-1965, Delhi, 1965,p.162
3 Ibid; p.171
4 Hanks,L; "flerit and Power in the Thai Social Order", American 
Anthropologist, vol.64,1962, p.1252
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ranks. Hanks argues that considerable mobility of movement is permitted, 
"The Thai social order roots individuals in no permanent rank"'*'.
Hanks supports this proposition with the example of the 'lowest man' 
catapulting himself to a position effectively superior to the king by 
taking vows and becoming a priest. However, although the estate of the
clergy is analysed in most of the literature as a part of the social
2
hierarchy it is somewhat outside of it, a point made by Ingersoll ,
Hanks suggests that the hierarchy and mobility of the social system 
is sanctioned by the Buddhist value system:
"As good Buddhists, the Thai perceive that all living beings stand in 
a hierarchy of varying ability to make actions effective and of varying 
degrees of freedom from suffering ... this hierarchy depends on a 
composite quality called 'merit* (bun)^".
Merit is continuously gained or lost depending on the behaviour of each 
individual. Hanks argues that the coherence of Thai society rests on 
'clientship',
"groups form only when a man has gathered resources and can distribute 
them as benefits others"^.
In a more recent work Hanks characterizes the Thai Social order as
a collection of self-sufficient units rather than specialized and
5
differentiated ones. He maintains that:
"there are no publics, no masses, nor even a proletariat"6, and
7
"concepts of class, elite and specialised institutions becloud our vision" .
1 Ibid; p.1248
2 Ingersoll^ 3; "The Priest Role in Central Thailand". In Nash, M; (ed) 
Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddism, New Haven, 1966, p.166
3. Hanks, L; Dp.cit, p. 1247
4. Ibid; p.1249
5. Hanks, L; "The Thai Social Order as Entourage and Circle", in Skinner,
W; and Kirsch, T; (eds) Change and Persistence in Thai Society: Essays 
in Honor of Lauriston Sharp. Ithaca, 1975, p.197
6. Ibid; p.207
7. Ibid: p.218
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Hans-Dieter Evers suggests that a class system is in the process 
of evolving in Thailand. He writes that the growing size, the mono­
polization of certain status symbols, the development of a distinct 
sub-culture and the concentration of economic and political power are 
indications that the bureaucratic elite are developing into a social 
class1 . Evers presents data to show that mobility between certain 
strata of Thai society has in fact declined. This notion of mobility 
is of central importance in discussing the distinction between a class 
and a hierarchical structure. Decline of mobility within a system of
hierarchally ranked status is conducive to class formation.
2
Although Wijeyewardene states that internal stratification is
universally low in rural Thai villages, and therefore Thai villages must
be characterized as egalitarian, there is abundant ethnographic evidence
which illustrates that important status differences exist within the
village, and Mulder has written that the concept of social equality is
3
unknown in the Thai cultural tradition. Age, sex, involvement in
religious affairs, education, occupation and wealth are all major factors
influencing rank and status differences within the Thai village.
Status Indicators 
Senior/Junior
The notion of age differences is implicit in the use of the pronouns 
phi and nonq - older and younger, and in general kin terminology which for
1 Evers, H; The formation of Social Class Structure. Urbanization, bureau- 
cratization and Social Mobility in Thailand, Clayton, 1965, p.19
2 Wijeyswardene,G; "Some Aspects of Rural Life in Thailand1' in Silcock, T; 
(ed) Thailand: Social and Economic Studies in Development. Canberra,
1967, p.74
3 Mulder, 3; "Origin, Development and Use of the Concept of 'Loose
Structure' in the Literature about Thailand: An Evaluation", in Evers,
H; Loosely Structured Social Systems: Thailand in Comparative Perspective, 
New Haven, 1969, p.19
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ego makes clear age distinctions between his own siblings together with 
the siblings of his parents* Age differences are also expressed in body 
movement, salutations with the hands and the lowering of the head and body. 
Floerman, in his study of Ban Ping writes,
"informal status, indicated by such things as pronouns used,; order of 
being served, and bowing •*. but not always in power and influence .... 
seniors outrank juniors"-*-.
In thB village of l\la Chuak Nuea, formal role behaviour associated with 
seniors and juniors is only clearly visible on formal occasions. By this 
I mean that everyday village life, on the face of it, lacks the formal 
behaviour noticeable in urban areas. On ceremonial occasions, seating 
arrangements, order of being served, and body movement is strictly 
enforced, but the salutation of a senior by a junior on entering the 
house, which I have observed in towns, occurs less frequently in the 
villages, although it is very much a feature of school life. I would 
therefore generalize here and suggest that formal role behaviour associated 
with age, and indeed other status indicators, is not an all-pervading 
system, but is 'situational1. Status differences emerge and are 
symbolized in various ways only on certain occasions,,, thus status 
distinctions in certain contexts are of a relative nature. Hors specific­
ally the status of the elder is realized in the religious life of the 
village. Flale village elders monopolize the temple committee, and the 
two village ritual officiants are both men in their late sixties. The 
female elders are responsible for the preparation of ceremonial objects, 
child-birth rituals, and they organize the presentation of the *daily 
food offering to the temple,
1 Floerman, FI; "Ban Ping's Temple; The Centre of a 'Loosely-Structured' 
Society", in Nash, FI; (ed) op.cit; p.140
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Male/Female
Status distinctions between males and females exist to the extent 
that females are not ablB to join the religious sangha, nor are they 
elected to political office. On ceremonial occasions seating arrange­
ments reflect the subordinate female position, males and females sit 
separately, females behind males. However, as noted in a previous 
chapter, the matrilineal ideology prevalent in the village as expressed 
through kinship terminology, inheritance and residence patterns, together 
with the powerful role of the female in household management, in effect 
reduces any status inferiority which might result from exclusion from 
the sangha, and from formal political office.
Lay/Clergy
One of the most obvious status differences within the village is
between the lay and clergy. The shaven heads and saffron robes of the
abbot, monks and novices are distinctive status indicators realised on
all occasions. Most men in the village become monks for an average
period of between one week and three months, between the ages of 17-20,
usually before marriage. While secular positions associated with religious
and ceremonial activities are mostly confined to the older members of the
lay community, the position of the abbot, monks and novices are occupied
by young men. The village abbot is 26 years old and novices are boys,
aged 10-12 years, usually from the poorer village households. Therefore
the status indicators of age and to a degree wealth (to be discussed later)
become submerged under an indicator of another order, religious merit.
The importance of the village priest is well documented in the literature.
1
Yatsushiro argues that the priest clearly outranks the position of head- 
man and school principal, and Ingersoll remarks that the status of the 
priest is the most highly elaborated and formalized role in Thai society.
The role of the priest is not confined to the realm of the sacred, .
1 Yatsushiro, T; Village Organization and Leadership in North-Fast Thailand 
a study of the Villagers approach to their Problems and Meeds,Thailand,
1966, p.38
2 Ingersoll,3; op.cit; p.51
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1
a point Kauffn&o makes in his study of Bangkhuad , The temple of Na 
Chuak Nuea performs an important banking function and loans of between 
1,000 - 4,000 baht with monthly interest rates of 5 baht are given 
from a central fund rumoured to amount to 100,000 baht. This fund is 
accumulated from money contributions made throughout the ceremonial 
year. Although the abbot controls the fund, any loans must be agreed 
to by the village headman and the temple committee.
Education
An important status-group within the village are thB school teachers. 
Excepting the religious Sangha. the school teachers form the most 
distinctive group within the village. They are the wealthiest village 
households, and their life-styles contrast sharply with their fellow 
villagers. One of the primary school teachers, living in a neighbouring 
village, is a very large landowner who owns a rice mill, pick-up truck, 
and a motor-bike. He has educated two of his children in the United 
States, and he lives in a large house expensively furnished and decorated. 
Another school teacher married the niece of one of the largest landowners 
in Na Chuak Nuea. He rents out his holding, a particularly good piece 
of land bordering the irrigation canal, to another villager.
Education is beginning to play a decisive role in creating different 
status groups within the village. By law all children are required to 
attend four years of primary education, however children from poorer 
households often attend irregularly, if at all, because their labour 
is often required on the family farm, or for livestock tending. Many 
of the wealthiest households are now sending their children to secondary 
school in the local town, and the case of one of the school teachers
1 Kaufman, Hj Banqkuad: A Community Study in Thailand, New York, 1960,p.69
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noted above, educating his children abroad, is an example of the extent 
of the educational aspirations that the wealthier village members now 
hold for their children#
Village Leadership
The action of a ’party’ in Weber’s sense, is orientated to the 
acquisition of social power.
"In any individual case, parties may represent interests determined 
through a 'class situation’ or ’status situation' and they may recruit 
their following respectively from one or the other. But they need be 
neither purely 'class' nor purely 'status parties', but sometimes they 
are neither" .
There are within Na Chuak Nuea a group of individuals elected to
occupy positions of leadership. The ultimate secular head is the
'phuyaiban'. the village headman. The title 'phuyaiban' implies the
notions of adult, elder and superior, floerman in analysing the role of
the village headman in Thailand characterizes him as a synaptic leader,
"In Ban Ping, and quite generally in Thailand, individual autonomy is 
highly regarded. Within the constraints of community life, the headrpan 
is probably more powerful than any other villager. In directing labour 
groups, organizing community enterprises, and conveying government orders 
his control over the behaviour of others is quite straightforward"2#
3
Kaufman characterizes the Thai village headman as a local 'big-man', and 
he stresses the dependency of the villagers on him.
The duties of the headman, according to the villagers of Na Chuak 
Nuea are to safeguard village welfare, maintain law and order, and to 
mediate between the village and local government officials. The style 
of leadership associated with the village headman has become radically 
transformed in recent years. Previously the village headman was complete­
ly identified with the village; his role as mediator or synaptor between 
the village and the nation-state was less developed. The village head­
man is now a regular government official with an annual salary, govern-
1 Weber, fl; op.cit; p.38
2 floerman, fl; "A Thai Village Headman as Synaptic Leader", Journal of Asian 
Studies, vol. 28, No.3, 1969, p.543
3 Kaufman,H; op.cit; p.34
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ment uniform and duties which more days than not, take him from the 
village to the local administrative cBntre, The necessary qualities 
of the present day village headman are an adequate Ib v bI of education, 
administrative ability and a personality type which permits easy 
communication with government officials. The former headman of Na 
Chuak Nuea was elected at the age of 40, and retained the post for 
twenty-five years, until 1974 when the government set a maximum agB 
limit of 60 years on holders of the office. The previous headman 
although greatly respected in the village had caused considerable 
discontent during his last years in office, when he set up house in 
another province with an eighteen year old minor wife, an arrangement 
which took him away from the village for long periods. During the 
years of his headmanship his role was that of a village father-figure, 
uniting the community and leading them. The new headman, Nai Thawin,
37 years old at his election, personifies the new style of leadership.
He has relinquished all participation in the family farm, conducts his 
administrative business in town each day, and is completely at ease 
with local government officials, many of whom visit his house socially 
for evening drinking sessions. ThB new headman was not born in the 
village but came from another neighbouring village seventeen years ago 
to ordain in the temple, and on leaving the monkhood he married a local 
girl. Prior to his election,he worked for the Royal Irrigation Department 
on survey work. On his election Nai Thawin retained the two former 
assistant headmen, Nai Khamta and Nai In. Nai Khamta^ assistant headman 
for fifteen years, seemed to be the natural successor to the old headman, 
however, he declined to stand in the elections because he felt he lacked 
ths necessary administrative abilities. Furthermore, his mother-in-law 
forbade him to stand, arguing that if elected he would have to neglect
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his farm and family. Nai Khamta fulfills many of the functions of 
the traditional headman, an expert farmer, familiar with all aspects 
of village life, he acts as a mediator and adviser in disputes arising 
within the village.
Yatsushiro has remarked on the lack of a single village pattern
for solving group problems or resolving common needs,
"which problem solving pattern and which village personalities appear 
as leaders depends upon the problem at hand"l.
This is certainly true in Na Chuak Nuea, and is illustrated by the roles 
of the headman and assistant headman, as discussed above. Furthermore, 
there are within the village a number of committees and associations, the 
members of which are elected by the community. These members form 
another important group of village leaders. The committees in the 
village for which representatives are elected include the Temple Committee, 
the School Committee, the Village Committee, the Water Users Association 
and the Water Senders Association, and there are also elected represent­
atives of the Land Co-operative. There is a certain amount of overlap in 
membership and this reflects the varying degree of importance of the 
leaders (see Fig. 4.12).
Thawin, the village headman, member of the School Committee, 
representative of the Water-Users Association and ditch-rider is rivalled 
by Sawat, a ditich-rider, member of the Temple Committee, and represent­
ative of the Land-Co-operative. The same age as the headman, 38, he 
unsuccessfully contended for village headmanship. As the Land-Co-op 
representative, responsible for tha organization of village loans, he 
holds an important position in village politics. Table 4.3. indicates
1 Yatsushiro, T; op.cit. p.112
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Fig. 4+12; Village Leaders, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975
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that this group of village leaders are drawn from different segments 
of the village community. There are young heads of nuclear households 
in their thirties and also older men, heads of extended households in 
their sixties. Many of these leaders have been born in the village; 
others have become residents since marriage. For the most part they 
are holders of adequate, if not substantial, land-holdings; village 
leaders, it would appear, are not drawn from the small land-holdar class. 
All but two are irrigated, which is of some significance. This does 
not necessarily mean that those with access to irrigation monopolize 
positions of leadership, because of their access to this new resource 
for as mentioned earlier, those now receiving irrigation water previously 
held the favourable low-lying paddy.
o
p . <D
• pq P Pa p PQ3 PQ o P
O o O d
Eh o o Oo o * Oo CD *\ •
0 ) *\ !—1 0 0 p
a 1 1 PQ
o CM o o
o o o O
d Eh o o o
M *s o
X CD
1—1 0 CM rH 0 0
« jp II II II II
0
Eh 1—1 CM CO
CM COCO CO
to
E-
m 10
to■H
lO
CO
CM O  O  CD lO  
CM ^  LO CM CM•H CO
i—I P
•HX XJ ">•H
■H
M M
00 CD
CD
00
CO
00 00 to 
CO CO CD CO
CO •H
CO
to a
<i -H •H
Eh EH 
(1)
CO -H
02
+J W H
c
Ctf *H  *H
P  ci oi
co iz; iz;
O P O P pq
•HhO cS 
ctf &
■H
175
In discussing village leadership it is necessary to mention the 
ritual officiants. There are two officiants in the village, Nai Orn 
and Nai Ta who are both in their 60's. They are called 'khon boran', 
men of ancient tradition, and hold their offices, not through election, 
but in virtue of special power and knowledge which they are believed to 
hold. Their power in the magico-ritual sphere stems in part from their 
previous temple experience. Nai Ta, who emigrated from another North­
east province 40 years ago, entered the monkhood as a novice, where he 
was instructed in 'special knowledge1. He is well-versed in Pali, and 
has in his possession certain magical texts. The ritual officiants 
have considerable power over the villagers, officiating at most village 
ceremonies, such as the Sukhwan and Sadq khrqj , and the placation of 
house spirits. The Sukhwan and Sadq khrq' bind the 'Khwan' - the soul - 
to the body, and are performed at times of uncertainty and transition: 
for example, during the marriage ceremony, prior to a long journey, 
during illness and after pregnancy. The animistic beliefs of the 
villagers are deeply embedded, and of fundamental importance, and the 
role of these ritual officiants 'as mediators between the mundane and the 
supernatural, and particularly as 'protectors' of the village, needs to 
be fully realized. The power of these officiants extends into all spheres 
of village life; they set auspicious days for ploughing, advise on the 
compatibility of marriage alliances, act as intermediaries in dispute 
cases, especially in cases of theft. During the last elections for 
headman, Nai Ta had an influential role in choosing the headman, advising 
many villagers to vote for Nai Thawin.
A distinction may be made here between the various positions of 
village authority on the basis of their primary orientations. Certain 
leadership roles are extra-village orientated, and the best empirical 
criteria for making this distinction rests on a) the location of meetings
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a.nd activities associated with certain positions of authority and 
b) the nature and scope of the contacts made by the incumbents of these 
positions* The meetings of the Temple, School and Village Committees 
are all held in the village, and the duties of the ritual officiants 
are for the most part also confined to the village community. Meetings 
of the Water Users Association and the Land-Coperative are both held in 
the local administrative centre, and the job of the 1ditch-rider1 is to 
consult with a zone-man in an office close to the district town. These 
latter positions require liaison with government officials and represent­
atives from other villages. Of course this distinction is not entirely 
clear cut, for the village as part of a 1tambon' (village cluster) is no 
longer an isolated unit, and the various committees which I suggest are 
’village orientated', on occasions involve themselves in extra-village 
activities. Nevertheless, I believe the distinction is an important 
one, and it has consequences for different styles of leadership. The 
incumbents of positions with an extra-village orientation are all 
younger men, and they represent the new style of village leader.
Kaufman has suggested that the Thai villager is not interested in 
power for its own sake, but because it exists as a prestige factor,^ and 
he argues that Buddhist values which emphasise non-aggressiveness, honesty 
and indifference to fortune and misfortune mediate against any strong 
drives for leadership and power. In Bangkhuad, Kaufman comments that 
households were autonomous, farmers were neither leaders nor followers* 
Foster makes the same point, he comments that in traditional peasant 
communities, villagers do not compete for authority by seeking leadership 
roles, "in peasant villages one notes a strong desire to look and act
1 Kaufman, H; op.cit; p.69
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like everyone else, to be inconspicuous in position and behaviour" .
Within Na Chuak I\lu8a it is possible to identify both political ambit­
iousness and reticence. I find it hard to make any meaningful 
generalization; not I believe as a consequence of any incomplete grasp 
of the situation, but because of the nature of the situation itself.
Village leadership includes a range of different styles, each with its 
different orientations, goals and rewards. Village leaders are both 
ambitious (the headman planning to stand in the * tambon* elections) and 
unassuming (the assistant headman declining to stand in the village 
elections). Thai village leadership is no longer simply one thing or 
the other, but a combination of different styles.
Wealth
The discussion now turns to a consideration of the role of wealth 
in the village; and its importance as a status indicator. In earlier 
chapters the increase in off-farm work opportunities was noted. The 
village economy can no longer be regarded as solely agricultural, although 
it is still predominantly so. The village income from crop sales for 
1975 was 24$> of the total income. Statistical tests show that those 
farmers with high crop incomes tend to be irrigated and those with low 
crop incomes, unirrigated (p = ,Ql), The following table highlights 
the differences in incomes between irrigated and non-irrigated farmers.
Table 4.4. Average Annual Income for Irrigated and Non-Irrigated Households
Ban Na Chuak Nuea,1975
Average annual
household income Irriqated l\lon-Irriqati
Total Crop Income 4,465.78 2,257.71
Rice Income 2,649.91 315.33
Upland Crop Income 900.23 1,400.67
Income from Wage 308.63 251.33
Labouring
Salaries and skilled 368.17 1,551.33
Labour
Total ca^h Income 12,144.48 8,962.2
1 Foster, G; 'Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Goodit? American 
Anthropologist, vol.67, 1965, p.303
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It can be seen that the non-irrigated farmers are receiving 
higher incomes from off-farm sources and from the upland cash crop 
sector. However, their significantly lower crop incomes are already 
beginning to be reflected in the total income figures. As second- 
cropping is still at an early stage it is to bB expected that its 
development will increase the emerging trend of an income disparity 
between those households receiving irrigation water and those who are 
not. Of course much depends upon the increase in off-farm work opport­
unities, although it seems doubtful that an increase in these opportunities 
will eradicate thB income disparity already existing. What then are the 
social implications of this growing disparity? To answer this question 
it is necessary to understand the role of wealth in the village.
Yatsushiro has written that . the possession of wealth in 
North-east Thailand does not automatically accrue to a person any 
appreciable degree of influence in the community. He states that wealth
must be employed in some recognised manner in order for the possesor to
1
achieve prestige and status. A wealthy person acquires status or prestige 
by either loaning money, or by making substantial contributions to the 
local temple. Yatsushiro, in what he terms an "attitude-survey", found
that only 6% of his sample recognised any relationship between leadership
2
and wealth. Kaufman suggests that wealth plays an important, though at
3
times subtle, role in Bangkhuad . He notes that a wealthy farmer in the 
village is in a position to exert pressure on many other farmers. Others 
turn to him in order to borrow or rent tools and land, and for loans, and 
once the transaction is made the debtor is obligated in many small ways 
throughout the year. However, Kaufman notes that wealth without proper 
behaviour results in contempt and malicious gossip. Kaufman also suggests
1 Yatsushiro,T; op.cit; p.94
2 Ibid. p .65
3 Kaufman,Aj op.cit; p.36
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that the status of the land-less in the village is not so low as they
percieve it to be, and he suggests that their feelings of inferiority are
only partially due to the attitudes of others and has much to da with
their own feelings af guilt at not being able to contribute to the temple.
Nevertheless, Kaufman notes that the village headmen are usually wealthy
persons elected because of their financial status,^ So it would appear
that there is some correlation between wealth and power. However, in
many cases it may well be that wealth is accumulated during headmanship.
This appears to be the case in Na Chuak Nuea where the headman's wealth
has increased substantially since his election, mostly due to his ability
to acquire large loans.
A related issue is the peasant attitude towards the accumulation of
2
wealth, foster, with his model of "Limited-Good" argued that a peasant
society is characterized by certain irreducible characteristics which
have to do with economic conditions. Land is completely allocated,
agricultural technology is relatively inefficient, and wealth is both
scarce and unexpandable, the 'pie', so to speak, is of constant size.
Foster analysed the peasant community as a closed system with fixed
resources, and this he argued accounts for the peasant's "cognitive
one
orientation" which views^man's gain as another man's loss. Furthermore, 
he argued that the peasant sees little relationship between work and 
production techniques on the one hand and the acquisition of wealth on 
the other. He writes,
"wealth, like land is something inherent in nature, it can be divided up 
and passed around in various ways, but within the framework of the 
villager's traditional world, it does not grow" 3.
1 Ibid; p.56
2 Foster, G; "Interpersonal Relations in Peasant Society", Human 
Organization, no. 19, 1960, pp.174-178
3 Foster, G; (1965), op.cit; p.298
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Criticism has been levelled against Foster's characterization of
1 2peasant societies as closed systems, notably by Kennedy and Piker .
I do not feel qualified to speak in depth on the cognitive orientations 
of the villagers of Na Chuak Nuea; however, a few comments may be made * 
in respect of Foster's statement. Wealth in Na Chuak Nuea is visibly 
expandable. Rising crop prices, the rising productivity of land, 
increased opportunities to earn incomes outside the village are constant 
indicators that the 'pie' is expandable. Certainly in the village there 
have been and still are strong levelling mechanisms, kinship ethics and 
religious duty stress giving and sharing, but these values are based on 
strong community ties, rather than on any notion that a rich man must 
redistribute his wealth because he could only have gained that wealth 
through depriving others of it. This is not to say that wealth is not 
envied. Most of the cases of malicious gossip I encountered were 
directed against the richer members of the community, and were made not 
by the poorest, but middle-range households.
Wealth can be defined as the sum total of assets, property or thei. 
value of legally established rights possessed by an individual household.
The researcher faces a number of problems when attempting to assess the 
wealth of peasant households. Fine distinctions have to be made between 
assets productively used, and assets held (perhaps unproductively due 
to labour constraints), also different land types make land pricing 
difficult. In a peasant society estimation of wealth is based on more than 
a mere calculation of certain quantitative factors, a series of qualitat­
ive factors naed to be considered. These qualititative factors relate
1 Kennedy, 3; "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good. A Critique".
American Anthropologist. 68, 1966, p.1217
2 Piker, S; "The Image of Limited Good:Comments on an Exercise in
Description and Interpretation". American Anthropologist, 68, 1966,p.1206
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to a society's system of values. It is only by comprehending this 
'ideology of wealth' that a researcher can with any validity comment on 
the implications of an emerging income disparity. If the possession of 
certain assets or the acquisition of different sources of income are 
differentially evaluated, then an expansion of different branches of 
the village economy will have different implications for the social 
system.
The Ideology of Wealth
In order to understand the village ideology of wealth in Na Chuak 
Nuea it was necessary to discover who the villagers themselves considered 
to be rich and who poor, and to examine these statements in the light 
of available data, to determine which criteria had been used in each 
estimation. Here I am interested in finding out whether wealth is 
assessed on the amount of land owned, the income coming into a household, 
herd size or whatever,
Firstly it was necessary to treat the notion of wealth as a 
relative concept. To ask a Na Chuak Nuea villager to name a rich man 
in the village (khon ramruay) would result in a response such as "no 
one is rich here, the rich all live in the town". Nevertheless, they 
are very aware that certain of their fellows are richer and some much 
richer. Thirty-eight farmers during individual interviews were asked to 
rank each other (i.e, the 37 others) as richer (mi kwa, to have more), 
of equal wealth standing (muankan, the same) or poorer (conkhwa, to be 
poorer). A ranking was then made on the basis of the responses, that 
household being ranked richer by the greater number of other households 
being ranked first and so forth. This ranking was then compared with the 
income ranking for the same year. Statistical tests1 showed that there
1 Spearmans Rank Correlation with tied correction
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was a weak correlation between the two (r = 0.373). This is a reflection 
of the instability of income; the income entering into a household in 
any one year fluctuates, and therefore the income figures provide only 
a rough measure of wealth. Throughout each interview it was clear 
that each villager had a very clear picture in his own mind of the relative 
wealth of each household compared with his own.
Before discussing the ideology of wealth in this Thai rural village
i t  is p e r t i n e n t  here to refer to a study by Turton, conducted in Chiengrai
Province. Turton1 found that in his village households divided themselves
into wealth categories for thB purpose of temple contributions. The
three-fold categorization made by households revealed not only differences
in wealth but also different patterns of consumption and different
relations of production. Category 1 contained households with large
land holdings; they owned good houses, had money to spare and never
worked for a wage. Category 2 contained' households who have some land,
but also work for wages, and Category 3 was composed of land-lBss
households predominantly wage-labouring. Turton comments:
"villagers can conceptualize the three categories as distinct socio­
economic types of household1^ .
The self-ranking wealth index of the l\la Chuak Nuea villagers 
suggests that a similar categorization of socio-economic classes. The 
ranking has been reduced to three categories, those households ranked 
1-12 fall into category 1, those ranked 13-26 constitute category 2, 
and households ranked 27-38, category 3.
1 Turton, A; Northern Thai Peasant Society. A Case Study of Jural and
Political Structures at the Village Level and their Twentieth 
Century Transformations. (Ph.D), London, 1975
2 Ibid; p.164
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Table 4.5. Economic Characteristics of Households by Category,
Ban IMa Chuak Nuea, 1975
Average 
Land Owned
Average 
Land Planted
Number
Hiring
Labour
Number
Wage Labour­
ing
Number
Irrigated
Category 1 
(No= 12)
36 23 8 2 10
Category 2 
(N = 14)
34 17 7 5 9
Category 3 
(N = 12
19* 9 4 8 3
* 1 household is landless.
Category 1 are the large landowners; most of these households hire wage 
labourers for agriculture, but only a few themselves wage-labour. Further­
more they are predominantly households with irrigated holdings. House­
holds in Category 2 are also large land holders, but they cultivate 
smaller areas of their holding, fflany of these households hire in labour­
ers, some are also wage labouring, and most of them have irrigated 
holdings. Category 3 is composed of the small land holders. Uhile some 
of these households hire in labourers the majority of them are wage- 
labouring, and for the most part they are households without access to 
irrigation.
The wealth rank clearly reflects different socio-economic classes 
within the village, distinguished by the amounts of land owned and 
planted, and in the relations of production. In some respects the 
ranking falls into two distinct groupings. Those households with irrig­
ation being ranked at the top, those without irrigation water at the 
bottom. The wealth index also reflects the developmental cycle of the 
household: those households at the initial stage Types 1 and II (newly 
formed households with young and adolescent children) congregate at
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the bottom end of the scale. Established households (ill, IV, V), 
both simple nuclear types with adult unmarried children, and the extended 
type with attached son-in-law units are consistently ranked at the top 
end of the scale.
Table 4.6. Wealth-Rank and Household Structure, Ban Na Chuak Nuea, 1975
Household Structure
Ranks 1 - 1 8
19 - 38
Types I, II III. IV. V
5 14
12
1
7
(JC =5.2, p= .025)
It was noted previously that the wealth-rank produced a weak 
correlation with the total income figures. Table 4.7. indicates that 
although category 1 households are predominantly in the top income 
brackets and category 3 are predominatly in the lowest income bracket; 
nevertheless the middle group income earners for 1975 are drawn from 
all three categories:
Table 4.7. Wealth-Rank and Total Household Income. Ban Na Chuak Nuea,
1975
Total Income in baht
Wealth Ranking 16,000+ 15,999-8,000 7,999-0
Category 1,N=12 5 5 2
Category 2,N=14 5 4 5
Category 3,N=12 1 4 7
18 5
Table 4.8. Wealth-Rank and Major Source of Income. Ban Na Chuak Nuea,
1975
Source of largest portion of Income
Wealth Ranking Salary
Crop
Sales
Livestock
Wage
Labouring
Others'
Category 1,N=12 4 4 2 0 2
Category 2,N=14 2 7 2 0 3
Category 3,N=12 2 2 2 6 0
Others - trading, remittances, rents and interest
Table 4*8. shows that households in Category 1 have attained most of 
their income from salaries and crop sales, while households in Category 
2 are deriving most of their income from either crop sales, or ’other' 
sources: trading, remittances etc; the major source of income from 
category 3 households is wage-labouring.
There is also a spatial distribution evident, both in respect of 
the location of the holdings, and the residence patterns of the three 
categories. Map 4.1. shows that all households in Category 1, excepting 
one case have holdings to the right of the Main Canal (irrigated or 
potentially irrigated land). Many of these plots form a belt to the 
North-east of the village, close to the road. This belt has traditionally 
been considered one of the most fertile areas. Households in Category 3 
have holdings in the west of the Canal (3 of them lie off the map). The 
plots owned by households in Category 2 are somewhat more dispersed. Map 
4.2. illustrates the way in which the village residence patterns also 
reflect the grouping. Category 1 households are found in the central 
portions of the village, Category 3 households occur on the perimeter, 
and category 2 households, for the most part, are found in between the 
two.
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It appears from this analysis that the village ideology of wealth 
is still to a degree constructed around an evaluation of the traditional 
systems of resources. Those households ranked at the top of the wealth 
scale hold plots of land which prior to the introduction of irrigation 
were located in the most fertile areas. Irrigation and its possibilities 
for second-cropping, and the expansion of upland cash-cropping have 
transformed the production profile of the village. In certain respects 
the evaluation of a household's wealth is related to the ownership of 
certain types of resource, rather than the use of that resource. An 
upland farmer growing cassava and obtaining a high crop income is still 
considered poorer than a household holding a good piece of lowland but 
doing little with it. In this respect the village ideology of wealth 
is still embedded into the traditional system of subsistence rice 
production rather than being orientated to the commercialisation of 
agriculture.
The socio-economic categories implicit in the village wealth ranking 
take account of a number of factors: resource endowment (the size of a 
holding, its location, and access to irrigation), relations of product­
ion (whether a household is hiring in labour or wage-labouring), the 
major sources of income, and the developmental cycle of the household.
The Emergence of Class Structure
In a recent work Potter proposes a new model of Thai social 
structure. He argues that despite the immense variation in Thai village 
structure certain fundamental structural features may be seen to generate 
rural communities. One of these principles is class.
"Class stratification based upon ownership of land is one of the principle
social structural elements in all Thai villages"!.
1 Patter, 0; Thai Social Structure, Chicago, 1976, p.149
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For those rural communities where a tenancy problem exists the
notion of class is applicable. Potter refers to studies made in
1 2  3
Bangkhuad , Bang Chan , and Banoi in the Central Plains where large
numbers of households own no land. In Bangkhuad, 34% of the households
rent in all their land; in Bang Chan 44% are renters and in Banoi 80%
are either landless or own holdings of less than 5 rai. In Ch'iangmai
village where Potter conducted fieldwork, 32.5% of the community owned
no land at all. However, when discussing those rural areas of Thailand
where tenancy problems on the whole are undeveloped, Potter appears to
construe classes from economic strata distinguished by holding size. In
a study of Baan Phraan Fluan in the North-east Tambiah comments;
"there is very little renting in or renting out of land, and landlord 
tenant categories are not important in the village economy,,. The hierarchy 
in the village is primarily of a generational nature rather than a creature 
of economic maldistribution"^.
Although Tambiah maintains that class divisions in Baan Phraan 14,uan
do not exist4 Potter, on his reading of the data maintains that there must
be important class differentiation based upon the different amounts of
land owned; and in wealth differences. Potter writes:
"The North-eastern villages, located in the poorest part of Thailand, 
show internal class differentiation, but it is less marked than in other 
regions of Thailand"^.
In attempting to integrate rural communities, with low incidence of
land renting and landlessness into an all-embracing modBl, Potter invalidates
his own argument by equating social class with differentiation. In the
last analysis Potter's class divisions are no more than socio-economic
1 Kaufman,H; op.cit.
2 3anlekha,l<; A Study of the Economy of a Rice Growing Village in Central
Thailand, Bangkok,1955
3 Piker, S; An Examination of Character and Socialization in a Thai Peasant
Community, (Ph.D), Washington, 1964
4 Tambiah, S; Buddhism and 5pirit Cults in North-east Thailand, Cambridge,
1970, p.23
5 Potter,3; op.cit; p.183
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strata. The ’class situation’ only emerges when a common consciousness 
between class-members arises.
"In fact, a class does not constitute a unity simply because, from the 
point of v/iew of economic analysis , its income has a single and identical 
source; from all appearances, there must also be a certain psychological 
community, and a possibly^sense of unity or even a desire for common 
action"
Turton concludes in his analysis of Northern Thai peasantry:
"It is certainly true that the classes of peasantry discussed ... by 
and large, lack the autonomy of classes which possess their own specific 
forms of consciousness and political organization''^,
In Na Chuak Nuea wealth differentiation reflected a division of 
households into three strata-based on ownership of land, relations of 
production, and major sources of income. It was also found that the 
scheme--of differentiation reflected the developmental cycle of the house­
hold. Therefore an element of mobility is implicit within the system. 
This mobility is one factor which will hinder the emergence of any class 
structure based on the present socio-economic categories,. ■ Turton in disc­
ussing" socio-economic categories in his analysis comments:
"mobility between categories may be to some extent a phenomenon connected 
with the developmental cycle of domestic g r o u p s " ^ .
and furthermore
"To the extent that there is some mobility due to developmental factors 
this is likely to add to the blurring of the sharpness of economic 
differentiation in the consciousness of villagers"^.
As well as an inherent element of mobility within the scheme of
differentiation, there exists a variety of ties of a vertical nature
linking households in one group with another. If the kinship ties
1 Aron, R; Plain Currents in Sociological Thought. Harmondsworth, 1965,
p. 165
2 Turton, A; op.cit; p.186
3 Ibid; p.173
4 Ibid; p.174
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between households in each of the three socio-economic categories are
mapped for Na Chuak Nuea, there is no apparent clustering of kinship
ties within each category, ties of kinship create vertical alliances
between the categories.
Furthermore within the village there is an ethic of egalitarianism.
Villagers maintain that everyone in the same ''fehuk khon pen muan kan1,
Turton found a similar ethic in his Northern village, where individuals
were reluctant to bB regarded as different from others. In this context
1
Turton speaks of a lack of fit between ideology and daily reality . It
is the multiplicity of vertical ties within the local village community
which prevents at present the realization of class structures.
"The vertical segmentation of peasants into local communities, clans 
and groups and the differentiation of interests within these communities 
themselves has made for difficulties in crystallizing nationwide aims 
and symbols"^
The emergence of class differences within the village is also prevented
S s <r
to an extent, by the solidarity felt by a rural community viz a viz the 
non-peasant classes: the town dwellers, and the government officials. 
Although some villagers are aligning themselves with the urban sector 
(for example the irrigation guards and the village headman) and imitating 
urban styles of life (adopting urban dress, eating non-glutinous rice) 
they nevertheless are still more a part of their own local community 
than any other*
It was noted earlier that the wealthiest households are aware of 
the importance of secondary education, and many of their children are 
now being sent to Kalasin town to further their education. From the
1 Ibid; p.188
2 Shanin, T; "Peasants as a Political Factor", in Peasants and Peasant 
Society, Harmondsworth, 1971, p.255
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1975 sample, 5 of the category. 1 households and 3 of the category 2 
households were providing their children, both sons and daughters, with 
secondary education, while none of the children of category 3 households 
have received more than four years (if that) of primary education.
The chapter began with an analysis of socio-economic mobility in 
the village between 1971-1975, It emerged that patterns of mobility 
are still a function of the developmental cycle with simple nuclear 
households displaying stability or descending mobility and extended type 
households displaying stability or ascending mobility. Shanin suggests 
that this fluctuation in the peasant system of stratification prevented, 
in the case of the pre-revolutionary Russian peasantry, the crystall­
ization of class lines. The introduction of irrigation, by increasing 
production, and through the employment of salaried guards, will tend 
to regulate the village economy which traditionally has been unstable.
The possibilities of a resultant formation of socio-economic classes 
were examined. To this purpose stratification by status was discussed 
and the importance, as status indicators, of age, sex, religious office, 
education, leadership and wealth were considered. A distinction was 
made between status distinctions expressed contextually, e.g. the 
senior-junior relationship expressed on ceremonial and formal occasions, 
and those status distinctions that permeate all spheres of village life 
in the clergy-lay distinction and distinctions relating to levels of 
education. In discussing the positions of leadership it emerged that 
different styles of leadership, exist within the village; a traditional 
form, characterized by mediation between fellow villagers, and a new
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stylB, monopolized by younger men, characterized by mediation between 
the village and local officials outside the village. In analysing 
wealth differentiation, as perceived by the villagers themselves, 
certain patterns emerged. The scheme of differentiation reflected 
both fluidity: the developmental cycle, and rigidity; resource endowment; 
the availability of irrigation water. The scheme of differentiation 
also reflected a division of households into three strata.
Category A: a group of large landowners, mostly irrigated, 
predominantly hiring in labour, with some renting out land; Category C, 
a group of small holders, some landless, most unirrigated, predominantly 
selling their labour, and Category B, a middle group sharing a number of 
the features of the other two, many wage-labouring, and many hiring in 
labour. It was argued that superimposed upon this system of different­
iation there is a pattern of status distinction, which together with 
ties of kinship and locality produce, in the last analysis, a criss 
cross of ties of alliance of a vertical nature which effectively blur 
any horizontal ties emanating from a stratification based on resource 
endowment and the relations to the means of production. However, the 
indications are that certain categories of villagers are re-investing 
a portion of their wealth in the education of their children. This 
fact alone, will play a decisive role in creating a new status group 
within the village, a status group which, with superior earning ability 
and a town orientated consciousness, may ultimately crystallize into 
a social class.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the previous chapters some of the salient characteristics 
of a socio-economic system were examined. In this chapter I shall 
draw together the main points of the argument in order to assess
a) the theoretical contribution of this study to our knowledge of 
rural Thai communities, and more generally, to peasant studies, and
b) the value of the anthropological perspective to a multi-disciplinary 
project.
In Ban i\la Chuak Nuea land, an important factor of production, 
is of two types: low-lying irrigable land, and higher land which can 
not receive gravity irrigation. The lowland is still predominantly 
allocated through inheritance, and the distribution of land on the 
death of patents, or before, articulates with a matrilineal ideology 
(that is, from the point of view of the new male head of household, 
affinal inheritance, through his wife). This articulation is adjusted 
by fagtars such as the amount of land to be distributed, the structure 
of the sibling group (number of siblings and age-sex ratios) and each 
sibling's present standing (whether each sibling has already inherited 
affinally, through their own spouse).
Allocation of the upland by purchase is becoming increasingly 
important. The upland, traditionally considered marginal to the 
productive system was frequently inherited by sons. Recently, since 
the kenaf boom in the 1950's the upland has become increasingly important 
for cash crop production. It was found that the different patterns of 
acquisition between these two types of land contribute to two distinct
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forms of land tenure which articulate differently with the social 
structure.
Much of the lowland is composed of adjoining plots, held by 
close matrilineal kinsmen, but not entirely, depending upon the 
compromise made between ideology and demographic fact (number of 
siblings and their sexes). For the lowland the pattern of tenure 
reflects approximately the residential structure of the village.
For the upland the correspondanc8 is slight, although in some areas 
brothers hold adjoining plots.
The new irrigation system: water sent according to schedule, 
an organization requiring new forms of co-operation among fellow 
villagers and non-villagers, has been imposed upon a pre-existing 
system of land use. The irrigation system has created certain areas 
of conflict at different levels within the structure, kinsman and 
kinsman, villager with non-villager, village with village, village 
with the government official. However, the hierarchical and segmentary 
nature of the organization, producing contexts of dispute to be 
reconciled on another level, offers some stability overall. The 
impact of irrigation can be seen to have altered the traditional labour 
exchange groups, and hired labour especially from outside of the village 
is increasing. Livestock - water-buffalo to plough, are now commonly 
hired from other villagers as livestock specialization, another'issult 
of irrigation, develops.
From the consideration of the distribution and allocation of 
certain factors of production, the analysis proceeded with an account
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of the utilization of certain resources, and glutinous rice production 
was reviewed. Following Sahlins it was argued that production levels 
in this still predominantly subsistence branch of production could be 
examined, in order to determine the economic co-efficient of the 
social system, that is, the degree to which elements of social organ­
ization influence the economic intensity of household production. The 
introduction of irrigation has fundamentally altered the overall system. 
Prior to the introduction of irrigation, production levels, while 
obviously influenced by the environmental factor, were also closely 
related to the development cycle of the household, with nuclear house­
holds producing above subsistence levels. It was proposed that the 
relations between the household labour force and the head of household 
(complete dependence of the labour force on the head of the nuclear 
household,and a labau.r force striving for independence from the head 
of the extended household) were an important factor. Expansion and 
dispersion, as different stages in the developmental cycle of the 
household, had different implications for resource utilization.
Resources, whether utilized adequately or utilized optimumly, depended 
upon the structure of the household. The irrigation system was to 
superimpose itself upon this pre-existing system of resource utilization. 
Those households now producing above the basic subsistence needs of 
its members are predominantly those receiving irrigation water. Before 
the implementation of the irrigation system resource utilization 
(specifically glutinous rice production) was subject to fluctuations 
which related to the environmental factor, and to the structure of the 
household. Since the introduction of irrigation a measure of stability 
has been imposed, there are now two distinct groups in the village 
those who have water (mi nam) and those who do not (mai mi nam).
197
As rice production has increased, the pattern of distributions 
made to the temple (another e^mple of an institution outside of the 
household impinging on production levels) has significantly altered 
since the introduction of irrigation, with many villages donating 
smaller amounts of paddy, but money has recently become an important 
component of temple contributions. Having considered the most 
important sector of the village economy, glutinous rice production, 
the discussion then broadened to examine other forms of economic 
activities, both agricultural: cash cropping, dry season cropping and 
non-agricultural, and here the analysis was confined to trading 
activities, and occupations outside of the village. In this section 
certain patterns of response to opportunity were discussed, and it 
emerged that opportunity response could be related to resource 
endowment, and certain structural factors: the composition of the
household, the age of the household head, the wider kin group, and 
residential patterns. Those marginal to the traditional subsistence 
system were displaying higher responses to cash-cropping on the upland, 
and second-cropping on the lowland; those favourably endowed: the large 
land-holders, were seeking salaried office outside the village, and 
many were engaged in trade activities. Epstein’s model was employed in 
order to determine which features of the socio-economic system were 
inimical or conducive to economic development, the conclusion being 
that certain features of the social structure were likely to impede 
economic development, in particular the patterns of residence and 
inheritance, and certain village values: the value of leisure, the 
traditional time-horizon and expenditure on the temple. Choice, whether 
to re-invest in the productive system or to buy a consumer item and 
village expenditure patterns were also examined. It was postulated that
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no categorization of households into investors or consumers was 
valid, given the' limited range of consumer items. The recent opport­
unity to obtain credit was reviewed; while the richer members of 
the community appear to be in a more favourable position to utilize 
the credit facilities, the analysis of the membership of one co-operative 
suggested that kinship ties were an important factor in determining 
membership.
In the final chapter the patterns of socio-economic mobility 
between the two study years were examined and these patterns were then 
related to the structure of the household. In order to examine the 
hypothesis that economic development often results in the crystallization 
of rural communities into classes, the patterns of village stratific­
ation were discussed. The major status distinctions: senior-junior, 
lay-clergy, male-female were reviewed, and the importance of education, 
leadership and wealth as status indicators was examined. On the basis 
of a scale of wealth differentiation, as perceived by the villagers, 
it was argued that the system of stratification can be viewed as the 
emergence of a three-class system, with a group of large irrigated 
landowners, predominantly hiring labour, a middle group both hiring 
labourers and wage labouring, and a bottom group: small unirrigated 
landowners, predominantly wage labouring. However the horizontal 
lines between these strata are criss-crossed by vertical alignments 
relating to the status-systsm and to ties of kinship and locality.
Thus it was concluded that the three strata-distinguished by relations 
of production, as yet have produced no class consciousness, although 
the role of education in the village (specifically the educational 
aspirations that the wealthier households now hold for their children) 
will play a decisive role in creating class differences. Socio-economic 
differentiation, as perceived by the villagers, is both a process,
(the developmental cycle, it was demonstrated, is a component in their 
evaluation) and a permanent fact (to have irrigation water or not).
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The analysis has evolved around two main themes, resource 
endowment and certain social structural principles. Resources, whether 
land, labour or water are organized and utilized in correspondence 
with structural principles; whether they be the composition of the 
household, the wider kin group (and the associated residence pattern).
I would stress that I do not postulate any kind of causative relation­
ship here between these two conceptual abstractions: resources and 
structural principles. For example, it cannot be argued tha't the land 
holding pattern is what it is because of a prevailing ideology of 
inheritance, when that ideology itself was generated by the resources 
at hand. Resources - their distribution, allocation, organization 
and utilization are components of a socio-economic system. The intro­
duction of a new resource into this system can be seen to alter the 
relationship and balance between resources and certain structural 
principles.
The transformation process, especially in the early years of 
change, is a process whereby a previously balanced ecological system 
becomes disrupted. The transformation process has altered a socio­
economic system which was to a degree fluid, and subject to fluctuations 
relating to environmental conditions and to the structure of the house­
hold. Since the introduction of irrigation this fluidity has tended to 
crystallize; the variations in environmental conditions and household 
structure now play a less significant role in influencing production 
levels.
One of the aims of the research was to illustrate with empirical 
data that the 1loose-structure! paradigm was inapplicable as an all- 
embracing general model for Thai society, a paradigm initiated by
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Sharp et al who wrote of
"The exceptionally amorphous, relatively unstructured character of
all Thai society
2
an argument which gave credence to Embree’s work , thus setting a
tradition followed by Wilson (who described Embree's concept of
4 5
loose-structure a ’felicitous bit of jargon’), Phillips , Piker and
6 7
Hanks . The tradition generated a modified approach begun by Hanks
8
and developed by Van Roy and Cornehls : the loosely-structured "entourage"
9,
- an approach labelled by Potter as "loose-structure in a new guise" *
The tradition has long had its critics: de Yaung^, Amyot^, Moerman*^
1 Sharp,Lj et.al; Siamese Rice Village: A Preliminary Study of Bang Chan,
1948-1949,Bangkok, p.26
2 Embree,3; "Thailand, a Loosely Structured Social System", American 
Anthropologist, 52, 1950, p.181-93
3 Wilson,D; Politics in Thailand, Ithaca, 1962, p.46
4 Philips,H; Thai Peasant Personality: The Patterning of Interpersonal 
Behaviour in the Village of Bang Chan; Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965
5 Piker,Sj"1 Loose Structure1 and the Analysis of Thai Social Organization" 
in Evers,H; Loosely Structured Social Systems: Thailand in Comparative 
Perspective, New Haven, 1969
6 Hanks,L; Rice and Han, Chicago, 1972
7 Hanks,Lj "The Thai Social Order as Entourage and Circle", in Skinner,G;
and KirschjM; (eds) Change and Persistence in Thai Society: Essays in 
Honor of Lauriston Sharp,Ithaca, 1975
8 Van Roy,E; and Cornehls,0; "Economic Development in Mexico and Thailand: 
An Institutional Analysis, Part Two", Journal of Economic Issues, 3,1969
g Potter,J? Thai Peasant Social Structure,Chicago, 1976,p.18 P*21“30
10 de Young,0; Village Life in Modern Thailand, Berkely and Los Angeles,1955
11 Amyot,D; Provisional Paper on Changing Patterns of Social Structure in 
Thailand,1851-1965, Delhi, 1965
12 Moerman,!^; "Bang Ping’s Temple: The Centre of a 'Loosely Structured’ 
Society", in NashjM; (ed) Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism, 
New Haven, 1966
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and recent studies by Turton, Davies , Tambiah and Keyes , in Potter’s
words
5
"Shatter once and for all the loose-structure paradigm"
But as Potter remarks
"old myths have a way of persisting; and even today the loose-structure 
paradigm, although controversial, influences anthropological thinking 
within the ranks of Thai specialists. Outside the field of Thai studies, 
the loose-structure model remains the most widely accepted characterizat- 
of rural Thailand" 6.
In Potters most recent work he isolates a number of structural elementsy
which, he maintains, can be seen to generate Thai rural communities: the
extended-stern family cycle, the bilateral kindred, neighbourliness and 
neighbourhoodst
formal-^ co-operative labour exchange groups, the junior-senior relation­
ship, class and status divisionss, entourages, political factions,
7
administrative hamlets, the village community and the temple . His 
analysis can in certain respects be criticized together with the 
tradition he attempts to discuss, for overly broad generalization. 
Although the concluding chapter of his latest work is entitled ’Form 
and variation', in the final analysis the variation is omitted from 
his paradigm due to the too strict imposition of structural form*
While such an exercise may be required for the purpose of debunking 
a tenacious theme as a theoretical contribution the analysis, which
1 Turton, A; "Patrilineal Descent Groups and Spirit Cults of the Thai-
Yuan in Northern Thailand". Journal of the Siam Society, 6o,1972,pp.217-56
2 Davis,R; "Muang Patrifocality"; Journal of the Siam Society, 61,1973,
pp.53-62
3 Tambiah,S; BucJdhiem and Spirit Cults in North-east Thailand, Cambridge,ig7Q
4 Keyes,C; "Review of 'Thai Peasant Personality', by Herbert P. Phillips", 
American Anthropologist,68,1966,p.793-94
5 Potter, J; op.cit; .p,'l48
6 Ibid;p. 10
7 Ibid;p.149
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isolates certain structural principles, fails to synthesise the
expression of these principles. Thus I argued that class-structure,
in my view inappropriately employed by Potter (taking no account of
class consciousness), exists within the system but is counterpoised,
and thus not realized in an empirical sense, due to the interaction
of the other structural elements. Potter's work is invaluable as a
contribution to the theoretical literature of Thailand, but is incomplete, 
mis
and thus open toftinterpretation until the exact interaction of all 
structural elements as a synthesis is formulated.
Shanin in 1966 wrote that the main stream of contemporary sociology 
had by-passed the traditional peasantry, and that a few sociologists 
had so far elevated the peasantry from the footnote to the page'*'.
During ' the last decade a large number of anthropological works have 
contributed to our knowledge of the peasantry. The task is now to 
re-consid8r a number of accepted generalizations of peasant types.
I refer here specifically to certain labels; the 'hirer* and the 'hired', 
and the 'innovator', I attempted to illustrate in this study that a 
range of types exist. Households hiring labour were thosB requiriing 
additional labour to meet a household shortage, and also those replacing 
their labour - two distinct types, with different theoretical implic­
ations, Those hired cover a wide range of types: whether resident 
adolescents, temporary kinsmen hired on a day by day basis, workers from 
outside the village, poor households supplementing the labour of richer 
ones, or replacing it, or wealthy large households providing a younger 
member (the commercialization of previous labour-exchange groups). In
1 Shanin,T; "Peasantry as a Political Factor", in Peasants and Peasant 
Societies, 1971, p.261. (First published Sociological Review, vol.14, 
no.l, 1966, pp.5-27)
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a study of change and transformation, especially when it is at an 
organizational stage''', theoretical typest ’the hirer', typified as the 
well-endowed, with ownership of the mean;$ of production, and the 
hired - as the landless labourer, on application threaten to obscure 
the multiplicity and variation.of empirical facts. Again, for the 
innovator there is no one type, but an array of types, each type to 
be explained by different factors, whether resource endowment or 
structural form.
Generalization, an invaluable tool of analysis, frequently pre­
empts theoretical development. Furthermore while attempts are made
2
to compound the features of a peasantry into an all-embracing type 
the variation in form and type of peasant communities equally needs to 
be accommodated into the theoretical literature. Having conducted 
this study, it seems clear that the study village is representative 
of a type of peasant community, at an intermediary stage of development 
between one village Ban Nonej *K»aw, some six kilometres to the west, and 
to another, Ban Turn, some 10 kilometres to the south, two other 
villages in which I worked. These three villages differ in their 
size, accessibility and the resources at hand, their household structures, 
styles of village leadership, and marriage patterns, Nong Kaw - a 
remote upland, unirrigatsd village, produces rice at a subsistence, and 
in many years, sub-subsistence level. It has a strong expression of 
local community spirit expressed through music and dance, a tendency 
towards hereditary leadership (the present headman is the son-in-law 
of the former office-holder), and a high rate of village endogamy.
1 Organizational as opposed to structural change. For an explanation 
see page 148
2 Shanin,T; op.cit; p.14
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Na Chuak Nuea, twice the size of Nong Kaw, now with two distinct types 
of leadership in co-existence represents a village at an intermediate 
stage of development between Nong Kaw and Ban Turn; a very large village, 
a sub-district centre, headed by an entirely new type of leader - a 
charismatic 'big-man1, very wealthy by village standards, and wbI I  
educated (the former headmaster). The form of Thai villages albeit 
in a general manner has been elucidated, the task now remains to 
accommodate features of variation into a theoretical model.
As a social scientist working with geographers and economists 
my own perspectives, if not changed, have been altered. The importance 
of the environmental factor, the value of carefully collected 
quantitative data, and the value of statistical analysis are only 
a few of the benefits resulting from this research experience. The 
contribution of this study to the multi-disciplinary project from which 
it evolved, is a contribution of perspective. I have attempted to 
elucidate the manner in which social structural principles whether 
they be the structure of the household, of the wider kin group or of 
residence, pattern the organization, allocation and utilization of 
resources, and also the response to opportunity. The anthropological 
perspective needs to be fully integrated into the final analysis, and 
not relegated to the footnote. Human labour is something much more 
than activity to be divided into 'man-days' (a unit of measure whereby 
the number of workers and number of days worked are compounded into 
one figure)^". Demographic differences between households with respect 
to rice production are something more than differences in household
1 See DeFlaine,H; The Use of Labour Resources, Lam Pao Report Series 
No,4, 1974
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size, upland and lowland contrasts are fundamentally much more
than differences in the inundation potential of soils, differences
2
in crops grown, and differences in the size of holdings . Lack of 
response to opportunity need not go hand in hand with unprogressive- 
ness, irrationality, inertia, nor the failure of extension work. 
Resource endowment and social structural principles interact, coalesce 
and reflect each other. Any discipline seeking to understand the 
organization of a peasant agricultural community must take account 
of the multi-dimensional nature of the situation.
1 See Dixon,C; The Patterns of Rural Paddy Production and Consumption, 
Lam Pao Report Series, no.5, 1974
2 See Ng,R; The Land Holding Pattern, Lam Pao Report Series, no.2,1974
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Appendix 
T ranscription
The Thai words used in this thBsis (except for common place names) 
have been transcribed according to the general system of the Royal 
Institute (see 'Notification of the Royal Institute concerning the 
Transcription of Thai characters into the Roman', Journal of the Siam 
Society, vol«33, part 1, March 1941,pp49-59). The system is as 
follows:
Vowels
Italian vowels except that
a© = sound of ea in English 'bear'
g = sound of aw in English 'dawn'
oe = sound of eu in French 'peuple'
u* = sound more open than German u
Consonants
English consonants except that
Initial k p t are unaspirated as in French 
Final k p and t are unexplosive and unaspirated 
kh = k aspirated 
ph = p aspirated 
th = t aspirated
ch = hardened form of ch as the cz in Czech 
ch = always as in English 'church' 
ng = as in English 'singer'
1 rai s
1 acre =
34.5 bajrt= 
1 baht =
Conversions 
.40 acre
2.5 rai 
£1
2.9p,
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